The durability of China's autocratic political system in history has long fascinated scholars. But few have offered a persuasive theory to explain its longevity. Yasheng Huang's The Rise and Fall of the EAST presents an original and provocative theory that has greatly advanced our understanding of the puzzle of enduring autocracy in imperial and contemporary China. Unlike previous scholarly attempts that focussed on political culture, Huang identifies a critical institution – keju, the examination system through which imperial rulers select administrators – as the central pillar of Chinese autocracy. In Huang's formulation, all nations face the challenge of finding the right balance between scale (homogeneity) and scope (heterogeneity). Greater homogeneity allows a nation to “scale up” by expanding its size and maintaining regime durability. But excessive homogeneity suppresses creativity and dynamism. On the other hand, greater heterogeneity fosters competition and change, but makes it harder for a nation to grow bigger or preserve the same political regime. In the Chinese case, its rulers preferred scale (homogeneity) to scope (heterogeneity) mostly because a more homogenous society is easier to rule and, more importantly, as Huang put it, “as China homogenized, it also became larger,” thus fulfilling the imperial ambitions of its rulers (p. 4).
However, as the growing size of China increases heterogeneity through the incorporation of territories and communities with diverse cultural traditions, this poses a severe challenge to governance. Managing the rising tension between homogeneity and heterogeneity requires Chinese rulers to find an institutional solution.
This solution, what Huang calls a “scaling tool,” is keju, which was invented in 587 to achieve homogeneity. The primary purpose of keju was to scale up the imperial bureaucracy as this novel institution was immensely proficient in selecting, training and intellectually homogenizing the officials that successive dynasties needed to administer the state. According to Huang, the credit of inventing keju goes to the Sui Dynasty, which is usually not considered a great dynasty. But it was under Sui Wendi (541–604) that a prototype of keju was established in 587. Another ruler, the much-maligned empress Wu Zetian (624–705), dramatically improved the system after she expanded the pool of eligible candidates for keju by allowing aspiring young men from outside the capital to sit for the exams.
After keju became the sole tool with which imperial rulers selected officials, it delivered the outcomes highly conducive to the perpetuation of autocratic rule. As the curriculum was dominated by Confucian texts (selected mainly because of their technical difficulties), keju homogenized thinking and resulted in ideological uniformity. The processing of studying and sitting for keju socialized potential ruling elites in similar educational tradition and ideological outlook. In short, keju produced standardized human capital that helped entrench autocratic rule.
To ascertain the impact of keju on stability, Huang examines the exits of 2,225 premiers from an imperial court database he has compiled. Voluntary exits – as opposed to executions – serve as an indicator of the loyalty of the most important official under the emperor, a critical factor in the longevity of dynasties. Using statistical tools, Huang finds that the “symbiotic relationship between the emperor and his most senior administrators,” as reflected by safe exit options for premiers whom emperors deemed loyal, emerged only after the introduction of keju. Prior to Sui, more premiers were executed (most likely for disloyalty). But after Sui, on average more premiers exited office alive, implying that, before Sui, the emperor–premier relationship was antagonistic but turned symbiotic after Sui: not only could premiers exit office alive (although they did not necessarily serve longer), but also emperors stayed in power longer. Huang's reasoning is that because premiers after Sui were selected through keju, they were more loyal than their predecessors picked by other means. Keju inculcated norms of loyalty and unquestioning obedience, thus making premiers compliant and dependable administrators for the emperor.
However, keju may have benefited imperial rulers beyond their wildest dreams, but it has had a lasting negative impact on the Chinese nation. The state's monopoly of intellectual elites through keju made China a “state without a society,” as Huang puts it. Unlike other autocracies without a similar “scaling tool,” imperial China had no independent intelligentsia, aristocracy, landed gentry, organized religion or precursors of a capitalist class despite a culture of entrepreneurship. Such a “state without a society” stifled innovation. Huang used the China Historical Invention Database to gauge the impact of keju on Chinese innovation. He finds that the most inventive period was before the sixth century (when keju was established). China experienced a dramatic fall in inventions after keju. He attributes this development to the end of “contestability” of ideas as the result of the intellectual hegemony maintained through keju. He argues that inventiveness is closely correlated with “scope” or heterogeneity (measured empirically by political or territorial fragmentation and ideological diversity). Once China achieves “scale” or homogeneity at the expense of “scope,” its capacity for innovation through intellectual contestation inevitably atrophies.
Huang also shows that the post-1949 regime under the rule of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has continued to favour “scale” over “scope” and, in essence, has retained “a state without a society.” The only difference is that the system developed under China's one-party regime is vastly more sophisticated and powerful. However, the CPC regime, in particular under the rule of Xi Jinping, who has imposed the strictest ideological control in the post-Mao era, will unavoidably repeat the mistakes of its imperial predecessors. As long as it prioritizes control over dynamism, the Party will unlikely catch up with the West in technology or unlock the untapped potential of its people.
Besides its breathtakingly original, brilliant and insightful theoretical argument, Huang's book is also notable for its methodological virtuosity. It makes use of extensive comparative examples and robust statistical analysis to illustrate how the introduction of an institution has fundamentally altered Chinese history. Written in elegant and accessible style, this book will be a perfect textbook for both graduate and undergraduate students. For the China field as whole, The Rise and Fall of the EAST is an instant classic and an inspiring example of theoretical ambition and scholarly excellence.
