Andrew March's The Caliphate of Man challenges the common but somewhat facile opinion that Islam's emphasis on divine sovereignty and sharīʿa renders it inhospitable to democracy. March does so by means of a thorough, thematic analysis of a number of important modern Muslim thinkers, drawing on a Muslim political tradition that goes back to the Quran itself.
Beginning in the preface, March situates his subject in the context of the Arab Spring, and the burgeoning, mostly unfulfilled desire for democracy in the Muslim world. He argues that a potential germ of democracy in Islam may be found in the traditional Muslim notion that the Muslim community (umma) should confirm the selection of the caliph, God's representative and vicegerent on earth (11–12). This teaching has been interpreted in various ways according to historical conditions. In classical times, absolute rulers managed to hold any effective notion of popular authority in abeyance. As March puts it, “the people figure very modestly in this tradition” (29), which relegated popular consensus to a “founding myth of lost paradise” (31). Yet the “sleeping Umma,” to use March's helpful metaphor, was waiting to be aroused, and given its due opportunity in modern times. In particular, the fall of the last great Muslim empire and crisis of the caliphate in the 1920s forced Muslims to reconsider their political system, giving rise to a number of polemics about the political future of Islam (38ff.).
March proceeds to interpret the development of the concept of popular sovereignty in five important twentieth-century Muslim thinkers: Rashīd Riḍā, ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī, Abū’l Aʿla Mawdūdī, Sayyid Quṭb, and Rāshid Ghannūshī. In the first four thinkers, the notion is present but clearly incomplete. Riḍā favored a restored Caliphate resting on some kind of community-wide consent, but ascribes more importance to the consent of the scholarly elite than that of the people as a whole (61). Sanhūrī also felt that a fusion of popular and elite opinion was needed to safeguard sharīʿa (69–71). As for Mawdūdī and Quṭb, their theoretical eagerness to win popular confirmation of sharīʿa was constrained by the utopian character of their political reliance on it, to which no people as a whole would easily consent. In cases of disagreement between sharīʿa and the people, they would take the side of sharīʿa (75–76, 93, 97–98, 146, 151–52). Nevertheless, Mawdūdī grants the people a certain authority to choose the officials endowed with “executive power,” as well as to disobey these officials who violate sharīʿa (98ff.). It is less obvious to me what Quṭb's “elaborate apologia for divine sovereignty” (146) contributes to this theme.
The most original chapter of the book focuses on Ghannūshī (1941–), an active participant in Tunisian political and intellectual life whom March has personally interviewed (218). March highlights Ghannūshī's strenuous efforts to reconcile Islamic thought and democracy. Ghannūshī asserts much more unequivocally than his predecessors that the ultimate right to choice and representation of God belongs to the Umma as a whole (154ff.). In seeking to realize this representation, he focuses less on political institutions and statecraft than on Islamic education (164). He ascribes the Madisonian doctrine of separation of powers to “materialism” (185–86, 196–97), arguing that it encourages conflict rather than the cooperation and “mutual consultation” mandated by Islam. While not nearly as utopian as some of his predecessors, Ghannūshī's faith in Islam as a force that could tame the quarrelsome elements of human nature still sets him apart from many Western liberals. Nevertheless, Ghannūshī chose to participate in Tunisia's emerging democracy, whose 2014 constitution (see https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf) is more clearly democratic than Islamic (205–6, 217). Was this simply a concession to reality? March arrives at the intriguing conclusion that Ghannūshī “shows us the limits of a political theory that is fully Islamic and fully democratic” (154).
Lucid and superbly researched, March's book is nonetheless not entirely satisfying. Despite a spirited and highly useful effort to refute the assumption that Islamic thought is inherently incompatible with democracy, March never quite asserts the opposite. He repeatedly describes the thought articulated in the book as “ideal” (4, 73, 221), without fully clarifying its relationship to the Islamic world's notorious struggles with democratization in this “nonideal world” (223). Nor does March address in any detail the light that the authors he interprets may shed on certain immediate obstacles to democracy in much of Islamic world, such as regimes whose rule rests more on brute force of arms rather than on popular sovereignty, religion, or theory of any meaningful kind (225). March acknowledges on several occasions that the thinkers he discusses have not elaborated an institutional framework that could reconcile democracy and Islam (117, 146–47, 164, 186–87). This failure distinguishes them from Hobbes and his successors, who succeeded partly because they not only developed democratic theory, but explained how democratic institutions could work. March's frequent comparisons between modern Islamic and Western thought are immensely helpful, especially for those less versed in the former, but do not say enough about this issue (87, 121, 135–36, 165, 185–86). It would be worth considering, as Ghannūshī apparently does, what role traditional Islamic legal authorities might be able to play in the judicial power of a modern democratic political system; March, however, alludes to this question only briefly (171–72). Beyond that, he does not elaborate on his concluding claim, that incorporating religious law into democracy seems “precluded by the oligarchic and bureaucratic structure of the modern state” (226).
Even more striking is the fact that March's conclusion alters, or perhaps even undoes, some of the interpretative arguments advanced in the body of the work. March goes so far as to predict that Islamist parties will, in countries such as Tunisia, yield to the new reality of “post-utopian” popular power and compromise (223ff.). In that reality, doctrines of divine sovereignty might need to be abandoned owing to the “fact of reasonable moral pluralism” (227). Yet does this mean that the Islamic thought discussed in the book is favorable to democracy, or merely compatible with it once it has relinquished its most uncompromising doctrines? March concludes by expressing the vague hope for something different from the thought interpreted in his book, an “Islamic political thought in a new register, a political Islamic political thought” (228). By the conclusion of the book, it is no longer evident what its interpretations are designed to prove. An excellent book would have been still better had it descended more regularly from the realm of ideal theory and provided more consistent answers to these practical questions.
