Miroslav Šedivý is a talented (and rather prolific) young Czech historian whose Decline of the Congress System constitutes what is in effect the third volume in a trilogy addressing international relations in the post-Napoleonic era. Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question (Pilsen, 2013) dealt with the years between the Greek rising of 1821 and the Egyptian crisis of 1841; his Crisis among the Great Powers: The Concert of Europe and the Eastern Question (London, 2016) focused principally on the Rhine Crisis that grew out of the intense international tensions of 1840 after the Austrians, British, and Russians decided to launch a campaign against Mehemet Ali. The events of 1840 might easily have spilled into a European-wide conflict, although today the episode is probably best remembered for inspiring Max Shreckenburger's Die Wacht am Rhein.

In this volume, Šedviý turns to Italy as a sight of international rivalry in the period 1815–48. Given that international relations and diplomatic history seem increasingly marginalized in many history departments, we should be extremely grateful to Šedivý for sticking with a perhaps unfashionable area of history. The work is in itself incredibly impressive. It is written in extremely clear prose and has been painstakingly researched. Indeed, it is worth noting that Šedivý has used an incredible array of archival sources not only in Italy and the former lands of the Austrian Empire but also in The Hague, Brussels, Stockholm, Moscow, London, Berlin, and Munich. But the real value of the book is that it offers a detailed and nuanced account of Italy's place in post-Vienna Settlement European affairs. This is of special significance because, over the last twenty years, the study of preunification Italy has become overwhelmingly cultural in approach. This reflects in large part the influence of Alberto Banti and his followers. The most important consequence of such emphasis on Banti's fairly narrowly defined Risorgimento culture (which pays scant attention to the majority of Italians, who were either indifferent to or actively opposed to the unification project) is the degree to which it entirely neglects the extent to which foreign influence shaped the realities of Italian politics.

As contemporaries recognized, the map of Italy since at least 1494 was shaped principally by the intervention, dynastic pretensions, and strategic needs of Europe's powers; this would continue until 1870. Historians of the Risorgimento overlook this at their peril. But many continue to misread events in the peninsula by misunderstanding the nature of post-1815 politics and international relations. Šedivý rightly challenges the continued misrepresentations that depict Austrian policy as hostile to reform, when in reality Metternich was often the key driver for more efficient and responsive government. Šedivý also demonstrates that the old chestnut that the Austrian authorities were terrified of Italian nationalist revolt is quite untrue: the preoccupation of Metternich was with the threat posed in the peninsula by France. It is a pity that the widespread ignorance among historians of the realities of the Italian political situation is telegraphed in the unfortunate endorsement on the back of the book by Robert D. Billinger who refers to the “self-seeking policies . . . of the Italian city-states,” a term that is clearly completely inappropriate for the restoration period.

Šedivý thus offers an analysis that is an antidote to those who try to understand pre-1848 Italy without appreciating its international context. Although the Polish-Saxon question had demonstrated the flaws in the so-called Congress system before the discussions in Vienna were even over, there existed after 1815 the potential to defend peace in Europe after the twenty-odd years of conflict visited on the continent by the revolutionary and Napoleonic régimes. Within the post-1815 settlement, however, Italy was always a potential weak point, where war could easily erupt. Indeed, Italy was perhaps the one area in Europe in which post-Napoleonic France stood a genuine chance of challenging the status quo. While the German Confederation provided an apparatus for collective action, Italian rulers had blocked Metternich's attempts to impose a similar system in Italy. Meanwhile, Italy's rulers continued to jockey for power with one another, and, as in earlier centuries, to look beyond the Alps for assistance in pursuing their self-serving ambitions. This destabilized Italy, and, in so doing, risked threatening European security.

Šedivý is also right to emphasize the degree to which Britain played a part in undermining the system. The British—still sometimes defended as champions of peace, trade, diplomacy—were perfectly ruthless in pursuit of maritime and commercial superiority. Palmerston brought the same bullying attitude and complete absence of moral scruple to the so-called Sulphur War of 1840 as he did to the Opium War with China. The readiness to use immense naval strength to intimidate weaker states in defense of the British interest puts the lie to any suggestion that Whigs acted on principles beyond economic advantage and the cultivation of support at home and power abroad. The Sulphur War made clear, as Šedviný explains succinctly, that “the use of armed force . . . set the tone in international affairs” (117). If the Austrians were driven by self-interest too, the British were masters of hypocrisy; meanwhile the governments of the Orléans Monarchy “behaved in a manner that was often aggressive, illegal and detrimental to the independence of some Italian states” (250). Ultimately, the conduct of the powers destroyed any faith in legality.

I do not share every interpretation in this book, and I fear that, for those not already reasonably familiar with the period and its dramatis personae, some of it may be difficult to follow, but Šedivý constructs his arguments clearly and is extremely adept at signposting them. This is an excellent work, by an extremely able scholar. It should be read by anyone interested in European history in the period 1815 to 1848.