Research on Middle East militaries is imbalanced. In recent decades, scholarly interest in Israel and Turkey has expanded, while the Arab states have more often than not been overlooked.Footnote 1 In this essay, I suggest how to address the “gap” in the study of Arab militaries by drawing parallels with militaries in non-Arab states,Footnote 2 which have received considerable attention.
According to the Freedom House Index (2011), Israel and Turkey are currently the two most democratic states in the Middle East.Footnote 3 However, the pattern of civil–military relations in these states has generally not conformed to the Western “model.” First, in both states the boundaries between the civilian and the security sectors are blurred and characterized by informal ties between acting and retired security officials and their partners in various civilian spheres. In Turkey, the term “deep state” refers to a network of individuals spanning the military, the intelligence agencies, the executive branch, academia, the media, and civil society that, among other things, has allegedly planned a military coup against the ruling pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party.Footnote 4 In Israel, the ties between acting and retired security officials have been conceptualized as a “security network” that influences domestic and external policy.Footnote 5
Second, in both states the military has, since independence, reinforced the position of the dominant sector of society, the Jews in Israel and the ethnic Turks in Turkey, vis-à-vis the subaltern sector: the Palestinian Arabs and the Kurds, respectively. At the same time, some members of the subaltern sectors, such as the Druze, Circassians, and Bedouins in Israel and the Kurds in Turkey have been conscripted into the military, and in Israel military service has arguably improved their political and socioeconomic status, especially when compared to other Palestinian Arabs who are not conscripted.Footnote 6 Finally, in Israel and in Turkey, the military sees itself as the main guarantor of the state against domestic and external threats and has effectively monopolized the area of national security. In Turkey, the military has launched several coups to prevent the state from sliding into the abyss, though in recent years it has shifted to more indirect pressures and established informal “rules of the game” with the civilian leaders.Footnote 7 In Israel, some security officials have adopted the practice of inflating domestic and external “existential threats” to legitimize the military's privileged position and secure the resources that it demands.Footnote 8
How can these observations inform the study of Arab states? First, in states such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and pre-2003 Iraq, where the military expanded into civilian spheres, especially the economy, the informal ties and networks between security officials and civilian actors should be explored in depth, although the impact of these ties on domestic and external policies—including during the current crises—might be difficult to discern. Second, in Arab states that are “divided societies,” the military's role in reinforcing the dominant position of a particular sector should be investigated. In Iraq, for example, the military was dominated by Sunni Arabs before 2003,Footnote 9 while the new Iraqi military—the Iraqi Security Forces—was, at least initially, dominated by Kurds and Shiʿa, adding to intersectoral tensions.Footnote 10 In Lebanon, by contrast, the military has been transformed from an institution dominated by Christians (especially Maronites) into one that is shared by all societal sectors.Footnote 11 The situation in other “divided” Arab states (e.g., Syria and Jordan) deserves more attention.
Finally, several Arab militaries have presented themselves as the last barrier to foreign domination and civil war, and this factor has helped cement tacit alliances between the military and civilian actors, including civil society groups. A telling example is found in a book by Ali Salem, an Egyptian playwright, novelist, and satirist whose works are often highly critical of political and socioeconomic realities in Egypt. In 1994, when Salem was asked by an Israeli professor if Islamic fundamentalists would ever assume power in Egypt, Salem replied that the Egyptian army would never allow this to happen. He added, “The cultural and psychological structure of Egypt's military establishment throughout history has been fit to defend Egypt's borders. It moves on the ground and does not hover in clouds of vague thinking.”Footnote 12 What is interesting in this response is how Salem accepts the dual role of the Egyptian army as both the guarantor of domestic stability in Egypt and the state's protector against foreign threats. A more critical perspective, also by an Egyptian civil society actor, is offered in the satirical 1992 film al-Irhab wa-l-Kabab (Terrorism and Kebab), which criticizes the manner in which real social and economic grievances in Egypt are conveniently framed as an Islamist threat by the regime and its security agencies.
