No less a figure than George F. Kennan, principal architect of America's post–World War II containment strategy, described the decision to expand the alliance as “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post–Cold War era” (George F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error,” New York Times, February 5, 1997, p. A23). Many scholars recognized the potential adverse consequences for relations with postcommunist Russia, the economic costs of admitting new members, questions concerning the potential military-to-military interoperability of Eastern/Central European nations with NATO members, and many other considerations, and they were at a loss to explain the administration's decision to pursue what appeared as a less than optimal policy choice. Goldgeier's balanced and objective treatment of this contentious issue makes clear the confluence of considerations—right or wrong—that resulted in a 1998 Senate vote (80–19) in support of NATO enlargement.

In this concise (six chapters) and well-written study, Goldgeier carefully reconstructs the range of variables that led the Department of State on a fast-track trajectory in support of enlargement, with the primary objective of creating an incentive for democratic transition in the newly independent states of Europe. Based on the interviews with General John Shalikashvili (Supreme Allied Commander in Europe SACEUR), Charles W. Freeman, Jr. (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Security Affairs), and other U.S. officials, Goldgeier provides detailed evidence to suggest that the Pentagon was reluctant to embrace enlargement; it favored the Partnership for Peace initiative as a first step toward constructing the preconditions for eventually integration of new members into the alliance. The Pentagon also appears to have assigned a higher priority to limiting the potential for renewed confrontation with Russia. Beyond defining the core distinctions between the Department of State and the Pentagon, the analysis expands to evaluate the weight of Congress, Russian political realities, U.S. public indifference, and interest groups composed of U.S. citizens of Eastern/Central European descent in the formation of policy.

Perhaps of most interest is Goldgeier's attention to the significance of key individuals in securing U.S. commitment to NATO enlargement. “Lake and the president laid out the vision between September 1993 and July 1994, and Holbrooke had the ‘chutzpah’ to move the policy forward in the fall of 1994” (p. 11). The author concludes: “My numerous interviews with enlargement opponents within the administration and with enlargement proponents outside of it have created the overwhelming recollection that in October 1994 Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard C. Holbrooke pushed forward an enlargement policy that was no more than theory to that point” (p. 152).

Goldgeier persuasively establishes the significant influences exerted by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and, even more important, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke in securing U.S. backing for NATO enlargement. Goldgeier observes that ambiguity in presidential decision making creates opportunities for policy entrepreneurs (in this case, especially Lake and Holbrooke) to strike decisively in advancing their preferences. The case study reveals how personality, skills, persistence, and conviction of the single policy entrepreneur can be directed toward “outmaneuvering” the bureaucracy to achieve desired objectives.

According to Goldgeier, Holbrooke served the role of enforcer, taking Clinton's words in support of NATO expansion to the implementation phase. Among several illustrations, the author carefully recounts a meeting in September 1994, shortly after Holbrooke's return to Washington as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; it involved more than thirty officials, and Holbrooke abrasively and astutely set the process in motion. Goldgeier includes General Wesley Clarke's recollection of this first interagency meeting called by Holbrooke: “Kruzel spoke first, since he was the policy guy, and said, ‘Why is this policy? It's supposed to be an interagency process.' Holbrooke crushed him like a bug. He said, ‘It is policy.' Ash Carter walked out of the room” (p. 74).

Goldgeier's study contributes to discounting some of the simplistic explanations put forward to account for NATO enlargement, such as the claim that Clinton favored the initiative only to gain the Polish vote. Clearly, the decision was far more complex, encompassing a range of individual actors and institutional interests.

Yet, despite the painstaking research effort, there are still some unanswered questions. Perhaps most significant, the factors that led Clinton to support expansion of the alliance are not entirely clear. According to Goldgeier's account, the visits of Polish and Czech presidents Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel with Clinton, in conjunction with the opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1993, involved “emotional appeals” for support of NATO expansion that made a significant and lasting impression (pp. 20, 165). But did these appeals prove decisive in persuading the president to favor this policy course? Are there equally plausible alternative explanations? How were Clinton's views shaped by discussions with the policy entrepreneurs. Boris Yeltsin's admonitions concerning enlargement, or strategic considerations?

Clinton's speeches indicate that he desired dual objectives: support of NATO enlargement while simultaneously keeping Russian democratization and the favorable climate in U.S.-Russian relations on track. Goldgeier makes an interesting point advanced by psychologists: “When faced with the problem of competing objectives, individuals often convince themselves that there is no contradiction, that they can, in the words of one senior official discussing the two tracks of this policy, ‘walk and chew gum at the same time'” (p. 160). Perhaps this explanation is sufficient. In the end, however, without conclusive evidence regarding the shaping of Clinton's views and motives, one critical area of the case study remains at least partially speculative. Future revelations in interviews with the former president or the release of his memoirs could yield additional material that will be useful in completing this analysis.

The study have been enhanced by devoting greater attention to the influence of the European dimension in the formulation of policy. No one can dispute that to “understand the development of NATO enlargement requires understanding the interplay of process, politics, and policy in Washington, D.C.” (p. 5). Europeans and other observers might take issue, however, with the claim that “all of the key decisions were made in Washington” (p. 5). In fact, concerns were raised throughout the enlargement debate about securing the approval of the 16 NATO members and their respective legislative bodies. Even if the “whether” and “when” were ultimately answered in Washington, expansion was contingent on complex political processes within other alliance nations. Furthermore, it would be interesting to ascertain the extent to which Clinton's position—or that of his key advisors—were influenced by European perspectives or considerations.

Goldgeier offers interesting insights concerning theoretical models. For example: “A classical model of bureaucratic politics tells us that where individuals stand depends on where they sit, and that how they perceive a situation also depends on their bureaucratic role. The NATO enlargement policy process suggests that which bureaucratic position is crucial for understanding the orientation of officials at lower levels, the higher up you go, the more longstanding beliefs rather than a particular job title prove critical in many cases” (p. 156). Goldgeier insightfully observes that support of enlargement from Madeleine Albright, Lynn Davis, Anothony Lake, and others resulted from assigning the highest priority to promoting democratization in Eastern and Central Europe, and the positions of these officials derived from individual preferences, values, or personal and professional experiences even more so than any view that might have been predicted as a result of institutional affiliations at the Department of State or elsewhere.

The author challenges some of the central theoretical arguments in the literature, but core questions and conclusions advanced in this study remain quite fundamental: “How do policies typically develop within the United States government?” (p. 5) “The development of the U.S. initiative to enlarge NATO reminds us that the decision process is often just that—a process—rather than a specific moment” (p. 152). Much that is revealed in this study is likely to be of greater interest to university students seeking to understand the making of American foreign policy than to seasoned specialists, who might expect major new theoretical contributions.

This book should be a priority for those interested in a detailed, focused case study that reconstructs the complex array of factors in a post–Cold War U.S. foreign policy decision likely to have significant consequences for generations to come.