The Franco-German partnership inside the Eurozone has experienced several ups and downs since the 2008 crisis, making it useful to examine how the two allies attempted to overcome their differences in the past in order to build a monetary union. That is the work of Amaury de Saint Périer, who sets out to study the birth of the European Monetary System (EMS) from 1974 until its first steps. Officially created in 1979, the EMS introduced an exchange rate mechanism that tied European currencies permanently together within an agreed margin of fluctuation. Because it put monetary integration at the center of the European project for the first time, the launch of the EMS is considered the real beginning of the European monetary union that was effective in 2001.

The creation of the EMS has already been the topic of several academic works: Peter Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System: A Case Study of the Politics of the European Community (1982), Jean-Pierre Patat, Histoire de l'Europe monétaire (1998), Kenneth Dyson, Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (1994), and last but not least, Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the European Monetary System (2012). Unfortunately, the author does not mention most of this literature in the bibliography. In fact, Saint Périer's book is more a bilateral study than a work on the collective process toward monetary union. The book takes a closer look at the role of the leaders of the major European countries in building the “EMS.” Moreover, one important contribution of this book is that it is based on primary sources and archival records from various French institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bank of France, and the office of the president of the Republic; however, it is regrettable that the author did not consult the equivalent records in Germany. Recollections of key protagonists in France as well as in Germany—such as the leaders Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt—complete the historical sources and give priority to the political point of view.

In the introduction, Saint Périer points out continuities from the 1969 summit in The Hague—which brought out the idea of a unique currency—to the creation of the “currency snake” in 1973. Having briefly reminded us of the history of the monetary union from its beginning until its legacy in the 1960s, he examines the slow, difficult, but continuous process of monetary cooperation from 1974 onward. The author sheds light on the political negotiations between the main protagonists, the French president Giscard and the German chancellor Schmidt. The outcome was all but certain at the time, and the book outlines the emergence of the political will for monetary cooperation at the highest political level. The first part of the book focuses on various attempts by the French president to develop his monetary projects from 1974 to 1977. In spite of the Fourcade memorandum and the Duisenberg proposals that were discussed, the project failed because the economic conditions were particularly difficult: inflation and unemployment set in as the crisis unfolded. The recession, together with the growing gap between the weak franc and the strong deutsche mark (DM), led to deep disagreements as to which economic policy to pursue. A French policy based on economic stimulus was one of the first major disruptions between France and Germany, as it was considered too lax by the latter. In less than two years, the French currency twice entered and came out of the monetary snake, ruining the French project.

The book's second part describes 1978 as a decisive moment to renew the European project. The French president took advantage of the political distance between the United States and Germany and of a favorable economic climate to relaunch his proposal at the European Council session in Copenhagen in April. This part focuses on the necessary convergence in policy beliefs of the two leaders, which brought reconciliation in 1978 when Raymond Barre became prime minister of France. The first step was the approval of a monetary stability zone by the state members, followed by the creation of a common currency—the European Currency Unit, or ECU—and of the European Monetary Fund (in accordance with the influential Belgian economist Robert Triffin's plea for European integration). Set up by the Franco-German reconciliation, the EMS was approved at last, in 1979, by the nine members of the European Economic Community.

In the last part of the book, the author explains that the difficulties the EMS initially faced—the second oil shock, the weakness of the DM, and the rise of the dollar—did not undermine its credibility but reinforced the German position in favor of “convergence” (p. 311).

Compared with the existing literature, this book presents a complementary view of European integration. The precise chronology of the book explains well the long road to the EMS following the end of the Bretton Woods system. I have two small criticisms: first, there is unequal treatment of France's and Germany's points of view, the latter being underestimated; second, this book could have been more explicit about the dilemma that was a part of a long-term process in the EMS's creation and that remained a significant issue since the 1960s, namely, the profound divergence between France and Germany on the European integration process (i.e., economic convergence before or after monetary union?). However, because technical negotiations are clearly explained, the whole book will be easy to understand for nonexpert readers, and with its lively style, it reads like a novel.