The responsibility of international organizations is a topical issue in international law that has attracted much scholarly attention since the well-known International Tin Council cases in the late 1980s. After different private codification efforts by the Institut de Droit international and the International Law Association, the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted the draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO) in 2009.Footnote 4 It is against this background of the completion of the DARIO on first reading that Antonios Tzanakopoulos argues in his book Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures Against Wrongful Sanctions, that the non-compliance of UN Member States with wrongful Security Council measures could be characterized as “countermeasures of disobedience”. In making his argument, he offers a comprehensive and enlightening analysis of the different components of the law of international responsibility, namely: the engagement of responsibility (Part I), the determination of responsibility (Part II), and the consequences of responsibility (Part III).
By way of introduction, Chapter 1 suggests that the legal responsibility of the UN, as conceived by the ILC, could largely be equated with the broader notion of legal accountability (p. 5), with UN Member States being the predominant accountability holders (p. 13). Chapter 2 then addresses the first of the two conditions of international responsibility, which is the attribution of conduct to the UN. Drawing pertinent comparisons with the law of state responsibility (p. 20), Tzanakopoulos explains that the conduct of the Security Council, as a UN organ, would rather engage the latter's responsibility by virtue of the promulgation of normative acts (Rechtsakte) than by operational activities. Although the secondary rules on international responsibility are generally not concerned with the nature of the particular conduct, the author's emphasis on the normative nature of the acts of the Security Council admittedly supports his argument that the test of “effective control” in Article 6 of the DARIO does not only include factual control but also covers “normative control” by the international organization over organs lent to it by its Member States (p. 40). Consequently, Tzanakopoulos questions the ILC's approach to treat this normative control only in the draft Articles on derivative responsibility for internationally wrongful acts of Member States. In particular, he criticizes the ILC's limited approach to normative control for turning the exceptional situation of derivative responsibility or attribution of responsibility (rather than conduct) into a general rule in the case of international organizations, which generally depend on their members in the implementation of their acts due to a lack of operational capacities (p. 47). Relying on his concept of normative control, Tzanakopoulos argues, in contrast to the ILC, that an international organization will be either exclusively or concurrently responsible with its Member States, depending on the extent of discretion that it leaves to its Member States in the implementation of the normative act in question (pp. 49−50).
Although Tzanakopoulos may be revealing some of the possible deficiencies in the work of the ILC, his further discussion in Chapter 3 on the element of breach as the second condition of responsibility offers an exposé on the obligations incumbent on the UN, which is at times not entirely convincing. In the opinion of the present reviewer, the author appropriately distinguishes between obligations of the UN under the UN Charter as lex specialis and obligations under general international as lex generalis. However, he does not sufficiently discuss the possible implications of this distinction in the light of the relevant international institutional law and emerging constitutionalist literature. Indeed, it is widely accepted that by creating an international organization, states contract out of the general regime of international responsibility by means of an international agreement to which the international organization is not a party, as Tzanakopoulos also observes in a later chapter (p. 179). While the constituent instrument of an international organization can be seen as a contract between states in the light of the law of treaties, international courts and scholars have increasingly recognized its constitutional nature for the international organization itself.Footnote 5 In this sense, he rightly acknowledges that the UN constitutes its own partial legal order, but he still seems reluctant to embrace the “‘prohibited’ analogies to other fictional legal entities, be it states or limited liability companies” (p. 180). Instead, the author continues to advocate the unconditioned applicability of the general rules on international responsibility, which leads his argumentation in subsequent chapters to constantly oscillate between a public law approach to UN accountability and the rather private law model of the general law of international responsibility.Footnote 6
After establishing the lack of possibilities of a judicial determination of UN responsibility, including a binding and systematic mechanism of judicial review in the UN system in Chapter 4, Tzanakopoulos concludes in Chapter 5 that UN Member States have retained their right to “auto-determination” of responsibility under general international law. Yet, while trying to argue that the political and judicial organs of Member States determine the international responsibility of the UN in their respective domestic legal orders, he concedes that states do generally not directly “attack” Security Council measures (p. 129), but rather indirectly challenge implementing measures under their own national laws (p. 131). Surprisingly, the author does not discuss the possibility that states simply hold their own organs, and not the UN responsible, which would have been in line with his interesting earlier argument of different degrees of normative control that allow for the shared responsibility of Member States and the UN.
While recognizing that the UN Charter establishes “a specialized regime that has its own legal consequences” (p. 167), Tzanakopoulos further contends in Chapter 6 that actions taken by the Security Council in reaction to non-compliance by UN Member States, as a result of “attacks” at the domestic level, are part of the content of international responsibility. More precisely, he characterizes actions taken by the Security Council to revoke or amend a contested measure as “juridical restitution”, which in the case of normative acts by the Security Council always falls together with the obligation to cease the internationally wrongful act (p. 145). As a result, the author depicts the non-compliance by UN Member States with UN Security Council sanctions as counter-measures against the UN under general international law, which aim at the implementation of the secondary obligations of cessation and restitution.
As Tzanakopoulos explains in Chapter 7, states can by “logical necessity” enforce the responsibility of the UN by means of “self-help”, through counter-measures due to the lack of a central compulsory third-party determination of responsibility (p. 156). Although the author admits that the applicability of counter-measures in the vertical relationship between the organization and its members seems counter-intuitive, he argues that only the “form of countermeasure” is different in the institutional context (p. 155). Based on the constitutional law concept of “civil disobedience”, he thus tries to combine the two notions of public and private law in the hybrid concept of “countermeasures of disobedience” (p. 174). However, while Tzanakopoulos offers an impressive account of the relevant practice of disobedience by UN Member States, he does not seem to allow for the possibility that this disobedience is confined to the internal constitutional sphere of the UN and hence outside the scope of application of the general law of international responsibility.Footnote 7 Instead, he proceeds from the assumption that “what matters is that the Charter imposes obligations on the organization, irrespective of whether one is inclined to ascribe ‘contractual’ or ‘constitutional’ character to them” (p. 180). Nonetheless, he does not sufficiently demonstrate how the disobedience resulting from a breach of these obligations by the UN Security Council can be qualified as counter-measures against the organization itself, and not simply as counter-measures against the other contracting parties to the UN Charter (pp. 180ff.).
Despite the conceptual inconsistencies noted above, Tzanakopoulos has written a well-researched book whose innovative approach to the responsibility of international organizations undoubtedly represents a very welcome and intellectually stimulating contribution to the general literature on the law of international responsibility.
