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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2004
Using monthly balance-sheet data of all major German credit banks, we analyze deposit withdrawals and bank failures in the German banking and currency crisis of 1931. We show that deposit withdrawals were related to indicators of bank liquidity and solvency and were hence not simply the consequence of a run on the German currency as has been claimed in the literature. In addition, we find only weak evidence that branch banks were more stable than unit banks. Finally, we show that larger banks had a lower probability of failure, were more likely to be bailed out by the public authorities, and were granted preferential access to the Reichsbank's discount window. We interpret these results as evidence for a “too-big-to-fail” phenomenon.
ISABEL SCHNABEL, University of Manheim
We analyze and compare two ways of describing historical events: ex post analysis by historians, made in retrospect mainly based on qualitative interpretations of facts; and quantitative analysis of ex ante assessments of contemporary actors, reproduced using contemporary historical statistics. Specifically, we estimate structural breaks in government bond prices of the Nordic countries and Germany around World War II and contrast them with the events that historians claim were important to that period's contemporaries. We find large differences between them. For example, whereas historians describe the Scandinavians as feeling safe from the threat of war until a very late stage, bond prices produce significant breaks at a quite early stage signaling the opposite. From a methodological point of view, we also introduce a systematic distinction between sudden and gradual structural breaks, which provides a richer way of capturing peoples' responses to major political events.
DANIEL WALDENSTRÖM, Stockholm School of Economics, AND BRUNO S. FREY, IEER, University of Zurich
The 1930s saw banking and currency crises, financial market collapses, and global contagion episodes. This paper examines international financial markets and the links between them using a newly hand-collected data set for more than 300 company stocks, encompassing weekly equity-market observations for 13 countries. I analyze the days of turmoil in the equity markets and the events associated with these days using two approaches: granger causality and principal component analysis. The events driving days of market jitters in 1930–1932 were related to German debts and reparations and to news of financial crises elsewhere. Market co-movement in crisis time indicates contagion. Sudden capital reversals and commodity price shocks were behind the common component across markets. On a sector level, there was higher contagion in the nonfinancial shares than on financials in the interwar period.
HANAN MORSY, George Washington University
Using a new data set detailing financial transactions in more than 60 towns and cities in France from 1740 to 1840, we examine two questions. First, which markets were able to recover from the French Revolution's attack on holders of financial assets? Second, which markets were more innovative in terms of financial instruments and intermediaries? In answering these questions we seek to contrast two approaches to the development of local markets. The first highlights the role of social capital; the second that of demand. We generally find no support for the social capital view. We then show that larger markets have more diversity in terms of contracts and intermediaries, which is consistent with the idea that they have better institutions. These larger markets, which suffer more from asymmetric information, however, also have greater demand for institutions.
JEAN-LAURENT ROSENTHAL, University of California, Los Angeles, PHILIP HOFFMAN, California Institute of Technology, AND GILLES POSTEL-VINAY, INRA-LEA
This paper challenges the North and Weingast (1989) view that attributes Britain's ascendancy to economic supremacy to institutions that provided protection of property rights starting in the late seventeenth century. We show that for much of the eighteenth century, interest rates in Britain remained fairly high, and fluctuated considerably in response to political instability. We also show that the volume of British government debt remained low for nearly a century after the institutional changes described by North and Weingast. Finally, we show that British interest rates moved in tandem with Dutch interest rates, suggesting that Britain did not embark on a different path following the institutional changes of the late seventeenth century. We conclude that, in the short run, institutional reforms do not lead to higher growth by lowering the cost of capital.
YISHAY YAFEH, Hebrew University and University of Montreal, AND NATHAN SUSSMAN, Hebrew University
This paper will examine output per person, efficiency, and the distribution of income within the English economy in 1600–1860 to ask whether the major political events of the period, the Civil War of the 1640s, the Protectorate of the 1650s, and the Glorious Revolution of 1688/89 had any discernable impact on the private economy. The evidence is that the period of political turmoil under the “bad” political regime in 1600–1688 was actually associated with rapid growth, and the “good” regime saw a halt in growth for 70 years until the onset of the Industrial Revolution.
GREGORY CLARK, University of California, Davis
After 1860 the frontier occupied the subhumid region of the United States between the humid East and the arid West. Prospective migrants had incomplete information about this land's fertility and thus the payoffs to establishing frontier farms. I use a newly constructed sample of households linked between censuses to investigate migration, wealth accumulation among frontier migrants, and the likelihood migrants persisted at farming. Self-selection is explicitly treated by estimating a structural model of migration and wealth accumulation. On average, frontier migrants fared well: they accumulated wealth faster than households living off the frontier. Moreover, migrants' location-specific experience in agriculture off the frontier explains patterns of wealth accumulation and persistence on the frontier. These findings have implications for our understanding of both economic mobility and farm unrest during the late nineteenth century.
JAMES I. STEWART, Reed College
Contemporary evidence suggests that immigration's impact on the returns to schooling is minimal. But the early twentieth century offers an ideal laboratory to study these questions. In 1910, 12 percent of American 14–17 year olds were enrolled in high school; by 1930 enrollment increased to 50 percent; enrollment in Britain was just 12 percent in 1950. But America's remarkable rise in human capital investment occurred in the midst of massive unskilled immigration from Europe, with some 14 million immigrants entering the United States from 1900 to 1917. This paper argues that these two events are causally related. By increasing the skill premium, unskilled immigration helped precipitate America's education boom. Using various measures of schooling and migration, the state-level panel data from 1900–1930 strongly support the hypothesized relationship, and the IV estimates suggest that migration played a substantial and heretofore-unremarked-upon role in America's human capital formation.
RODNEY MAMCHARAN, IMF
The almost complete absence of French Canadian settlers in the Canadian west during the Wheat Boom (1896–1914) fundamentally altered Canada's linguistic balance. This paper investigates why so few francophones moved west, while large numbers moved to cities in the northeast United States. Other Canadians moved both to a wider range of U.S. destinations and to the Canadian west. This paper uses a new sample of individual-level data from the 1901 Census of Canada, data from the U.S. 1900 IPUMS, and data for 1908 collected by the U.S. Immigration Commission to investigate why so few francophones moved west. We consider factors affecting the costs and benefits to francophones of moving to different destinations. Lower levels of literacy and lack of English-language skills, and the earlier age of marriage for francophones were of major importance in discouraging migration to the west.
ALAN GREEN, Queen's University, MARY MACKINNON, McGill University, AND CHRIS MINNS, Trinity College, Dublin
This paper assesses the economic impact of the Civil War in ways that have received less attention by other scholars. We examine the impact on factor price ratios and on relative product prices. Our analysis attempts to account for both “real” factors, such as possible changes in factor productivity induced by emancipation, as well as “monetary” factors. The specific monetary factor we address is implementation of the National Bank Acts. In an attempt to establish a national currency, these acts may have had disparate regional impacts on relative prices. Our paper contributes to the understanding of the economic impact of the transition from slavery to freedom by examining the impact of this transition on prices.
WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, Vanderbilt University, AND ROBERT MARGO, Vanderbilt University
Frank Owsley observed in Plain Folk of the Old South (Louisiana State University Press, 1949) that white literacy rates in the antebellum South were not much lower than those in the North and well above those in most of Europe. This paper examines sources and consequences of literacy in on Southern city, Charleston, 1790–1840. White adult literacy rates differed greatly by sex and class and rose over time. Mothers played a critical role in literacy transmission among the very poor. Skill acquisition by adolescents depended upon timing of literacy acquisition and family structure in early childhood. These results are consistent with present-day studies that trace the sources of adult living standards back into childhood.
JOHN E. MURRAY, University of Toledo
During the interwar period increase in productivity-adjusted real wages and unionization had a significant impact on how transitory and permanent employment was distributed across black, white, female, and male workers. Increases in the productivity-adjusted real wage and unionization significantly increased blacks' share of transitory employment relative to permanent employment. Research has shown that the high-wage policies of the 1930s had a significant impact on wages and unionization. To the extent to which these policies were effective in increasing wages above a level justified by worker productivity, they caused a disproportionate share of the employment downturn to be allocated to black workers.
RYAN JOHNSON, Brigham Young University
The passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) during the summer of 1933 ushered in a unique experiment in U.S. economic history—the NIRA sanctioned, supported, and in some cases, enforced cartelization of industries. Antitrust laws were suspended and firms were required to write industry-wide cartel “codes of fair competition” that effectively fixed prices and wages, established production quotas, and imposed restrictions on capacity. Recent studies, however, show that the NIRA underwent a “compliance crisis.” Specifically, by spring 1934 it was clear to firms that the NIRA enforcement mechanism had no bite and, therefore, most of the cartel agreements fell apart. This paper combines a game-theoretic model with empiric testing to further explore the nature, causes, and extent of the NIRA's crisis in compliance. Further, to gain empirical insights into competing aspects of cartel theory, the output effects of cartels are examined in the months prior to the compliance crisis.
JASON TAYLOR, Central Michigan University
After technology for the mass production of steel was first brought to the United States in the 1860s, iron and steel production grew dramatically. Data on wages from a U.S. Census survey of manufacturing firms show that earnings inequality rose in the iron and steel industries at the time the new technology arrived, but did not rise in other industries. The paper shows evidence of uncertainty about the future of the technology and market and argues that this environmental change is the cause of the rise in earnings inequality, and against a narrow skill-bias interpretation. During this time new skills were invented, new professions appeared, and isolated inventors made important discoveries. Examination of the effect of the new technology and uncertainty on particular occupations, such as rollers and puddlers, explains some of the inequality change.
PETER MEYER, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
The international diffusion of cotton textiles was an early episode in globalization. Because British textile machinery firms supplied nearly 90 percent of world trade in spinning machinery before World War I, we are able to observe the evolution of this technology in microscopic detail. The world industry did not quickly converge on a single choice of technique. Faced with two contrasting paradigms—the flexible, skilled, all-make “British” mule versus the fast, standardized, energy-intensive, semi-skilled “American” ring—national industries displayed a remarkable range of responses. Performance indicators suggest that both techniques supported ongoing productivity growth down to 1914, with no clear advantage to either one. But the ring triumphed by 1920, because technical improvements extended its competitive range to product quality, allowing its advantages in labor costs to come to the fore.
GAVIN WRIGHT, Stanford University, AND GARY SAXONHOUSE, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
The International Monetary Fund was designed during World War II by men whose world view had been shaped by the Great War, the Great Crash, and the Great Depression. Their views on how the postwar international monetary system should function were also shaped by their economics training and their nationalities. After the IMF began functioning as an institution, its evolution was similarly driven by a combination of political events (Suez, African independence, the collapse of global communism), economic events (the rising economic power of Europe, the middle East, and Asia), and trends and cycles in economic theory (the monetary approach to the balance of payments, new classical economics, the rise and fall of the Washington consensus). As they happened, these forces had effects that were perceived as adaptions to current events and new ideas within a fixed institutional structure and mandate. The cumulative effect of history on the institution has been rather more profound and requires a longer and larger perspective.
JIM BOUGHTON, IMF
Recently the developing countries have been under great pressure to adopt a set of “good policies” (e.g., free trade) and “good institutions” (e.g., strong intellectual property laws) in order to foster economic development. It is often argued that these are the policies and institutions that the developed countries used in order to develop. However, the historical fact is that they did not develop on the basis of the policies and institutions that they recommend to the developing countries. Virtually all of them used tariffs and subsidies to promote industries, while they did not even have such “basic” institutions as democracy, a central bank, patent law, and a professional civil service until they were fairly developed. Given these historical facts, and given the fact that the recent adoption of “good policies” and “good institutions” has failed to improve the developing countries' performance, a radical rethinking of the development orthodoxy is required.
HA-JOON CHANG, Cambridge University
Economic historians and policymakers at the World Bank and the IMF share a concern with the processes and institutions underlying development. They are also similar in that they do not always demonstrate sufficient appreciation of how important context can be. Too often economic historians suggest that the particular case they have analyzed in great detail is so rich as to reveal general truths about the way the world works. Development economists at international organizations, on the other hand, are prone to believing that they already know the general truths, and need only to implement the requisite policies to achieve their principal goal of stimulating growth. I argue that the productivity of both groups could be much enhanced by an explicitly comparative perspective—one that recognizes that the processes and institutions of growth can vary enormously, if systematically as well, across different countries.
KENNETH SOKOLOFF, University of California, Los Angeles
Economic historians hypothesize that households in the nineteenth century substituted away from carbohydrates and fiber and towards protein and fat as their incomes rose, and that this substitution explains a significant portion of the height gains seen since that time. I reject the hypothesis that the income elasticity of fiber is less than the income elasticity of protein, fat, or sugar—contrary to what has been posited by the nutrition-stature hypothesis. Using parametric and nonparametric techniques, I find the shares of carbohydrates, fat, and sugar in the diet vary with household income, but the shares of protein and fiber do not. In looking at the diet calorically, however, I reject the hypothesis of income elasticity equality between cereal calories and meat calories, and also between cereal calories and dairy calories. These results imply that substitution between food groups is more prevalent than substitution between nutrient groups, and this in turn implies that nutrition-based market interventions are not likely to have their desired effect.
TREVON D. LOGAN, University of California, Berkeley
The Antebellum Puzzle refers to the unusual situation in the nineteenth-century United States when average human heights declined in the decades preceding the Civil War although the economy was growing. The literature argues that economic forces can explain a substantial proportion of this puzzle. In order to address this issue, we have collected a sample of human heights from passport applications over the period 1830–1924 that allows us to construct a series of the net-nutritional status of the economically better-off for both males and females, representing predominantly the urban North East. We also address local determinants of the biological standard of living. The results show that the middle class managed to overcome the adversities associated with the transformation of the economy better than the average population. The gains in stature in the long run were larger among females than among males.
MARCO SUNDER, University of Munich
This paper introduces a large sample of nineteenth-century inmates in western prisons to assess how the opening of the West may have influenced biological living standards. Segregating inmates by nativity, North American inmates were the tallest, followed by Norwegian, Australian, and Irish inmates. Through its proximity to Asia and Latin America, the west had a proportionally greater composition of Asian and Latin American ethnicities. The stature of inmates born in the West increased over time while the stature of Latin Americans remained roughly constant and Asian stature decreased. Disaggregating inmates by birth in western states indicates that the Antebellum Paradox may not have been as prolonged in the West and that the mean stature of inmates from Utah, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington exceeded the mean stature of convicts from Arizona, New Mexico, and California.
SCOTT CARSON, University of Texas, Permian Basin
The transition from childhood dependency to adolescent employment formed a major life-cycle stage for most working-class children in eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century England. This paper speculates about the complex set of interactions between the household and the labor market that accompanied the transition to work in the English labor market between 1750 and 1851. How did this near universal transition alter through time and in what ways did demographic change and the diversification of the English economy lead to a secular decline in the need for child labor? Several discussion points are considered, including child dependency, the age at leaving home, diverse sectoral demand for child workers, state intervention, and urbanization.
PETER KIRBY, University of Manchester
The industrial revolution in Europe gave rise to many new types of industrial and manufacturing processes, which in turn increased the demand for child labor. This paper compares the case of Britain with the continent, specifically with Belgium and the German principality of Hess-Cassel. Various factory and manufacturing data are used to explore the incidence and causes of child labor for three different European regions during their respective transitions from agrarian towards more industrialized economies. In this paper we assess the move in each country towards labor laws limiting the use of children in factories and mines. The evolution of educational reforms and the rise of mass schooling are also compared to assess how they differentially affected the supply of children to the labor market and the nature of a child's workday within the three European regions.
SIMONE WEGGE, College of Staten Island – CUNY, AND CAROLYN TUTTLE, Lake Forest College
This paper uses a broad sample of English farm accounts to measure the wages and employment of female day-laborers between 1740 and 1850. Relatively little information is available about this group of workers, but new data from farm wage books will allow me to construct indexes, and to test previous hypotheses based on smaller amounts of data. I will construct a wage index for male and female summer and winter wages. Female wages were not, as is sometimes claimed, constant throughout this period. I will examine how female employment varied with farm size and output, as well as with date and region. Female employment is measured as the percentage of total labor days worked by females during a given year.
JOYCE BURNETT, Wabash College
Contrary to the assumption of technology being a free good, technology tends to be tacit and difficult to reproduce. This makes it hard for latecomers to catch up and negates any Pareto optimality with respect to competitive policy. When technology is not “free,” developing countries can either act to raise their productivity or to lower their wages in order to compete even in markets in which they, in theory, have a comparative advantage. Which choice did they make, and how did it affect their development?
ALICE AMSDEN, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Japan's post–World War II economic development challenges economics, either neoclassical or something else such as Marxist, in two opposing ways. First, high economic growth from the 1950s to the 1980s does not fit well with a standard microeconomic theory, because price distortions created by government's industrial policy apparently did not result in suboptimal performance of growth. Second, zero or negative economic growth since the 1990s does not please conventional macroeconomic theories, because recovery policy prescriptions coming out of textbooks, either Keynesian or monetarist, have not cured the economy's serious illness.
TAKASHI HIKINO, Kyoto University
It has now been acknowledged that minimizing state intervention and simply “getting the prices right” is not sufficient to sustain economic growth in LDCs. Within policy circles, attention has been redirected to reforming the state and increasing its regulatory capacity. Yet, despite the fact that the private sector is now seen as the engine of development in developing countries, neoclassical economics has paid little attention to the firm. Implicit in neoclassical theory is a world of competitive industries in which firms are price-takers and relative prices are the main determinants of private-sector oligopolized industries in which firms create and exploit competitive advantages. To the detriment of both, these two literatures remain largely distinct, particularly with respect to developing countries. It is incumbent upon economists to bring the firm into their analysis and policy prescriptions. Failure to do so leads to an inability to account for anomalous results and increases the potential for policy mistakes.
HELEN SHAPIRO, University of California, Santa Cruz
Persistent deflation in the Atlantic economies of the late nineteenth century created financial pressures on debtors, especially governments and railroads, that led to widespread financial crises in the 1890s. Faced with a common shock, the major stock exchanges in the first global financial market nevertheless responded in quite different ways; the result of differences in their political and legal environments and the persistence of their respective microstructures. Their distinctive responses to the challenges of deflation at the time provide a natural experiment for examining the results of different government policies and different financial innovations for the effective functioning of capital markets. We conclude that the New York and London stock exchanges were the most innovative, and their innovations the most beneficial for the long-run growth of their respective economies.
LANCE DAVIS, California Institute of Technology, LARRY NEAL, University of Illinois, AND EUGENE WHITE, Rutgers University
The recent crisis in Argentina raises many questions about the role of financial institutions in restructuring sovereign debt defaults. We believe that there are many lessons to be learned from economic history, especially the Council of Foreign Bondholders (CFB). Established in 1868, the CFB was an association of private investors that helped to coordinate actions by lenders in response to debt defaults. Drawing from the archival sources of the CFB and a new database of weekly sovereign debt prices, we analyze the effectiveness of different types of contracts used to promote sovereign repayment. The study should provide new insight into the role of financial institutions in resolving international debt crises.
KRIS MITCHENER, Santa Clara University, AND MARC WEIDENMIER, Claremont McKenna College
This paper documents the transition of the U.S. money supply from the mixture of fiat and bank paper, certificates, and foreign coins that circulated at various exchange rates with the British pound during the colonial period to the unified dollar standard of the early national period, and the importance of this standardization in bringing order to the nation's finances and facilitating the accumulation and intermediation of capital. It describes how the struggle of the colonies to maintain viable substitutes for hard money—a struggle that ultimately allowed output and productivity to rise—set the stage for the financial leaders of the Federalist period, led by Alexander Hamilton, to settle upon the dollar, attach it to a convertible metallic base, and create a national bank that issued notes denominated in the new monetary unit. It also presents the first estimate of the U.S. money stock for 1790–1820 and relates them to the nation's industrial modernization around 1815. The essay concludes by contrasting the asymmetric real effects of “good” and “bad” monetary policy in the early United States through a brief account of the Jackson years, including the displacement of the specie base in 1836.
PETER ROUSSEAU, Vanderbilt University
Since 1880 American popular music professionals have crafted production and marketing systems based upon creating hits. Until the 1880s American music publishers largely exploited European songs, which were not then protected by reciprocal international copyright licensing. At that point, a group of young New York publishers began promoting the works of American songwriters, at first utilizing vaudeville performers. Collectively, these publishers and the writers they employed developed a style of producing songs on demand that still prevails today. Mass media helped publishers and songwriters develop their copyrights as musical properties. By 1890 piano rolls and recordings supplemented sheet music. After 1920 radio and motion pictures provided new means of popularizing songs, with television increasing such opportunities following World War II. The performance rights licensing organization Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), organized by radio interests in 1940 to compete with the older American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), dramatically altered the music industry by admitting anyone who chose to join, paying royalties on the basis of recorded as well as live performances, and determining royalty distributions on the basis of non-network as well as network broadcasts. These practices opened up the music industry to thousands of new musicians.
JOHN RUMBLE, Vanderbilt University
Much remains to be learned about the speed and character of transformation imposed on the late medieval economy by the Black Death of 1348/49. While the impact of late medieval demographic crises on England's agrarian and economic arrangements was profound, it was neither immediate nor consistent across space and time. Indeed, perhaps as important as the transformation of late medieval England's economic structure was a transformation in the economic mindset of the landlord, a transformation that lagged well behind the structural accommodations to which the landlord acceded. This paper examines the abbot of St. Edmunds's reaction to greater peasant mobility and to an array of local conditions when he formulated the policy for his estate during the second half of the fourteenth century. It devotes particular attention to the pace at which his seigniorial policies and his economic mentality were transformed.
DAVID ROUTT, University of Richmond
According to the conventional view, the early Middle Ages were characterized by the emergence of the bi-partite manor as the dominant form of agricultural organization and the devolution of centralized government to seigniorial authorities whose public functions were financed by the product of the demesne. The arrangement has been attributed to the collapse of markets at the end of the Roman era and generalized insecurity in a space now governed by peoples without a strong tradition of statehood. This paper reviews this account by analyzing its historiography, the significance of the persistence of the late Roman fiscal system in the successor kingdoms, and the persistence of local and long-distance markets. That review indicates that the stylized facts regarding the medieval manor as a primitive economic form adapted to a world with few markets are mostly wrong, and that the disintegration of the state in the post-Roman and Viking periods was much less pronounced that the conventional view holds. These indications, if borne out by future research, have profound implications for the economic history of the West as a history of the rise of markets and civil liberty.
GEORGE GRANTHAM, McGill University
In the modern sense of the word, a market economy is defined as universally valid institutions that protect property rights, regulate their transfer by consent, and guarantee compliance with obligations. In this strict sense, a market economy did not exist before the eighteenth or even the nineteenth centuries. But this paper shows that craft guilds conveyed the values required to set up such an economy. They fostered the spread of markets in pre-industrial societies. Considering the fact that, under the conditions of low degree of freedom, high insecurity and uncertainty, and no commercial rules, productive incentives are weak, we can conclude that craft guilds cause a change in incentives. The better personal integrity and property rights are protected, the stronger productive incentives become. All other things being equal, craft guilds should lead to a rise in productivity by fostering specialization.
CHRISTELLE MOUGEOT, University Nancy 2
Economic historians explaining the divergent economic paths in North and South America over time focus on the postindependence period in the former British or Spanish colonies. Their explanation for Latin American economic backwardness is anchored in the political disorder that occurred in the postcolonial period, which did not provide the right conditions for economic growth. Yet, more important than political aspects, fiscal and monetary fragmentation of the Spanish Empire were major factors in hindering the economic growth later in the nineteenth century. This paper argues that economic struggle over resources determined political outcomes rather than the other way round. By assessing the macroeconomic effects of independence on the contemporary and further economic and political development it shows that comparisons with North America are ill conceived. The study focuses on the disintegration of colonial fiscal and monetary regime, that had organized the economy around silver mining and the export of silver currency as fiscal revenues, and the subsequent transformation into export-led economies, specialized in producing raw materials and foodstuffs.
MARIA ALEHANDRA IRIGOIN, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
The paper deals with two transitions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The first transition includes the early postwar period, when the region moved toward the Soviet model, the second treats movements to the market-type system. In the early postwar period the main economic policy measures contained reconstruction, nationalization, implementation of monetary reforms in order to eliminate wartime and postwar inflation, realization of land reform, and finally introduction of short-term central planning mechanisms. The second transition started with the collapse of the Soviet-type system and continued with monetary stabilization, economic liberalization. and privatization. CEE countries' aim is to be integrated into the European Union. These two transitions provide abundant examples for the changing roles of the market and the state in the economy.
TAMÁS RÉI, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
This paper seeks to provide an improved understanding of the origins of democracy. It begins by developing a theoretical model to demonstrate how exogenous economic conditions can influence both the incentives to establish democratic institutions and the likelihood that such institutions survive. The model predicts that democratic institutions will expand where they mitigate important time-inconsistency problems and, therefore, encourage investment. Exogenous conditions determine the magnitude of those time-inconsistency problems and, hence, the likelihood of democracy. A comparison of ancient Greet city-states suggests that the conditions under which democracy first emerged support the model. Other potential applications are discussed.
ROBERT FLECK, Montana State University
The purported failure of the classical quantity theory of money in the colonial economy is shown to be a failure of data and not a failure of theory. When new data on the quantity of specie in circulation per year—the first of their kind ever constructed for colonial America—are added to the current data on paper money and prices, and econometrically estimated in both short- and long-run monetary models for the colony of Pennsylvania, the long-debated anomaly regarding the performance of the classical quantity theory of money in the colonial economy disappears. For example, from 1729 through 1775, per capita total real money balances are found to exhibit a stationary process with no trend. How paper money was backed and could be exchanged for specie was important, but not in the way theorists assert.
FARLEY GRUBB, University of Delaware
Historians have argued that home cloth production across New York State declined after the Erie Canal was built because it became more attractive for farmers to produce for market and purchase cloth than to produce their own cloth. Their arguments are supported by county-level census data that show that cloth production was lower in counties with water access to New York City than those without, and that home cloth production declined once cheap water access was available. It is not clear whether production declined because of the changing behavior of existing farmers, however, or because of an influx of new migrants. This paper addresses this question by linking households recorded in the 1825, 1835, and 1845 state censuses from three districts in New York, and comparing the behavior of the households that stayed within a district and those that were new to a district.
ANDREW COLEMAN, University of Michigan
This paper examines nearly 1,000 poor to middling citizen households from the city of Amsterdam with a view to assessing their place in the larger wealth distribution of the city as preliminarily sketched by the work of Soltow, van Zanden, and others. It utilizes the probate inventories drawn up by the Amsterdam Municipal Orphanage, which, when coupled with the marriage, baptism, and burial records of the city archives, allow for the reconstruction of the household circumstances, material, financial, and demographic, of the families associated with the institution. These data yield detailed information about precisely the kind of people who were systematically excluded from the tax registers and asset accounts which form the basis for most of our knowledge about wealth holding in the past. The lower portion of the wealth distribution will be drawn and then linked via housing rental rates to the larger distribution of all social classes in the city.
ANNE MCCANTS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
This paper uses a range of statistics to explore financial transition in Southeast Asia and Japan before the Second World War. In 1913 per capital incomes in Southeast Asia and Japan were similar. By then Japan had acquired a modern financial system comparable to those in the West. But finance in Southeast Asian countries was (and remained in 1939) little developed, dominated by metropolitan interests, considerably reliant on informal finance, and heavily geared toward primary commodity exports. The paper argues that the slowness of Southeast Asia's financial transition is explained by a continued ability to tap natural resources, a predominance of small farmers, and the laissez-faire stance of governments. By contrast, Japan could not depend on abundant resources for growth. Japanese experience demonstrates how political objectives pursued by a committed government can accelerate financial transition and the eventual rewards of achieving this in terms of economic development and military power.
W. G. HUFF, University of Glasgow
Contrary to the claim of Pomeranz and other “world historians,” the prosperous parts of Asia between 1500 and 1800 look similar to the stagnating southern, central, and eastern parts of Europe rather than the developing northwestern parts. In India and China, grain wages were comparable to those in northwestern Europe, but silver wages were substantially lower. The high grain wages of the most prosperous parts of India and China can be attributed to the high share of agriculture in economic activity and the high yield of rice relative to wheat, with comparatively little development of a high value-added structure above the subsistence agrarian system. The “Great Divergence” between Europe and Asia was already well underway before 1800.
STEPHEN BROADBERRY, University of Warwick, AND BISHNUPRIYA GUPTA, University of Warwick
In this paper we investigate the evidence for convergence in per capita incomes across 124 economies during the period 1950–1998 and assess the impact that international trade patterns had on this process. Traditional analysis of income convergence has tended to focus on growth and to leave issues of distribution largely aside. However, the distribution dynamics approach adopted here, which involves nonparametric estimation techniques, allows us to asses the dynamics of both growth and distribution simultaneously. The paper thus builds on our earlier work where we have used distribution dynamics to examine income convergence in a relatively small sample of OECD economies for 1870–1992. One of the main results there was that distributional convergence was a temporary phenomenon, largely confined to the Golden Age. This paper extends the analysis in two major ways. First, conditioning is used to examine the importance of potential causal factors in processes of distributional convergence. Hence, it will be asked whether the interaction among economies trading with each other affected the dynamics of the international income distribution.
MAX-STEPHAN SCHULZE, London School of Economics, PHILIP EPSTEIN, London School of Economics, AND PETER HOWLETT, London School of Economics