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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2005
This book is a commendably ambitious undertaking, but its author winds up biting off considerably more than he can chew, at least very easily. Jonathan Fox's ambition is to explain the overall relationship(s) between religion and conflict in the last decade of the 20th century and, presumably, the first years of the new century, as well. This is an important topic if ever there was one. Anyone who doubts it should simply review recent newspaper headlines, in either online or hard-copy formats, or notice that library shelves are now groaning under the weight of all the recent works on the subject.
Fox begins by calling the reader's attention to what seemed to many observers the virtually unexpected revival of religious practices around the world in recent decades. It was unexpected because reigning theories of modernization predicted the opposite: as societies became modernized and citizens became better educated, religion would play a diminished role. What follows is an extensive literature review in which Fox takes the reader through a procession of explanations for the contemporary religious revival. Looming large in these accounts are two related explanations. First, the process of modernization produces a kind of backlash against itself as the result of its profoundly disturbing social and psychological effects on large numbers of the tradition-bound. Second, at the personal level, modern secular societies leave individuals in a spiritual void because they fail to answer the most basic human questions about the purpose of life and death, especially since such “secular religions” as Marxism have been found wanting, to say the least.
Fox next turns his attention to the perplexing matter of religion and conflict: why the former should be related to the latter. Once again, readers are offered an extensive literature review, with contending theories grouped into discrete categories. Fox begins this excursion by noting the obvious paradox of the major monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, Islam—expressing the lofty goals of peace and human reconciliation while simultaneously being associated with mass murder and the darkest forms of barbarism. Fox considers the possibility that Islam represents an exception, that it is a religion whose adherents are more susceptible to the appeals of violence than those of the other two revealed religions. But he marshals considerable evidence to demonstrate this is not the case. In so doing, Fox, employing his data set, emphasizes a number of structural explanations for the religion–violence link, including the nature of the political regimes that rule societies and the relative sizes of religious majorities and minorities functioning within them.
All this commentary—the extended literature reviews that take up more than half the book—constitutes the prologue to Fox's real work, an analysis of Ted Gurr's Minorities at Risk data set. Gurr's data set was developed to assess threats posed to ethnic minorities around the world. Some of these ethnic minorities express religions differently from those of the majorities in the countries in which they live—for example, Tamils in Sri Lanka. But others, such as Basques in Spain, do not. In other words, Fox employs a data set intended to measure one thing—minorities at risk—and uses it for another purpose. In pursuing this goal, he restricts its use to cases where religion and ethnicity overlap. Hence, the analysis is really about ethnoreligious conflicts, not simply the role of religion in conflict per se.
At this point Fox deploys standard social-science techniques. First, he develops a model, a modified version of the one Gurr uses, according to which discrimination produces grievances, which in turn stimulate mobilization, which gives rise to protest and rebellion. Fox's model, naturally enough, begins with measures of religious discrimination and “provocative actions by a religious minority” before embarking on its journey through the chain of causality up to protest and rebellion (pp. 163–65). Second, from this model of ethnoreligious conflict Fox derives six hypotheses, which he then proceeds to test. Space does not permit a rendition of all of them. The first two and most important hypotheses are (1) that religious discrimination leads a minority ethnic group to the formation of religious grievances; and (2) that these religious grievances then produce protest and rebellion that are either not supported or only weakly supported by the data analysis. Fox then seeks to figure out why the results appear disappointing—that is, why the data do not conform to his logically deduced expectations. What follows is a combination of more sophisticated statistical analysis and the kind of ex post facto speculation common to many social-science enterprises. Fox's general message is that the links between religious discrimination, ethnicity, mobilization, and protest/rebellion are far more nuanced than he had anticipated.
In sum, Fox has engaged in an ambitious and worthwhile project on an exceptionally important subject. But he has not discovered a Rosetta Stone, uncovering the secrets of the relationship between religion and political violence.