This joint effort by Klabbers, Peters, and Ulfstein has produced a remarkable book that discusses one of the most contested notions about the international legal order today—whither its constitutionalization. The authors tease out the complex issues, particularly on fragmentation, pluralization, verticalization, privatization, et al. and, unlike other expositions, use domestic constitutionalist analogies only where applicable to international law. Their aim is to straddle the normative and descriptive modalities to “make visible what might be called the invisible constitution of the international community” (p. 4).Footnote 1
The book is divided into seven somewhat discrete chapters. Klabbers, in the Introduction, outlines the book’s framework, drawing on parallels in European Union (EU) law to illustrate the process of international law’s constitutionalization. He states that given the increasing fragmentation of international law, two models of constitutionalization (federalism and hierarchy) and three techniques (subsidiarity, margin of appreciation, and proportionality) can be discerned. These he discusses in turn with respect to their usefulness to the constitutionalism discourse which needs to be both pluralist (possessing a diversity of actors and values) and legitimate (in procedure, substance, and the actions of participants).
Within this framework, Ulfstein introduces the main contributors to global constitutional law—institutions—and analyses how such international empowerment should maintain democratic accountability and rule of law guarantees, and uphold human rights. Expounding on how international co-operation takes place in formal international organizations, treaty bodies, and soft law organizations, Ulfstein delves deeply into the web of relationships among the institutions themselves and between such institutions and member states. He posits that while the United Nations (UN) has the broadest general competence, the disparate and fragmented architecture within which the UN and myriad other organizations operate limit international governance. While it might be rational to overcome fragmentation by integrating overlapping institutions or establishing a hierarchy, there is opposition to this within specialized regimes like international environmental law, not to mention on the grander scale of global governance. Moreover, integration might not generate greater effectiveness, especially where dynamic systems are already in place. Similarly, while the hierarchical ordering of institutions might bring clarity and focus to the general framework, it might not further efficiency, given that structural adjustments might bring more disadvantages than advantages. Ulfstein concludes that while the powers of international institutions are necessary for the working of the global order, the principles of legality and subsidiarity and greater human rights guarantees must be applied to prevent abuse of powers by such organizations.
In chapter three, Klabbers tackles the long-standing problem of what international law is and how it is made within a “constitutionalizing” system. He notes the infinite variety of international law and moves beyond the conventional making of treaty and customary law to discuss the pertinence of soft law—and its lack of the guarantees (e.g. democracy and accountability) afforded by formal law-making, and the difficulties in defining the amorphous area between law and non-law. Critiquing modern international law theories as inadequate for capturing the idea of a constitutionalist international law, Klabbers propounds several ideas of legal philosophers such as Hart and Fuller that might distinguish law from non-law in a constitutional world order, whilst conceding that there are hard cases.
Discussing the international judiciary, Ulfstein observes that there are differences between the due process requirements (expertise, independence, equal access, and fair hearing) of municipal courts and international courts—for example, while judges are often expected to be legal experts, the election of international judges is political and compromises are sometimes needed to accommodate the need for expert knowledge specific to the tribunal and international law. Unlike the national system, international tribunals are not hierarchically organized but a plethora of different systems, where competing jurisdictions, inconsistent judgments, and the overburdening of international courts with a multiplicity of cases might occur. In the face of such dangers, Ulfstein stresses that international tribunals must relate to the judiciary and legislature at the international and national levels, and that the tribunals should act constitutionally by respecting the special expertise and precedents of other courts in arriving at their decisions.
Reading chapters five (Membership in the Global Constitutional Community) and six (Dual Democracy) together, Peters discusses in great detail the participants of the international community—individuals, states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and business actors. What is most interesting is the acknowledgement of the “other” significant players, apart from states, in the constitutionalization of international law, and how the emphasis on human rights and democracy widens the arena of participation. Democracy is particularly important as a plurality of voices would balance out the present inequalities. To that end, Peters discusses a multiplicity of accountability mechanisms for global governance, such as judicial protections and “output legitimacy”, and cautions that one formula cannot provide an all-encompassing solution to the democratic deficit, though a combination of mechanisms might achieve the best outcome.
In the concluding chapter, while acknowledging the relevance of the constitutionalist paradigm, Peters also addresses the challenges it faces, including whether it is merely an academic exercise rather than entirely reflective of power and politics, or that it oversells itself without actual added value, or even that it muffles the interests and cultures of developing states. Be that as it may, Peters ends on a cautiously positive note, opining that debates about the constitutionalization of international law are useful, contributing (to a certain extent) legitimacy as well as a richer legal discourse.
This book brings one up to date with current normative ideas about international law. Well researched and clearly written, it introduces many new ideas whilst explaining and critiquing existing constitutionalist arguments, though it presupposes familiarity with the subject matter to get the most out of the book. That said, it is more a book to be dipped into than to be read cover to cover, given the discrete structure of each chapter and the nature of the issues analysed.
