Fifty years ago, the urbanist section of the political science discipline held the place of prominence. But it has since been marginalized, charged with excessive partisanship and a lack of vision, crowded off the pages and out of the footnotes of the prominent journals, and elbowed aside for the best jobs at the best institutions. The editors of this volume, determined to reurbanize the discipline, have launched a thoroughgoing critique of mainstream political science, questioning its state-centered account of politics, its uncritical embrace of pluralism, its fixation on rational choice theory, the behaviorist orientation of its research methods, and its claim to objectivity and value-free research. The assault is effective and stimulating and deserves wide attention. To encourage that attention, this review focuses on the main thrust of the urbanists' challenge to the mainstream, rather than singling out specific contributors or exploring the many tensions among these collected essays.
In their theoretical essays, the urbanists argue that the disciplinary boundaries that assign the study of society, economy, culture, environment, and politics to different social sciences are the product of “seeing like a state” (a term coined by James Scott). As the nation-state accumulated policymaking authority and imposed uniform categories of analysis (unemployment or drug addiction, land ownership or inflation), each policy-oriented social science claimed for itself one of these governable fields. But politics, the urbanists argue, happens everywhere. Cities are largely self-governing places, where multiple authorities operate “in different registers and at different scales” (p. 44). Indeed, the present global order owes more to the spread of urbanity than to warring state sovereignties.
City people by and large line up, take turns, negotiate transit, respect privacy, properly dispose of wastes, and create agencies to care for specific issues. Much of the effort to manage violence, confront external threats, and provide for health, safety, and welfare, which makes civilization possible, does not originate with the state. Nor is the political order static, an illusion associated with states. Cities are constantly changing and creating change. Silicon Valley, for example, generated global change rather than reacted to it. Once we start “seeing like a city” (p. 41), we recognize that the only certain thing is the inability to make accurate predictions. Not even the form of the political is static, perhaps least of all that. We can only watch for patterns, instabilities, signs of change. Not surprisingly, the strategic gambits of sovereign states in the global urban order have unpredictable and unintended effects (think Baghdad).
The urbanists' challenge to pluralism comes out of their conviction that state and society cannot be separated into distinct, unconnected realms. Instead of treating power as widely dispersed (and only mobilized and coordinated by the state), the urbanists argue that the socioeconomic system confers advantages and disadvantages on various groups, generating political inequality. In a capitalist system, states give preference to business because government success depends on the size and profitability of capital based in their territory. Capital, in turn, looks to the state to provide a favorable business climate and manage competition, social polarization, and economic crisis. The relationship is neither conspiratorial nor static, but systemic and dynamic. In 1975, for example, investment bankers imposed a new regime on New York City, reinforced by state and federal governments, redirecting priorities from wages, employment, and social services to repaying bondholders. Although the subsequent spread of neoliberal regimes seemingly left little room for progressive urban regimes, the urbanists still find levers of change in an urban working class that was promised liberalization but is experiencing centralization, inequality, and moralistic coerciveness.
Despite their emphasis on the structural dimensions of power, the urbanists thus see political order as unstable and dynamic. In part, this is a product of their rejection of behaviorist assumptions and the rational choice model. By broadening the range of the political to include everyday activities, the urbanists define politics as “a more subtle, less confrontational, and gradual reorganization of power relations” (p. 60). Political action in cities is shaped by interdependence, unpredictability, mobility, difference, speed, and intense affects. Constantly faced with unexpected situations, urbanites often make small gestures without strategic or calculated purpose that nonetheless reshape interpersonal and social relations. The uncoordinated revolts in the banlieues in France in 2005, for example, took on global significance because of the “scope and intensity of interdependencies” (p. 62) in global networks of media and youth. Interdependency thus generates unpredictability, which is embraced as normative. The current fixation on the creative class, for example, implies that people ought to take risks in transforming the unexpected into innovation. But the speed of urban innovation makes it difficult to extrapolate from the past to the future and encourages action without reference to consequences.
Rational choice theory fails to explain these urban ways of acting. Indeed, the marginalized squatter in an illegal settlement engaged in illicit activity reacting in a hostile atmosphere of emergency may be a more paradigmatic example of the urban actor than the voter studying a ballot or a consumer choosing between toothpastes. The salience of difference, of constant self-scrutiny and self-critique, of defining and distancing the other, also undercuts the cogency of rational choice theory. So, too, does the role of intense affect, where action arises less from antagonism and calculation than from the building up of emotional impulses arising from interaction with others. Finally, mobility makes up for the inability to predict what adversaries might do or even who the adversary is, while increasing the range of experiences that inform action. This is quite unlike making a rational choice from a static set of choices provided by others.
Yet much of mainstream political science proceeds via the opinion survey, providing an incomplete account of politically significant human dispositions and implicitly endorsing as normative a political system of limited citizen participation and individualistic political orientation. The urbanists thus turn the charge that they “Identified so closely with the object of their analysis that scholarship, advocacy, and ideology often have become hopelessly entangled” (p. 98) against the mainstream. The difference between the mainstream and the urbanists is between “a critical value stance” and “a value stance sanctioning (and even celebrating) the reigning status quo” (p. 98). Every time a survey instrument is used to measure political behavior, thin democracy is legitimated and more discursive and participatory forms discouraged.
In their policy analyses, the urbanists apply (and complicate) these theoretical approaches. Residential segregation, for example, arises more from the individual choices of citizens than from the actions of the state. Even when the state plays a role, segregation is the outcome of democratic politics. Diversity is in conflict with liberty. Democratic theorists have to see choice as one element of participation and accept that Americans are unlikely to support antipoverty efforts that involve a challenge to residential segregation.
Other urbanists take choice head–on, however. If privacy, choice, and mobility are taken as the key issues, the libertarian defense of sprawl as a rational consumer choice threatened by excessive government interference is difficult to counter. Americans see it as morally justifiable to strive to live in a good neighborhood and pass on advantages to the next generation, treating the public goods in those better neighborhoods as on sale in the market. Shifting the ground to questions of justice invokes the principle that whatever other inequalities we have, public goods ought to be equal. It forces libertarians to explain why those well-off in private goods should also be better-off in public goods. But even, then libertarians can respond that democratic majorities do not see society as a cooperative quest for justice but as a game with winners and losers. Critics of sprawl thus need to add questions of citizenship to those of justice and ask how to create a just political regime.
Once we shift attention from choice to civic life, the freedom to associate only with people like ourselves loses its moral attractiveness. It also moves us beyond the critique of sprawl toward a more robust vision of a just and democratic city. Questioning the assumptions behind the policy of relocating the poor in mixed-income neighborhoods leads in the same direction. The empirical evidence suggests that dispersing the poor disrupts existing social networks without much gain in other forms of social capital, except that those relocated to more affluent neighborhoods enjoy better public services. But that injustice has an obvious and more immediate solution. The policy of relocating the poor and the critique of sprawl thus overemphasize the issue of space. Without changes in larger political economy, proximity will not alleviate poverty and inequality. Short of a dramatic expansion of state direction of private investment, public spending in central cities offers the most promising means of reducing inequality. And by reducing the factors that push people to the suburbs, the revitalization of central cities may also improve our civic and public life, while making our metropolitan regions more environmentally sustainable.
The decision to lump the authors together as “urbanists” obscures the many fruitful tensions here. The emphasis on contingency and unpredictability, for example, bumps up against the stress on structural and systemic factors that confine the political process. Philosophical pragmatism colors much of the volume, which treats theories as tools to understand the world and offers contingent, situated knowledge. Yet several of the essays never leave the rarified realm of theory. The volume offers a nuanced critique of the positivist assumption that “knowledge can be produced in order to act on a relatively fixed and recognizable reality” (pp. 56–57), and it shifts attention from the management of social problems toward an understanding of how political actors (including the researchers themselves) define the issues. But many of essays remain of the traditional policy-recommendation sort. And while it seems that the authors, and the field, are seeking a wider public audience, much of the volume has the feel of an insular struggle among academics. But these tensions only add to the stimulation of an extraordinarily useful collection of essays.
