Soon after Frederick Douglass joined the abolitionist lecture circuit, he faced a problem: his oratorical skills so impressed his audiences that many began to doubt whether or not he truly was “a graduate of the peculiar institution.” This (among other things) led his Garrisonian mentors to attempt to rein in their new colleague. “Give us the facts,” John A. Collins instructed Douglass, “we will take care of the philosophy.” Douglass did not take this advice and, as Peter C. Myers so masterfully demonstrates in his new book, the American liberal tradition is all the richer for it.
Although it is true that Myers is, in his words, “far from the first on the scene” as a student of Douglass's political thought, the scope and depth of his study are groundbreaking. Myers is to be credited for throwing down the gauntlet to scholars of American political thought: Douglass was a serious thinker, and he is worthy of our attention as a significant voice in the ongoing conversation about the “meaning and soundness” of liberal political morality (xii).
Myers has two major aims in this book. First, he seeks to offer an explanation of “the core, not the whole, of Douglass's political thought” (13). This core, Myers argues, consists of Douglass's commitment to natural rights. Through the lens of “natural rights doctrine,” Douglass viewed all questions of political morality, and Myers focuses in particular on his application of this philosophy to the problem of “racial justice” (7). In Myers's discussion of Douglass's approach to race, we find the author's second major aim: he argues that “Douglass was right in finding in the natural rights principles of the Declaration of Independence a necessary and sufficient theoretical basis for addressing the nation's racial problems” (12). This will undoubtedly prove to be the most controversial aspect of Myers's project. But before we turn to the merits of this argument, let us see how he gets there.
Myers begins his reconstruction of Douglass's political thought by reflecting on the summum malum that animated him: the “concrete experiences” of slavery (22). Douglass thought and wrote in the shadow of slavery, and in his case against the peculiar institution, we find some of his most important contributions to liberal political thinking. Myers masterfully employs Douglass's words in order to show how he brought “into view slavery's attempts to obliterate the human character of its primary victims as distinctively social, rational, spiritual, and moral beings” (28).
Myers transitions from Douglass's critique of slavery to his affirmation of natural rights and natural law. Douglass believed natural rights philosophy was true, but that Americans had failed to apply this philosophy to all people. Here we find the heart of Douglass's project. According to Myers, the inconsistencies of American political practice and the “sophistic cleverness of slavery's defenders” compelled Douglass to offer a refined account of natural rights theory. Douglass challenged defenses of racial hierarchy by explaining that “the essential characteristics of humanity are everywhere the same” and that any differences among groups are rooted in “environmental causes” (52–53).
In the chapter on natural rights, Myers also explores Douglass's case for self-ownership. Douglass identified self-ownership as the “one idea” that animated all of his thought and yet there has been little attention paid to it in the secondary literature. Myers attempts to address this gap by exploring what Douglass meant when he declared that “Every man is the original, natural, rightful and absolute owner of his own body” (54). Douglass defended this claim by pointing to the universality of human desires and capacities. First, he argued that human beings have the desire to own themselves. Second, human beings have the “capacity for self-ownership.” The rational, volitional, and moral capacities of human beings, Douglass contended, are the “natural powers” that provide “the foundation of our natural rights” (54).
Myers proceeds to spell out in some detail the “natural law” side of Douglass's thought. Perhaps surprisingly, Myers's discussion of Douglass's use of natural law focuses less on appeals to the idea as a basis for humanitarian intervention to liberate slaves than it does on the natural law obligations of the slaves to liberate themselves. In Douglass's view, the “bearer of natural rights held compelling natural duties to practice the virtues necessary to secure and sustain those rights” (57). Although Myers's discussion of the natural-law obligations of those whose rights are being violated is fascinating and important, one cannot help but wish he had devoted more attention to the natural-law obligations individuals have to vindicate the rights of others. Clearly Douglass believed individuals must practice certain virtues to secure and sustain their freedom. It is also clear, however, that he offered another kind of natural-law argument: he tried to convince northern moderates that they had natural-law obligations to close the gap between the promise of universal natural rights made in the Declaration of Independence and the realities of American life.
From this discussion of natural law, Myers transitions to a consideration of how Douglass used this lens to read the Constitution as antislavery. Whenever one thinks about Douglass's reading of the Constitution, one must confront the difficult question: Is it possible to read Douglass as anything other than an “interpretive cheater”? In other words, can antislavery constitutionalists make any claim to interpretive fidelity? Myers contends that we can read Douglass as a faithful interpreter if we focus on his fidelity to the moral core of the Founding documents. He read the Constitution “as it truly was in its essential, completed form, with its disfiguring provisional scaffolding finally removed in fulfillment of its original design” (109).
After providing these accounts of Douglass's antislavery views of natural and positive law, Myers proceeds to provide an account of Douglass as a would-be “founder of a new order.” According to Myers, there are two central components of Douglass's postwar “Constitution of Liberty”: virtue and fairness. First, he thought it was essential that individuals practice the “virtues of self-reliance or self-making” (113). In addition to exhorting individuals to behave virtuously, Douglass's “Constitution of Liberty” requires fairness. According to Myers, Douglass's belief in fairness led him to oppose colonization, segregation, and the Black Codes and to endorse equal political and civil rights for all citizens of the United States.
In the last full chapter and conclusion, Myers examines Douglass's views of racial justice and makes the case for the continuing relevance of these views. He argues that his principled natural-rights, liberal approach to race relations in America is particularly relevant to our own times. Although Myers resists the temptation “to speculate on the precise positions” Douglass would take on various public policy questions, he contends that “it is far from idle—it is, instead, urgently necessary—for us to reflect on the present vitality of Douglass's core conviction that faith in America's promise of justice for all rests on solid rational grounds” (200). Here we find the core of Myers's argument about Douglass's relevance today: his commitment to the natural-rights principles at the core of the American experiment is superior to the “radical” rejection of those principles by other African-American thinkers (196). Myers even goes so far as to say that “the argument of Douglass lives on” in the arguments of thinkers such as Orlando Patterson, Juan Williams, Thomas Sowell, Shelby Steele, and John McWhorter (202–3). Here Myers is sure to provoke the ire of some readers. While it is certainly true that Douglass's commitment to the fundamental soundness of natural-rights liberalism separates him from radicals of the past and present, one cannot help but wonder if he would have been radicalized by the experience of African Americans since the time of his death (1895). I am inclined to think that Myers's conclusion on this matter is basically correct, but such conclusions must always be modest and tentative; we cannot know for sure how the twentieth century would have altered Douglass's perspective.
Myers' book is a truly excellent study of an important American thinker. He is to be credited for offering a clear and compelling explanation of the core of Douglass's political thought. His application of this core to the problem of racial justice in Douglass's time and our own is sure to inspire a lively discussion about the soundness of liberalism as a lens of political morality.
