Uzi Rabi's study reassesses the four-decade reign of Saʿid bin Taymur (1932–1970), usually depicted as an uninspiring interlude in the history of the sultanate of Oman and of minimal interest to academics. Scholars have generally perceived the coup of July 1970—whereby Sultan Qabus bin Saʿid, the current ruler of Oman, deposed his father, Saʿid bin Taymur—as a watershed event denoting a systematic change from tradition to modernity in Omani politics. Rabi's study maintains that Qabus's rule should be regarded as another phase in a continuing progression of state building in Oman. In this sense, Saʿid was not a medieval, isolationist despot but a complex ruler seeking to serve his society and government as he understood them; he maintained Oman's financial viability, guarded the country's independence, resolved the issue of the imamate, and provided the foundation for Qabus to integrate two rival versions of the state prevalent in the 1960s—Saʿid's tribal state and the British one.
Utilizing a wide variety of archival sources and a theory of state development, Uzi Rabi makes the case that the rule of Saʿid bin Taymur deserves to be seen in a more favorable light. Inheriting an economically and politically bankrupt coastal sultanate, Saʿid stabilized it for the first time since the days of the memorable ruler Saʿid bin Sultan (1806–1856) and, in due course, unified the two parts of the country. He left his son, Qabus, a balanced budget and a unified country free of imamate claims.
Nonetheless, rehabilitating Saʿid as father of the modern Omani state is troublesome. First, Oman has no specific date of independence. It was never a portion of the formal structure of the British Empire although British influence on the country was eminent. Second, Saʿid's legacy is not straightforward or institutionally uncomplicated because he was removed from power against his will. Even as Saʿid's reign should not be seen as a place in which time stood still, his pattern of rule did not meet the changing needs of the dynamic environment of the Persian Gulf in general and Oman in particular. Although the Omani reality at the time of his rise to power in 1932 had altered beyond recognition by 1970, Saʿid remained unaffected, adhering to the canons of his tribal state doctrine and the patterns of rule derived from it.
Rabi's historically detailed survey of the nature and evolution of Omani society and politics (especially the role of the tribes) under the rule of Saʿid bin Taymur contributes valuable information to the historical record and provides a thought-provoking reinterpretation of a noteworthy period in the modern history of the Arabian peninsula and pre-oil societies. In seeking to right Saʿid's historical profile and provide a more balanced view, Rabi points out that the contrast between the rule of Saʿid and Qabus was not that of medieval slumber versus modern rebirth. Saʿid contributed to the development of Oman even as the country rapidly outgrew him. He was neither a pathological miser nor a capricious recluse; rather, Saʿid responded to the challenges of his day within the parameters of his vision of the state. Rabi makes considerable effort to point out Saʿid's contributions to development and to correct scholarly misunderstandings of the period, considerably influenced by the press and official publications of the regime instituted in Oman after 1970. Nonetheless, Saʿid remains a transitional figure confronting with an ultimately outmoded worldview the whirlwind changes brought about by increasing oil revenue, the appearance and influence in Oman of expatriates associated with the petroleum industry, and the eventual rise of an internal rebellion.
Rabi utilizes the methodology of state building to explain and analyze the evolution and development of Omani society from 1932 to 1970 and after. Rabi holds the “view that the state should not be seen as an independent political actor, but rather as a political field, i.e., an arena within which diverse actors compete for influence and resources” (p. 3). His adoption of a non-Weberian version of the state as a flexible organization capable of change seems appropriate for the historical period of Omani society under analysis. As always in the social sciences, it would be desirable to quantify the types of states he mentions and the elements that are crucial to their change and performance. Rabi states, “During the reign of Saʿid bin Taymur (1932–1970), the Omani state underwent several stages of state building; each stage was facilitated by major changes in its environment and in itself was a by-product or a coalescence of different versions of the state—the sultanic, the British, and the Imamate version—that vied for primacy during the 1950s” (p. 4). Thus, the reader is left with three models of the state, which provide an element of clarity and around which the historical events from 1932 to 1970 are organized and explained. Such an inductive approach provides a wealth of material, contributes to middle-level theory building, and avoids the error of overreaching generalizations.
To students and scholars of Oman, this book provides comprehensive and fascinating data related to a little known and often neglected period of modern Omani history. I would recommend the book for libraries, graduate students, professors, researchers, and policymakers interested in contemporary Middle Eastern studies.
