In Transformed by the People: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Road to Power in Syria, Patrick Haenni and Jérôme Drevon present a paradigm-shifting analysis of one of the most significant political-military developments in the modern Middle East. Moving decisively beyond the simplistic labels of “terrorism” or “Political Islam” that have long segregated Islamist actors from mainstream revolutionary and insurgent organizations studies, the book compellingly reframes the ascent of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a seminal case study in revolutionary state-building and ideological realignment under conditions of extreme duress. The authors masterfully argue that the group’s—under the leadership of Ahmad al-Sharāʾ—conquest of Damascus in December 2024 was the product of a dual upheaval: first, a “silent revolution” (p. 5) involving a centrist ideological realignment within Idlib, which in turn laid the groundwork for the second, more dramatic military conquest. By focusing on governance, ideological adaptation, and institutionalization, the authors bridge a critical scholarly divide, integrating the study of a jihadi-turned-nationalist movement into the broader comparative literature on rebel governance and ideological realignment amidst constraining environments.

The book’s primary conceptual innovation lies in its application of the “Thermidor” framework, positing that as the revolutionary fervor faded, HTS was forced to confront political reality and “social inertia” (p. 7, 173, 182). The authors develop the notion of a “ratchet effect,” suggesting that tactical accommodations, once accumulated beyond a certain threshold, crystallize into irreversible strategic transformation (p. 8). This approach elegantly sidesteps the sterile debate over whether HTS’s moderation was sincere or opportunistic, shifting the analytical focus toward structural outcomes and organizational learning, an orientation that resonates with Staniland’s call for an integrated study of ‘organization and violence’ (Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse, 2014).

Methodologically, the work is a tour de force, grounded in a rigorous fieldwork that forms the bedrock of its credibility. The analysis is built upon a vast collection of primary sources, including original interviews conducted with a wide spectrum of actors, from high-ranking HTS leaders including al-Sharāʾ to mid-level commanders, technocrats, and activists. This granular access allows the authors to document the inner workings of an insurgent polity with remarkable clarity. Moreover, the authors’ multiscalar perspective captures not just the leadership-level strategy but also the sociological reconfiguration of HTS’s middle cadres and ideological recalibration under pressure (see: Lorenzo Bosi and Donatella Della Porta, “Micro-Mobilization into Armed Groups: Ideological, Instrumental and Solidaristic Paths,” Qualitative Sociology 35(4), 2012).

The book’s structure meticulously charts this “Thermidorian” journey of HTS as an armed movement across twelve detailed chapters. It begins by establishing the foundational tensions within Jabhat al-Nusra (Chapter 1), which later rebranded as HTS, before detailing its ruthless military consolidation over other armed factions, from mainstream groups to global jihadis (Chapter 2). The heart of the argument lies in the subsequent chapters on governance, where the authors demonstrate that its “Salvation Government” in Idlib was the engine of de-radicalization, forcing the group to delegate authority and adapt to Turkish strategic interests, which in turn compelled an internal restructuring that elevated a new generation of technocrats (Chapter 3). This process involved the critical dismantling of HTS’s decentralized power structures, centralizing control under al-Sharāʾ (Chapter 4). HTS’s ideological transformation—from Salafism toward a pragmatic al-siyasat al-shar‘iyya—is shown as an act of adaptive legitimacy rather than theological reform (Chapter 5), complemented by outreach to Sufi networks and religious minorities (Chapters 6–7). This reflects the broader pattern of pragmatic ideological realignment under governance pressure—a process seen in revolutionary movements from Latin American guerrillas’ “socialist renovations” (see: Manuel A. Garretón and Timothy J. Power, “The Ideas of Socialist Renovation in Chile.” Rethinking Marxism 2 (2), 1989) to Islamist parties’ moderation under participatory constraints (see: Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, 2006).

The later chapters dissect HTS’s balancing act between “top-down de-radicalization” and “bottom-up re-radicalization” (Chapter 10), revealing the intertwined logic of coercion and consent that defines rebel–civilian relations. The group’s adaptive governance operated within a complex hybrid ecosystem, where it simultaneously coexisted and competed with traditional authorities, NGOs, and Turkish actors—revealing the negotiated hybridity of rebel authority and legitimacy that underpins the ‘hybrid governance’ paradigm. The final comparative chapter expands this framework globally, juxtaposing HTS’s trajectory with the French far-right parties to highlight common patterns of ideological moderation and populist realignment—a daring but illuminating parallel that situates Islamist evolution within a universal logic of political adaptation and ideological moderation.

The book’s analysis powerfully speaks to several major streams in contemporary civil war scholarship. It bridges two literature often treated separately. First, its detailed account of the “Salvation Government” resonates with the literature on rebel governance, illustrating the complex realities of providing security, justice, and public goods in a contested territory. Furthermore, the trajectory of HTS’s institutions—from wartime authority to the cusp of state power—directly engages scholarship on the enduring legacies of wartime governance (see Reyko Huang, The Wartime Origins of Democratization : Civil War, Rebel Governance, and Political Regimes, 2016; Zachariah Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War, 2011; Megan A. Stewart, “Civil War as State-Making: Strategic Governance in Civil War.” International Organization 72 (1), 2018), demonstrating how insurgent political orders can shape post-conflict realities. Second, the investigation of the movement’s ideological metamorphosis reflects broader trends of Islamists’ realignments under constraint (see: Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, 2006). HTS’s pragmatic turn thus emerges not merely as a Syrian anomaly but as part of a broader comparative pattern of ideological realignment as strategic adaptation, shaped by structural constraints, social feedback, and external patronage.

By tracing HTS’s evolution from a decentralized jihadist faction to a centralized, quasi-state actor, the book offers a compelling empirical response to a central directive for future research. It effectively weaves together the dimensions that Staniland’s Networks of Rebellion (p. 35) identifies as essential for “an integrated study of organization and violence,” skillfully combining “military strategy, state-building, path dependence, ideological meaning-making, institutional change, and social transformation” into a coherent account of HTS’s restructuring—thereby setting a new benchmark for a dynamic, organizational approach to insurgency.

While the authors persuasively depict al-Sharāʾ as a leader reshaped by the burdens of governance, his project faces enduring uncertainties, as it remains unclear whether this “Thermidorian” experiment can sustain legitimacy across Syria’s deeply fragmented sectarian and ethnic landscape. The true test lies not in the seizure of a capital but in the protracted, uncertain endeavor of constructing institutions capable of bridging Alawite, Druze, and Kurdish divides. The scale of this undertaking reinforces the authors’ central argument—that the politics of rebel governance cannot be separated from the sociology of ideological realignment, and that even the most radical movements, once compelled to govern, are inevitably transformed by the societies they seek to command. This challenge is particularly daunting given the devastating legacy of a brutal war that has entrenched intercommunal violence and deep mistrust, especially among Alawite communities, the Druze of Sweida, and the Kurds in the northeast. It is compounded by the fact that, as the authors note, HTS has yet to publish any formal doctrinal revisions that would codify its ideological transformation in line with the principles of a modern state. Nonetheless, its governance experiments—as al-Sharāʾ himself repeatedly emphasizes—can be seen as a microcosm of what a postwar Syrian political order might resemble: a hybrid system where revolutionary legitimacy, institutional pragmatism, and local social contracts coexist in uneasy but evolving balance. Forging a unified national project from these fractured remnants may thus prove an even greater challenge than military victory itself.