Most African states failed to deliver the political order and economic development that liberation from colonial rule promised. This observation is at the heart of Darin Christensen’s and David Laitin’s exploration of why weak state institutions, lagging economic output, chronic corruption, authoritarian governance, and civil war violence became endemic in so many African states. The authors acknowledge that there are differences in performance and leverage information about positive cases as they build their argument for how to imagine a more democratic, secure, and prosperous continent. They render the findings of influential technical studies and graphical representations of data accessible to the reader, and provide a series of concise case studies to convey core findings. In doing so, the book provides a history of ideas and investigations about political and economic failures since independence. This is a book that integrates theory and evidence to explore the roots of the continent’s difficulties and its prospects. African States since Independence offers original and accessible insights that will be valuable to a wide array of readers, from those familiar with these issues for years to students new to the study of political and economic development in Africa.

The authors’ core argument is that an unusually broad set of exogenous factors presents obstacles to building strong states in Africa. These factors range from deep-rooted legacies such as colonial institutions geared toward extraction rather than providing public goods. Likewise, contemporary borders reflect the priorities of nineteenth-century European relations and undermined indigenous state-building projects then underway. The authors point to even deeper structural obstacles to political order and economic development in their report that “the effects of slavery were not immediate and have increased with time” (p. 142). The countries most exposed to the slave trade had significantly underperforming economies after independence. Why? Empires built on the slave trade failed in the nineteenth century, exposing them to the ills of insecurity and colonial conquest. Slave trade practices “made Africans suspicious of one another and political authorities,” producing populations with low levels of “generalized trust” (p. 144).

Weak state institutions, the products of these legacies, lie at the heart of Africa’s political and economic development dilemmas. Very soon after the moment of independence, leaders faced the first round of coups d’états, and quickly understood that was in their interests to undermine the formal institutions of their own states and rely instead on rents and patronage to manage potential challengers. Borrowing from Alex De Waal’s concept of the “political marketplace” in his The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa (2015), Christensen and Laitin explain how the imperatives of regime survival led to efforts to divide opposition coalitions and purchase the political loyalties of others. These techniques of power went on to undermine political and economic reforms and generate cynicism among citizens. The failure to support stronger institutions, such as credible protections of property rights, adds to economic problems, which in turn contributes to political instability and, in a significant number of countries, endemic violence and civil wars.

The authors caution that these structural constraints are not determinative. Leaders’ decisions matter. Nelson Mandela’s support for a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa and its transition to democracy mattered a great deal. The end of the Cold War contributed to enabling protests that led to reforms of political institutions and economic policies that attracted international support. The results led to real improvements in people’s lives in many countries. That historical moment also permitted coordinated international intervention to address conflicts. Efforts of the African Union and regional associations to impose mutually binding rules on member governments that made it harder for coup leaders to gain international recognition have seen some success in promoting a continental commitment to political accountability. Progress notwithstanding, the authors present findings that suggest that the recent acceleration of economic growth across the continent bears little resemblance to the sustainable economic transformations in East Asia. Democratic reforms are reversable, and political order is fragile.

Readers looking for “a realistic foundation for imagining a more democratic, a more secure, and a more prosperous continent” (p. 10) receive advice as they reach the end of the book: “Vigilance, for those anxious for success, rather than optimism is the best response for Africa’s current situation” (p. 350). That message suggests a path-dependent continuation of underperformance. At the same time, Christensen and Laitin present ideas and observations that may be more significant than they acknowledge. The benefit for the reader in this situation is that the book provides a framework for thinking for oneself about prospects. These include the authors’ observation that democratic and authoritarian governments in Africa have become more reliant on routinized bureaucracies and procedures, even as personalist elements of authority remain important. They also make a brief but important comparison to the first 70 years of Latin American independence that exhibited many elements of the “political marketplace” and leaders who purposefully undermined the formal institutions of their own states. Then a critical juncture was reached, with much-larger-scale state-building projects and intensified engagement with the global economy.

The reader also may ponder the role of the international system in Africa’s lag in state-building and the maintenance of internal order. Perhaps the protections afforded to even the weakest African states, such as global recognition and the prohibition of conquest that Christensen and Laitin point to as partly responsible for the lag in state-building, were a holiday from history. One finds now a more competitive global environment and the breakdown of the UN-sanctioned peacekeeping system that may force African states to invest in their own political and economic capacities to survive. Climate change receives brief mention. Technological developments such as improved instruments of communication and surveillance are mentioned and left for interested readers to explore as mechanisms that enable states to broadcast authority at much lower expense and through commercial partnerships with firms and states outside the continent. In sum, it might not be that leaders need to exercise agency to break out of a set of path-dependent structural obstacles. It may be that global and continental structures are changing in ways that put more of a premium on exercising capacity, at the same time that they lower some of the costs of state-building.

In sum, this book’s broad overview of important theoretical frameworks and findings that have shaped thinking about Africa’s political and economic dilemmas is what one needs for thinking about contemporary challenges. These are a few missing key works, such as Jean-François Bayart’s L’État en Afrique (1989–2009; English translation) that develops an influential argument about the agency of Africa’s leaders in a global system that enables “strategies of extraversion” in which leveraging state sovereignty in business deals, often shady, and political relationships enable leaders to shape political and economic “reforms” to their advantage. Important African voices are included, though in relatively moderate numbers and none from the francophone Academic tradition. But these are quibbles. This is an important book that provides a fruitful lens for anyone who wants to explore the causes for Africa’s current condition and to think about what the future may hold.