This article traces the contours of a historical entanglement that characterised the socio-religious life of the worldwide Ismaʻili community in the twentieth century.Footnote 1 The setting for this historical process, and the changes that it unleashed, is colonial South Asia and East Africa, where the Indian-origin Khoja Ismaʻilis comprised a diaspora, somewhat akin to the complex composite model put forward by Engseng Ho that informs the present study.Footnote 2 The diasporic Khoja Ismaʻili community of the western Indian Ocean rim represents a classic example of the appropriation of the late colonial configurations of capital, cultural and ideational exchange. It is among the diasporic Khoja Ismaʻilis, again, that Ithna ʻAshariya Khoja Ismaʻili secessionism — defying the authority of the Imam and laying the foundations of a Khoja Shi‘a Ithna ʻAshariya community — bore implications probably greater than anywhere else. This, in the process, led the hereditary Imam of the Khoja Ismaʻilis, Sultan Muhammad Shah Aga Khan III (1877–1957; Imam from 1885 to 1957), to resort to taking the first steps in laying down community protocols that over the decades came to define the Khoja Ismaʻili community's relations with the Imamate, while also instilling a new sense of community ethics. An array of coeval historical forces in South Asia and East Africa in late colonial times thus marked the first steps towards the development of an Ismaʻili identity, dovetailing with certain understandings of Ismaʻili ethics of social service and activism under Aga Khan III and thereafter, Shah Karim Aga Khan IV (1936–; Imam since 1957). The transition from Aga Khan III's Imamate to that of Aga Khan IV marked a further expansion of the scope of this project of social service, feeding as it did into grander developmental ventures invoking at once the sophisticated rhetoric of corporate management, academics and policy making, with the Hazir Imam Aga Khan at the apex.Footnote 3
An outcome of this complex shift is now best encapsulated in a network called the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), operating in the sphere of social service and “development”. It consists of agencies with different mandates — from education to microfinance and rural support programme, and from humanitarian assistance to health — established at different times in the twentieth century. The key terms ‘development’ and ‘network’, however, go no further back than the 1980s, reflecting a gradual but definitive shift towards an all-encompassing wider conceptualisation of development and a rather flexible organisational framework operating under the general leadership of the Hazir Imam, Aga Khan IV, as the ‘Chairperson’. A key vehicle for universalising the liberal humanitarian discourse of social responsibility under the leadership of the Ismaʻili Imamate, the AKDN thus seeks to “realise the social conscience of Islam through institutional action”,Footnote 4 and working “to improve the welfare and prospects of people in the developing world, particularly in Asia and Africa, without regard to faith, origin or gender”.Footnote 5 At the same time, the claims of an Ismaʻili ethics under the leadership of the Hazir Imam, i.e. Imam of the Time, the Aga Khan, simultaneously give the whole structure a specific Ismaʻili imprint. Instrumental to this structure, as literatures produced by the AKDN underscore, are “the Ismaili community with its tradition of philanthropy, voluntary service and self-reliance, and the leadership and material underwriting of the hereditary Imam and Imamat resources”.Footnote 6
This discourse of social service with religious underpinnings has to be seen against the backdrop of a wider historical experience of the Ismaʻili (and more specifically the vanguard Indian-origin Khoja Ismaʻili) community, and its leadership.Footnote 7 Emerging out of prolonged legal processes in the nineteenth-twentieth centuries, the experience involved at one level forging together a host of universalist values, of common good and social service, eventually manifesting in a range of organisations. In doing so, it produced a common language of social engagement to be emulated by a very disparate community across the globe, gradually and increasingly brought within the rubric of an Ismaʻili denomination that acquired new socio-political meanings over the twentieth century.Footnote 8 At another level, this remoulding of an Ismaʻili identity, gradually subsuming in the process the various ethnic and socio-political differences at the global level into an overarching denominational formation, also involved universalising and standardising certain denominational aspirations and traits. This created, in the process, a distinctive sphere within the larger rubric of Shiʻi Islam and indeed the Muslim community at large, while asserting a discernible Ismaʻili position in that balance. This translocal-to-global journey thus reflected some of the key traits of religious internationalism of the times: the reconfiguration of religious identities; the emergence of organised global philanthropy; and religiously underpinned social activism and voluntarism with the potential to develop an increasingly “secular” face.
The present attempt to trace the ideational genealogy of this ethical system as well as the precursors of the Imamate's contemporary developmental ventures, I should qualify, should be seen as neither an exhaustive account of the AKDN, nor a definitive commentary on the community-specific internal issues.Footnote 9 This is only a preliminary effort to chart the broad contours of some key aspects of the historical process, the historical matrix within which it took shape and their wider and more recent implications. The larger historical context gives us the canvas necessary to understand the nature of the shifts and nuances of the process that is characterised by certain connectedness, both vertical and horizontal, stretching back to the colonial period and linking the community's experiences in South Asia and parts of East Africa. And, indeed, it is mostly the South Asian-origin Ismaʻili population from Africa that constitutes the bulk of the contemporary Ismaʻili community in the global North, thanks to successive waves of secondary migration to Europe and North America in the wake of the political excesses that entailed post-colonial African nationalism in many of the African countries.
This article has three sections, before it moves on to the concluding part. In the first segment I invite the readers to engage with some conceptual issues that inform this study. The second seeks to foreground the question of the connectedness that had historically tied the Ismaʻili experience in late colonial South Asia and East Africa together. It suggests that this history of connectedness drew substantially upon the diasporic experience of the community in Africa, a process that also requires us to reconceive the very conceptual frame of ‘diaspora’. The last part of the article tries to identify the key aspects of the process through which a somewhat more concrete Ismaʻili identity was forged, in more recent times bringing together an essentially composite global Ismaʻili community. This is where we also see the relevance of both the discursive frame and vocabularies of social service in the Ismaʻili imagination and their lived experience across the globe.
Some Conceptual Considerations
In an effort to understand this process, this article takes its cue from a line of scholarship on global social structures of the Ismaʻilis that focuses on the intersection of rational humanism, modernisation and institutional proliferation in contemporary times, often seen as an age of global assemblages.Footnote 10 The most recent oeuvre in this vein, one focusing on the Ismaʻilis of contemporary Tajikistan and northern Pakistan, looks for the antecedents of the contemporary deterritorialised Ismaʻili formations in the early ventures of Imam Aga Khan III, resulting in the development of an Ismaʻili “corporate community”.Footnote 11 Accordingly, it is suggested here that the diasporic experience of the Khoja Ismaʻilis in the western Indian Ocean sphere was no simple linear process and, therefore, has to be problematized. The dynamics of a range of forces characterised this process: internal schisms on the basis of contesting claims to Islamicity, a thriving associational life promoting contending denominational norms and reformist claims, and a dynamic conversation across the western Indian Ocean. Even though the diasporic Ismaʻili community on the African soil was of Indian origin, there had been a substantial number of cases of adaptation to and accommodation of local African elements, probably most noticeably through marriage patterns, and resulting in some degree of socio-cultural diversity. This article further suggests that the institutional endeavours of social service under Aga Khan III were not only supported in various ways by the British Empire but were part and parcel of a larger discursive frame of “imperial Islamicate” that informed the Indian-origin Muslim diasporic experience on the western Indian Ocean in late colonial times.Footnote 12
This complexity, therefore, is an outcome of a concatenation of a range of intertwined forces. The first of these forces relates to the activation of universalist humanitarian ideals and norms buttressed by languages of legitimation claiming to have their roots in an Ismaʻili denominational inspirational repertoire. Second, in the process it fed into an increasing emphasis on the humanitarian ideational bases of an Ismaʻili identity in a highly competitive religio-social sphere. Finally, discourses of social service and improvement also provided the validating idioms for the Ismaʻili claims to leadership in the Muslim social sphere in Africa.
It is out of the crucible of this complex dynamic process that a holistic developmental discourse with a certain religious inspiration as its cornerstone — as though a trademark of the Ismaʻilis, first in South Asia and East Africa but gradually across the world — emerged. The inclusive developmental philosophy that the AKDN signifies — marking this translocal to global passage — exemplifies in effect a wider understanding of the subject, one in which the nomenclature of ‘development’ denotes a constellation of ideas going beyond the predominantly economistic interpretation that characterises Cold War discourses on ‘development’.Footnote 13 By the translocal dimension of this project of social service and activism I refer to the Khoja Ismaʻili experience in parts of South Asia and East Africa, especially in the early twentieth century. “Translocality” as a conceptual framework provides an intermediate ground for understanding historical processes connecting different localities and their implications which are neither necessarily global in scale, nor connected to specific global moments. Furthermore, the concept also pays particular attention to local and regional empirical realities amid otherwise overarching homogenising developments.Footnote 14 In the present case, South Asia and East Africa happened to be the sites that witnessed the earliest of the experiments with developmental endeavours as well as a tradition of systematic jamaʻat (Khoja congregation) constitutionalism, both under the aegis of Aga Khan III.Footnote 15 The corpus of jamaʻat literature — jamaʻat rules and regulations and constitutionsFootnote 16 — first emerging in the early twentieth century, and comprehensible partly as response to specific secessionist developments within the community in East Africa, has gradually come to define the community's internal organisation and relations, providing one with a lens through which to get a clearer picture of the community-specific issues and the ensuing conversations.
When Shah Karim Aga Khan IV succeeded his grandfather Aga Khan III to the Imamate after the latter's death in 1957, he inherited a community spread across vast stretches of the globe, large parts of which were then undergoing, or were soon to experience, decolonisation with very varied and acutely region-specific socio-political implications. These changes in historical milieus had their imprint on the social policy of the Imamate. The resultant reappraisals brought about, in their process, crucial shifts in the Imamate's social policy and establishing new contours of social engagement and its idioms. The steady emphasis from the 1960s onwards on founding and/or consolidating a host of organisations (either newly established, such as the Aga Khan Foundation in 1967, or restructuring the ones already existing in different forms) that gradually went on to constitute the bedrock of the Aga Khan Development Network, has to be seen as part of this larger historical process. It is also in this context that the imperative of addressing audiences from both within the community of the Ismaʻilis, as well as beyond them has to be seen. It is a declared emphasis on the latter aspect, i.e. reaching out to a much wider audience beyond the Ismaʻili community, that most notably distinguishes the AKDN and its component bodies from the pre-AKDN organisations. All this, however, did not involve a dilution of the Imami Ismaʻili identity, with the Imam Aga Khan combining his role as spiritual leader with far wider social responsibilities, which continues to operate in its specific form within the larger Muslim community. In other words, central to this Imami Ismaʻili identity is the importance of the spiritual and temporal role of the Imam, the latter coming to the forefront increasingly since the times of Aga Khan III, and especially under Aga Khan IV.
Towards a Conjoined History – I
While colonial South Asia was the crucible of certain social welfare programmes and progressive developmental visions among the Khoja Ismaʻilis that characterised what contemporary commentators would call a version of liberal Islam, many of the practical experiments were part of a broader maze of connected historical developments that linked colonial South Asia with its diasporic Khoja Ismaʻili community in different parts of East Africa. It is this conjoined nature of a host of socio-religious experience that gives the broader historical process its salience, laying the foundations of the contemporary global Ismaʻili community, and its specific socio-religious ethical framework. Furthermore, the flexibility that characterises the community's socio-political orientations, while albeit remaining dedicated to a specific denominationalism, also emanates from the didactic instructions of Aga Khans III and IV from at least the late colonial times in the Afro-Asian arena. The Indian Ocean as a category in itself with a focus on the transoceanic experiences of its various networks is well researched.Footnote 17 The cumulative achievement of this substantive corpus of scholarship is perhaps best summarised in the paradigm which conceives the Indian Ocean as a diffuse “interregional arena” rather than a rigid ‘system’, a sphere of human interactions with an immense “depth of economic and cultural meaning”.Footnote 18 Increasingly — and perhaps this is more relevant for the present paper — scholars have also drifted towards understanding the nature of connections between the societies on the seaboard, both on the Indian and the East African coasts, from different perspectives and with varied implications. The quest to understand the nature of relations between the peoples on both sides of the Ocean, in both precolonial and colonial times, elicits a range of possibilities: from relations gravitating around trade and commerce, sometimes with an emphasis on a persisting “Asian” agency in the colonial times,Footnote 19 to socio-religious exchanges,Footnote 20 to analyses of civilisational discourses.Footnote 21
While sensitive to these wider aspects, I suggest that studies of specific socio-religious communities present on both sides of the Ocean may actually best illustrate the dynamics of some of the above issues. The history of the Khoja Ismaʻilis in western India and the Khoja Ismaʻili expatriates in parts of East Africa, as argued below, shows a complex combination of connectedness and divergence, the outcome of a dialectic of a range of forces: the specificities of the two regions; the experience of the Khoja expatriates in East Africa contributing in part to a somewhat different form of nationalist expression and imagination during the course of the nationalist movement in the subcontinent; and above all the strong leadership of first Aga Khan III and after 1957, Aga Khan IV. Indeed, as history of the global Ismaʻli community unfolded over the twentieth century, one can scarcely overestimate the centrality of religious leadership in Khoja Ismaʻili socio-religious life, and the nature of their political engagements across the globe, sensitive at the same time to the regional specificities.
In this understanding of diasporic experience which, I argue, conditions in no small measure the historical complexities, I take my cue from Engseng Ho's path-breaking work on the subject. This idea of diaspora — one that Ho calls the “British model”, drawing his empirical data from a case study of the Hadrami Arab diaspora in South East Asia — is to be seen as different from the more conventional version of the concept, as illustrated by the Jewish example. The British, according to Ho, were not like ethnic minorities with particularistic visions: the British diasporic experience, that took the form of an empire, hinged on the activation of a cluster of universalist principles and claims, and not least building institutions that sustained such universalist aspirations. Ho argues that much like the British model, the diasporic minority of the Hadrami Arabs developed a corresponding universalist aspirational model, one that assumed the shape of religious mission paralleling a systematic assimilation into the local society, attracting at the same time their brethren from the Arab homeland, and maintaining rather resiliently their mobility across the Indian Ocean through trade, pilgrimage etc.Footnote 22 In what constitutes a rewarding addition to works on the Indian diasporas on the Indian Ocean, Lakshmi Subramanian in a recent work has drawn upon Ho's arguments. Her study of the Chulias — a subsection of the Marakkayar mercantile community originally from the Coromandel coast in South India — in South East Asia resonates similar views on mobility and diasporic experience but translated into the Indian-South East Asian context.Footnote 23
The Khoja Ismaʻili case on the eastern shores of Africa — and indeed in general the global Ismaʻili community with its disparate ethnic, economic, social and political backgrounds — reveals, furthermore, identical resonances. The Khoja Ismaʻili community in East Africa, though essentially of South Asian origin, entered into regular assimilative practices in local African society, as recorded from the late nineteenth century onwards, if not earlier.Footnote 24 The enduring nature of the variegated life experiences that emerges out of this composite form is further driven home by more recent anthropological explorations that show that amid discourses of community cohesiveness under their religious leadership, a certain community fragmentation, discernible in the realm of religious practices and performance, still persists among the Aga Khani Khojas, distinguishing the expatriate communities from the natal groups in India.Footnote 25 In the African scenario it is crucial to note that Indians in general and Indian Muslims and/or Khoja Ismaʻilis in particular were also urged by personalities such as Aga Khan III to think in terms of a moral project, one in which the Indians and Indian Muslims/Ismaʻilis were seen as carriers of improvement and progress. This derivative discursive scheme of trusteeship, reflective of a wider imperial vision of a three-tier civilisational pyramid — with the white masters at the top, the coloured Indians occupying the middle zone and the Africans the bottom — vested the Indians with the moral responsibility to facilitate progress in backward African societies, promoting some degree of nationalist fervour.Footnote 26
To this discourse of moral commitment to social activism, Aga Khan III added the element of religion. The connection between religious inspiration and social activism could probably be seen as part of a wider discourse of self-affirmation that swept nineteenth- and twentieth-century Islamic culture in South Asia, marking a shift from the “other-worldly” to “this-worldly” piety.Footnote 27 For Aga Khan III, an understanding of Islam with strong humanitarian inspirational underpinnings gave direction to the whole venture since, according to him, “genuine Islam is in perfect agreement with reason”, ensuring material, social and spiritual welfare through a “co-operative Muslim enterprise”.Footnote 28 Wedded to the received discourse of three-tier civilisational schema, this social-activism-oriented Islam required the Indian Muslims “to work for the uplift of all Muslims of indigenous [East African] origin”Footnote 29 and, as Aga Khan III noted in a conference in Mombasa, “give Islam a lead here [East Africa] until it is possible to see the day that in a meeting like this, this chair is occupied by an African Muslim”.Footnote 30 While such improvement required “permanent organisation”, it also called for an all-round development through building educational institutions: pan-Islamic universities, somewhat on the lines of Aligarh, for instance.Footnote 31
That this went far beyond creating traces of India in Africa is testified to by Aga Khan III's general stance on the question of flexibility and adaptation.Footnote 32 His consistent exhortations towards accommodation, ranging from marriage relations with local womenFootnote 33 to instructions to adapt to new conditions, were nevertheless underwritten by the retention of Ismaʻili traits — most importantly the belief in the guidance of the Living Imam — as the key identity marker in the case of the Khoja Isma‘ilis. The idea of adaptation and flexibility in general, celebrating compositeness and cultural pluralism, was central to Aga Khan III's philosophy of social engagement, something he believed to be integral to Ismaʻilism throughout his life. In his own words: “Ismailism has survived because it has always been fluid”.Footnote 34 The Indians in general were thus urged not to think of making financial gains in a new country only with the idea of taking it back to India,Footnote 35 and the Ismaʻilis in particular were enjoined to be loyal to the country of their residence.Footnote 36 As part of such concrete measures, the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS), established in 1945 in Mombasa by Aga Khan III, sought to propagate a more organic idea of unity among the Muslims on the continent. It funded the establishment of mosques, schools, scholarships, catering also to the needs of Africans, and such projects as the Vasini Island Water Reservoir.Footnote 37 The discourse of adaptability was thus evidently coupled with Ismaʻili denominational sensibilities under the Imam's leadership, and perhaps also valorised at the same time a discourse of the Indian Muslim, and more specifically, Ismaʻili superiority. The question of denominational specificity in particular had historically been crucial in determining the community's relations with the Imamate. This history stretches back to some early twentieth-century developments in East Africa that affected the community there as well as in South Asia. Thus, the reason to reiterate the East African Khoja Ismaʻili example is the very fact of their being part of a disparate diaspora — somewhat in the sense that Ho conceptualises it — whose experience of identity formation was bound up with processes of defining community membership rules and not least the emergence of religiously inflected ethics of social service.
At the core of these developments lay schisms within the community and occasioning in the process a series of responses from the Hazir Imam Aga Khan III that went on to define the nature of the community's relationship with the Imamate. These responses were both ideational, with a discourse of voluntary social service and the Imam's apex position in providing guidance, and organisational, in the form of farmans (commands from the Imam to his followers) and rules of community governance. Indeed, it was first and foremost the challenges posed by a section of the East African Khojas, leading to the breakaway Ithna ʻAshariya Khoja Ismaʻili faction that spurred Aga Khan III to set out the rules and regulations for the community in 1905, published in Zanzibar for the first time. The 1905 example was followed by similar initiatives elsewhere, in South Asia and other parts of Africa, aimed crucially at containing further similar challenges. These developments came to condition the socio-political (upholding the view of adaptability) and religious orientation (safeguarding Imami Ismaʻili denominational sensibilities) of the community vis-à-vis others: ethno-religious groups and political dispensations. These developments, to begin with, were thus of translocal import, straddling the western Indian Ocean. However, they gradually came to bear global significance as the community spread or, as in the case of post-Soviet Central Asia, facilitated closer links with groups previously connected to the ecumene through only symbolic skeins of engagement and, perhaps more tangibly, through the disbursement of taxes to the Imam.
I hope that the on-going discussion has brought out at least two key factors. First, it has underlined the immediate importance of the East African case that occasioned the Imamate's intervention in the form of setting certain community codes and a protocol that created ripples, first in a translocal sphere, though gradually producing, by 1986, an internationally applicable Constitution under Aga Khan IV. Second, it has highlighted the importance of the composite and assimilative nature of the Khoja Ismaʻili diaspora in East Africa that betrayed not only a combination of certain universalist aspirations and denominational specificity but had also actually been centrally important in the early experiments with a kind of community governance that the Imamate gradually developed and replicated elsewhere.
Towards a Conjoined History – II
Recent scholarship has shown how the succession of Aga Khan IV to the Imamate after the death of Aga Khan III was closely connected with, and furthered by, British interests in a fast decolonising world, augmenting the hereditary authority of the Imam and creating in the process a rubric of liberal ethics.Footnote 38 Faisal Devji emphasises that the Ismaʻili mode of governance — accentuating the Imamate's state-like form, with bureaucratised elites serving the Imamate, the diplomatic status enjoyed by the Imamate and its representatives in different parts of the globe, and furthermore with its constitutions, flag and anthem — emulates the British model of indirect rule.Footnote 39 For Devji, the remarkable aspect of “the project of development among Ismailis” lies in the way it became dominant, “transforming or even replacing properly religious ideals and practices with its language of improvement”, creating in the process “a development bureaucracy”.Footnote 40 Under Aga Khan IV, Devji adds, this involved a virtual reinvention of his role as a religious leader by “internationalizing it through projects of cultural and economic development in the Muslim world and beyond” while presenting him as “the face of liberal Islam in the West”.Footnote 41
The transition from the Imamate of Aga Khan III to that of Aga Khan IV was marked by a gradual process of internationalisation, a process that integrated or systematically incorporated regional bodies into greater schemes. The ideational bases of these widening ripples are sometimes seen through the lens of ‘encounters’ of cultures, as Aga Khan IV did in a 1994 speech, making a specific case study of Tajikistan. Tajikistan, according to him, represents the meeting ground of three distinct and rich cultural traditions: “the Western world” offering its ideals of democracy, private institutions and liberal economics; “the Muslim world” offering “deep roots in a system of values, emphasising service, charity and a sense of common responsibility, and denying what it sees to be the false dichotomy between religious and secular lives”; and “the ex-Communist world”, with a history of economic failure but significant investments in social welfare, the status of women and forging social cohesion. Speaking in the shadows of the collapse of the Communist bloc, Aga Khan IV found the increasing number of participants (in this process) to be the most distinctive feature of these historical encounters.Footnote 42 This in effect amounted to opening up new terrains of engagement and with new possibilities and, not least, I should perhaps reiterate, new understandings of community membership in what can perhaps be called an era of global assemblages, characterised by the activism of non-state actors in spheres once monopolised by the state. In the process, new forms of connections were forged with different regions and societies which, though adhering to the Ismaʻili creed, had historically had their own ethno-cultural particularities.
The process of this transformation was thus acutely sensitive to the changing socio-political formations and to a whole gamut of temporal, spatial and societal specificities,Footnote 43 and hinged upon a superimposition of certain models and improvisations on pre-existing structures developed under Aga Khan III. The discourse of social responsibility and welfare among the Khoja Ismaʻilis that developed under Aga Khan III — with his early initiatives in the fields of education and health in particular on both sides of the western Indian Ocean — was in turn conditioned in large part by a longer historical process originating in the Khoja community's internal reformist critiques in nineteenth-century Bombay. These critiques went on to shape, from at least the 1860s onwards, the nature of communication that ensued between the pro- and anti-Aga Khan establishment, lending the reformists a language with which to uphold those values of civic life and liberties which they accused the Aga Khan (i.e. Aga Khan I, 1804–1881) of subverting.Footnote 44 The very language of the Aga Khan's defence, therefore, was conditioned by these reformist critiques, providing the Aga Khan's establishment with a vocabulary to emulate.Footnote 45
While the 1866 Aga Khan Case established a Shiʻi identity of the Khojas with the Aga Khan as the spiritual head,Footnote 46 from the 1870s onwards internal differences within the Shiʻa group exposed it to further schisms, eventually splitting the community into the Imami Khoja Ismaʻilis under the Aga Khan's leadership and the Twelver Ithna ʻAshariya Khojas. Also from the 1870s, certain voluntary social activism sponsored by the Twelver Shiʻa Ithna ʻAshariya Khoja faction became more visible vis-à-vis the Aga Khani version of Imami Shiʻi faith, thus adding a further dimension to the already complex Shiʻa–Sunni Khoja divide. Symptomatic of the Twelver Ithna ʻAshariya Khoja public life in Bombay was a thriving associational activism that promoted Ithna ʻAshariya Khoja beliefs and practices and set a pattern of voluntary service to that effect.Footnote 47 In nineteenth-century East Africa on the other hand, the pioneers of the early philanthropic activities were rich Ismaʻili merchants like Tharia Topan (1823–1892) and Allidina Visram (1851–1916). Topan started building the Jubilee Hospital in Zanzibar. In a remarkable display of inter-denominational cooperation, his sons Musa and Gafar divided their estates according to the Sunni shariʻa (religious law): Gafar made endowments for a Sunni mosque, and Musa for a Sunni madrasa (religious seminary).Footnote 48 Visram is said to have established the first “non-denominational” school for Indian children in Mombasa, and Sewa Haji Paroo (1851–1897) is credited with having founded one of the earliest hospitals in Bagamoyo in what is now coastal Tanzania.Footnote 49 None of them, perhaps to some extent contrasting with the Bombay example, are known to have been overtly critical of the Aga Khan's establishment. This is not to suggest that the reformist rhetoric in Bombay — either from the Sunni Khojas, or from the Ithna ʻAshariya Khojas — provoked any knee-jerk reaction, producing any immediate readymade discourse of social responsibility, or for that matter the highly organised welfarist and developmental endeavours that subsequently became the hallmark of the Aga Khani Ismaʻili socio-religious world view. They did, however, condition to an appreciable extent the development of a vocabulary of social commitment, voluntary service and a social policy that in the long run characterised much of Aga Khan III's public career. The early educational initiatives, tied up with discourses of community development and providing a cohesive language, were centrally important to this project.
Much of the operational aspect of community development also depended on the way the community was conceptualised in the first place. Amid a general scenario of contested religious nationalisms in South Asia, as I have argued elsewhere, for Aga Khan III this meant two different but inter-related layers of engagement, sensitive, on the one hand, to the practicalities of South Asia's Muslim qaum (nation), and on the other, to the denominational specificities of the Ismaʻilis.Footnote 50 But it was above all the reformist-welfarist projects of Aga Khan III, especially in the spheres of education and health care, starting from about the early twentieth century in South Asia and East Africa, which formed the organisational bases of much of the later developmental ventures. Thus the history of the Aga Khan Education Services (one of the various agencies of the AKDN), the earliest schools of which were founded in the early 1900s in Mundra and Gwadur in India and in Zanzibar about the same time, followed by scores of them in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, drives home the coeval nature of developments in South Asia and East Africa.Footnote 51 The appeal to universalist values such as education was inextricably linked to the development of community spirit. Thus even though Aga Khan III contributed the bulk of the expenses in the early years, as the community grew prosperous he expected the locals to match his grants.Footnote 52 One can imagine that this financial policy in educational administration went a long way towards instilling a sense of belonging, something in which the community could clearly see its own stake and active involvement rather than just being passive receivers.
A sense of the Ismaʻili imprint in such educational administration, at least in the early stages, can be derived from a volume commemorating 60 years of “Ismaili education” in Kenya, and indeed to some extent in East Africa in general. Thus until 1905, school teachers in all towns and villages were responsible to the Mukhi (treasurer in a Khoja jamaʻat). After 1905, when the Ismaʻilis in Africa received their first set of rules and regulations, school committees, albeit still answerable to the Mukhi, took over the administration. In rural areas Local Education Boards supervised by local Ismailia Councils were established, while in urban areas Provincial Education Boards administered schools under the supervision of the Ismailia Provincial Council.Footnote 53 From the 1950s, however, this Ismaʻili community exclusiveness gave way to larger initiatives incorporating other Muslim communities and Swahili-speaking Africans.Footnote 54 The Madrasa Early Childhood Development Programme for instance — launched in the early 1980s, and benefiting over 54,000 children in Mombasa, Kampala and Zanzibar, and training over 5,000 teachers and 2,500 school committee members — has to be seen against this backdrop.Footnote 55
This widening trend indicates certain shifts in the discourse of social service and the organisational restructuring that in part also mirror the gradual evolution of the Aga Khan Development Network, with its wider project of addressing the interests of the non- Ismaʻilis. As mentioned, this umbrella organisation with two key expressions, “development” and “network”, came to be used from the 1980s onwards, reflecting an all-encompassing connotation of development and certain flexibility in organisational structure balanced with a degree of centralisation with the Imam at the apex. Indeed, the gradual establishment of a range of bodies with different mandates — the Aga Khan Academies (AKA), Aga Khan Education Services (AKES), the Aga Khan Agency for Microfinance (AKAM), the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development (AKFED), Aga Khan Health Services (AKHS), the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP), the Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC), Aga Khan Planning and Building Services (AKPBS), FOCUS (Focus Humanitarian Assistance) etc. — complementing each other within the AKDN, and placed under the apex authority of the Imam as the Chairperson underscores a critical balance. In reactivating this wider inclusive discourse, the Imamate in effect connects to a holistic normative approach to human development and social welfare while reinventing its role in the social sphere. Furthermore, the importance attached to local and/or regional specificities by the Imamate both under Aga Khan III and Aga Khan IV is no less significant. This reflects, as well, some key concerns about developmental endeavours that some social scientists have been emphasising for some time.Footnote 56 Development programmes and global philanthropy thus hinge upon a wider discourse of sustainability, involving both urban and rural populations, and marginalised groups. “Age old systems of religious, tribal or inherited family authority” and “local identities”, as Aga Khan IV points out in a recent speech echoing much of the contemporary sophistications in the field, thus constitute the bases on which to carry on development, promoting an all-round “sustainable progress” in diverse societies.Footnote 57
In its efforts to reach out to the broader society beyond the Ismaʻili community, the AKDN is not “denominational”, even as religion provides the inspirational basis and the Hazir Imam stands as lynchpin in the whole structure.Footnote 58 Thus in one single webpage of the AKDN, the umbrella organisation is said to be dedicated to “improve the welfare and prospects of people. . . without regard to their faith, origin or gender”; but the centrality of the Imam Aga Khan's role is buttressed on the basis of a certain understanding of “Islam's ethical tradition”, one in which “religious leaders not only interpret the faith but also have a responsibility to help improve the quality of life in their community and in the societies amongst which they live” (my emphasis).Footnote 59 Understandably, the role of religious leaders does not end with religious guidance but has to address a wide range of worldly issues. The Hazir Imam Aga Khan, as the apex Imami Ismaʻili authority, thus has an immense role to play. Such convergences are also played out in a different manner, interchanging the categories of Islam and Ismaʻili, reflecting two different, but intertwined, layers of religious consciousness and/or belongingness.
The intersection of these two strands is perhaps best marked in the sphere of the educational curriculum of the London-based Institute of Ismaili Studies’ taʻlim programme.Footnote 60 The aim is to evolve an Islamic curriculum, even as a specific Imami Ismaʻili version, foregrounding the Imami Ismaʻili values and norms runs centrally in this endeavour right from the pre-school to primary education level. The curriculum initiates the pupils into the Aga Khan's social welfare activities as well, in addition to his spiritual role.Footnote 61 It is important to note, however, that such educational enterprises, geared as they are to complement standard formal schooling, are basically meant for the Aga Khani Ismaʻili children all over the world. The taʻlim curriculum thus acts as a cohesive force, uniting an essentially disparate Ismaʻili community spread across the globe, otherwise fragmented along ethnic, socio-political lines.Footnote 62 The idea, therefore, is to bring up Ismaʻili children with a set of values declared to be Ismaʻili and yet, at the same time, enable them to see themselves as part of a wider Muslim umma (community) and indeed the world at large – inculcating a strong sense of social responsibility. The history of the development of the taʻlim programme as an integral part, and indeed as one of the key vehicles of the Ismaʻili community's group-specific socio-religious value-system, promises a highly interesting case for academic enquiry. This would also involve the study of the community's wider socio-religious history, its values and sensibilities, in a corpus of literature often garbed in a language that requires specific training to decipher, and therefore, should be best left to more qualified authorities. Suffice it to add here that such studies might bring fresh insights into our perspectives on the socio-political as well as religio-cultural history of the community.
However, the transition from the 48th to the 49th, i.e. the present Imamate, and the changes in social policy that it entailed — the diversification of developmental ventures, marking a passage from the translocal to the global — was not seamless. In the initial stages the process often involved negotiations with community elders for mobilising funds for larger developmental ventures.Footnote 63 Discourses of social justice and sustainability — with its manifestations in economic, social, and not least legislative spheres — are thus systematically wedded to those of religious inspiration and religious authority, while also drawing upon the participation of a community whose developmental aspirations gradually witnessed at once a diversification and horizontal widening of its sphere of activities. Encapsulated in the form of the AKDN, this basically meant an emulation of the pre-AKDN social welfare models with a substantial improvement on the organisational domain on a highly professional basis that holds together an array of agencies with diverse mandates in over 30 different countries across the globe, and addressing the needs of a much bigger section of population. For this much bigger audience, the significance of the Aga Khan's religious authority is for all practical purposes mostly symbolic — rendered possible furthermore through his styling as “Chairperson”, in a corporate bureaucratic tone — while the services that his AKDN provides are very tangible, even opening up the AKDN's various social services to non-Ismaʻilis. The AKDN's functioning often involves close cooperation with the governments of the various countries and/or federal states of countries where it is present, or even the local populations where it works.Footnote 64
But while the discourse of social service became increasingly inclusive in nature, encapsulated in the AKDN, it never quite entailed an erosion of the Ismaʻili community-specific activism. This is best reflected in the series of community regulations and constitutions, gradually augmenting the sections on social activism, community welfare and organisational aspects. Thus, even as a more inclusive developmental agenda was being worked out, especially from the 1960s, the 1962 Constitution published by His Highness the Aga Khan Shia Imami Ismailia Supreme Council for Africa, also part of the first set of protocols after Shah Karim succeeded to the Imamate, emphasises its concern for the community's religious and social welfare.Footnote 65 Furthermore, a range of “Jamati institutions” — also referred to as “Ismaili institutions” — cater to the various needs of the community members.Footnote 66 What we have here then is a case of division of responsibilities. Both drawing upon a certain religious inspiration, with the Aga Khan and his Imamate at the apex, albeit reconfigured as a corporate bureaucratic framework, this bifurcation between the AKDN and the jamaʻat-centric social service rests more with the target audience, and signifies not much of a difference in essence and spirit.
Concluding Reflections
This article has sought to throw light upon some crucial complexities within a Shiʻi community that illustrate the interlinked nature of its sensibilities of self-identity and certain wider and universal aspirations and values. The history of Ismaʻili philanthropy, its social welfare and more recently, grander developmental projects, presents a complex entanglement, best comprehensible when seen over longue durée. The complexities are part of — and were conditioned by, at least in the initial stages — the specific historical and socio-political formations in East Africa and South Asia over the length of the twentieth century. The Ismaʻili case shows some aspects of a conjoined history of community development, and discourses of reform and welfare facilitated by socio-religious actors straddling across the western Indian Ocean. It was first and foremost the schisms in East Africa that contributed to the formation of a system of protocol, in the form of written rules and regulations and constitutions, shaping the relations between the Imamate and members of the denomination drawn from a historically disparate background (although with the Indian-origin Khojas at the vanguard) and were soon replicated in South Asia. At the same time, they produced a new socio-religious and ethical basis. This is precisely where one also sees the relevance of historical enquiry that seeks to understand not only dialogues between the imperial metropolis and its colonies but also the multiple networks connecting different parts of what used to be the British Empire out of a shared imperial experience, albeit perhaps in different degrees and in different ways. While the Khoja Ismaʻilis had a complex diasporic experience in East Africa, they were — and I apologise for invoking a truism that I nevertheless feel has to be reiterated — not cut off from the rest of the world, least of all from their natal community in South Asia. Thanks to the different law cases in South Asia and East Africa, the Imamate's efforts manifested through systematisation of rules and regulations and subsequently constitutions, having the most dynamic character in the early twentieth century. However, and as suggested above, understanding this process requires no less than a virtual reconceptualisation of the diasporic experience. These developments — invoking first and foremost the fundamental questions of identity and religious authority — were carried out in no closed clerical circle but necessitated public engagement and invoked a range of universalist aspirations and principles, those of social responsibility and the creation of a common value-system and even the very idea of belongingness to society or a community.
The question of belonging to a community has to be emphasised in particular, because it is the sphere where there was also a specific Ismaʻili ethos at work, vis-à-vis a larger Islamic universalism and also other contending forces within the Shiʻa or the Sunni denominations. This intersection of the universal and the particular was mediated by the Imamate. At one level this meant retaining specific Imami Ismaʻili traits and its religiosity, even universalising its social values and attaching an Ismaʻili logo to such values at another level but both subjected to a carefully balanced system headed by the Imam that has, over the decades, tended to develop a corporate profile. It is a structure in which the religious dimension is wedded to the trappings of a state, a system subject to the rules, regulations and constitutions of the community, and in which emblems like an anthem or a flag convey sublime symbolic messages. These forge a sense of an Ismaʻili community under a religious leadership of their Imam who, and whose legates, are often accorded diplomatic status in different parts of the world. This article has sought to retrieve some of the key features of the historical circumstances and the process that marked this transformation, transcending translocal spaces and experiences and reaching out to global formations.
