America's and Britain's health care systems share at least one important characteristic. In either nation, to allege that a health policy resembles that of the other is often sufficient to kill it. Apocalyptic predictions of policy convergence abound. Government takeovers or market-driven destruction await. In transatlantic health polemics, every slope is slippery, every decision a thin-ended wedge.
Against that baroque backdrop of mutual negativity it is perhaps all the more surprising that, among some policy actors and researchers at least, ideas flow readily across the Atlantic. However, misunderstandings still arise, even among those inclined to give the other side the benefit of the doubt. American admirers of the NHS imagine it to be goal-directed, integrated and uniform. Yet despite universal coverage, minimal financial barriers to access and population-orientated primary care, they are surprised to learn of class-based health inequalities, fragmented care, unjustified clinical variationFootnote 1 and recurring but often counter-productive administrative reorganizations (which post-war history suggests are an intrinsic feature of the NHS’ direct political control).
Similarly, British policy tourists in search of the US health care system make a category mistake, comparable to talking about the western European health care system. For that is to misunderstand the geographical heterogeneity of US care delivery for 316 million people, its plural funding and a federal government with constitutionally enumerated and delimited powers. The psycho-political distance between Texas and Washington, DC resembles that of Westminster to Brussels; the physical distance is six times greater.
So why the mutual interest? Most US–UK health care comparisons are promulgated either by those seeking to prove their own system's intrinsic superiority – or the exact opposite. So comparative health policy is all too often an ideological battle between the self-deluding and self-despising.Footnote 2
Transcending this tediously superficial stereotyping, Ted Marmor and Rudolf Klein proffer an accessible collection of some of their ‘greatest hits’. This richly insightful selection of essays by two of the leading health policy scholars of their generation surveys the twentieth century macro- and micro-politics of health policy and reform on both sides of the Atlantic. Arguing that comparative analysis both aids understanding and ‘stimulates the policy imagination…enlarging our sense of what is possible’, the volume is replete with profound insights and bon mots.Footnote 3 Its terrain of inquiry spans ideologically controversial health system reforms; public health policy, panics and moral crusades; health care rationing and resource wars; disputes surrounding professional accountability and autonomy; and the recent emergence of consumerism. In addition to the ‘high politics’ of health reform, the collection includes granular multi-country analyses of topics such as tobacco control, Viagra rationing, physician reimbursement and blood safety.
Political science fights back?
Taken together, their selection amounts to a three-part manifesto: a sustained defense of a particular methodological approach to explanation; a substantive assertion about how political processes generate health system outcomes; and an analytic ambition that is not only diagnostic but therapeutic, with ‘more informed discussion of policy options’ leading to ‘fewer cycles of naïve enthusiasm leading to disillusion’.
The authors’ methodology can approximately be summarized as follows. Prefer cross-national comparisons over single-country studies, to better isolate the active ingredients that explain particular policy outcomes and avoid ‘ethnocentric over-explanation, anchored in the circumstances of individual countries’.Footnote 4 Reject what they regard as the epistemological imperialism of economics in favor of ‘disciplinary eclecticism’ – which in this volume means a counter-assault from political science,Footnote 5 with covering fire from sociology, legal studies and history to avoid ‘temporal over-explanation, anchored in the circumstances of a particular…epoch’. Give qualitative evidence due prominence in the explanatory arsenal, in order to understand the ‘assumptive worlds’ of policy actors.Footnote 6 However, in contrast to first-draft-of-history Bob Woodwardism,Footnote 7 ground the entrail readings and divinations that result from these private conversations and document reviews in historically aware and theoretically informed criticism.Footnote 8
Generally, this empirical strategy works well for the research questions the authors address, and this type of research framework is continuing to yield important new results in the hands of many other scholars too.Footnote 9 However, if there is a methodological caveat, it might be that a new generation of quantitatively orientated economists are aggressively and successfully upgrading the empirical rigor of much public policy analysis. Working with large data sets and, in some cases, using experimental designs, these new approaches may yield original insights into a least some longstanding debates, which would not be obtainable using the research procedures principally deployed by scholars in the Marmor/Klein tradition.Footnote 10
However, the Marmor/Klein approach, while qualitatively orientated, does include scrutiny of ‘revealed values, not officially stated ones’. And its – not uncritical-attention to the aims and intentions of policy actors also enables the authors to capture what (in this reviewer's experience) is indeed the reality of the policymaking process, while avoiding naïve condescension about its shortcomings. Thus, ‘governments are almost always engaged in a complex balancing act’, ‘policy debaters…are in struggles, not seminars’, governments can act beyond their short-term interests, but policy emerges as an adaptive learning process (Stevens, Reference Stevens2007). From which it follows that the ‘rational model of policy making – first experiment, then evaluate, finally decide – may thus be based…on a series of irrational assumptions about the feasibility of applying it’.
Macro health reform
In explaining policy outcomes in particular national, temporal and policy contexts, the authors essentially synthesize the last four decades’ research literature on the political economy of health care (Tuohy and Glied, Reference Tuohy and Glied2011), and adopt a trifocal lens to examine the interplay of interests, institutions and ideas. While absorbing path-dependency theory, they caution that it is better at explaining policy inertia than change. Using their ‘3i-s’ conceptual model, they argue that macro health system developments on both sides of the Atlantic since the 1970s cannot simply be explained by the largely unchanged institutions of government or configuration of interests. Ideas mattered, and the assumptive world of policymakers changed. Patterned by wider economic and social concerns, and shaped by normative ideas incorporated from outside the health sector, these shifts occurred as a reaction against ‘bureaucratic regulatory bodies in the United States and hierarchic bureaucratic control in Britain’, and because ‘the world into which the NHS was born in 1948 no longer exists’. In Klein's often-cited formulation, it was an NHS now seen less as a church and more as a garage – or perhaps a ‘drive-in church’.
However, institutional differences on either side of the Atlantic shaped how shared ideas were given effect, and provide the ‘most parsimonious’ explanation for the divergent careers of the 1990s Clinton and Thatcher/Major health reform proposals. In the United States, concentrated interests plus dispersed institutional decision making equaled interest group veto power (Starr, Reference Starr2011), whereas parliamentary majoritarianism meant ‘ideas can make a difference more quickly in Britain than America’. Whether that is a good or bad thing is a normative question (Lee Rawls, Reference Lee Rawls2009). Although if the United States had a parliamentary system, some think that it would have had universal insurance decades ago (Oberlander, Reference Oberlander2012).
Do these conclusions still hold, given recent developments? How was the United States able to enact the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) at the same time as a new Coalition government in England struggled to legislate its own health reforms? Is this apparent transatlantic role reversal explicable using the Marmor/Klein framework?
In the United States, unusually, and for 213 days, Democrats combined control of the White House, House of Representatives and a Senate supermajority. Organized interest groups for hospitals, doctors and pharmaceutical companies were co-opted in support (Jacobs and Skocpol, Reference Jacobs and Skocpol2010). As they account for around three quarters of the US health care spending it is perhaps no surprise that PPACA, in Marmor's assessment, ‘has no credible cost control strategy’ (Marmor, Reference Marmor2012). In England, a parsimonious ‘3is’-based explanation for the new Coalition government's difficulties might point to the decision to use primary legislation as against administrative action, allied with the relative weakening of an executive branch now reliant on inter-party not just intra-party majorities in the House of Commons.Footnote 11 Rather than characterizing his policy ideas as an extension of the previous decade's reforms, the incoming health secretary portrayed them as radically discontinuous (Timmins, Reference Timmins2012). Interest groups, already nervous about the latent cross-party consensus on NHS reform, successfully deployed the incoming government's Year Zero rhetoric against it to mobilize opposition by reference to ‘a mythologised past…and a demonised future’ (as Klein describes the similar debate two decades earlier).
Budget wars ahead
Notwithstanding these recent legislative outcomes in the United States and England, as both governments now react to their recession-induced impoverishment, the coming years will likely be a period of substantial budgetary pressure on health care. What do the Marmor/Klein theses imply about these stressors?
The authors’ historical sensibilities would doubtlessly lead them to remind us that public health care and welfare systems have been subject to fiscal crunches and policy assaults in the past, and lived to tell the tale (Klein, Reference Klein1983; Kent Weaver, Reference Kent Weaver2000; Tuohy, Reference Tuohy2003). Indeed for Klein, what needs explaining about the NHS is less the various organizational changes introduced by successive governments, but how it is that the NHS’ defining features have survived unscathed. Perhaps exaggerating for effect, he argues that this outcome ‘might be predicted if one sees the welfare state not as an instrument for ‘doing good’ – let alone for achieving equality – but as both the product and producer of coalitions of self-interest’.
This, however, prompts the question of under what circumstances would key interest groups – particularly organized medicine – defect from that coalition of support for a tax-funded NHS. Klein distinguishes ‘constitutional’ vs ‘distributional’ confrontations between the state and medical profession – the former being disputes about fundamental health care system structure and decision making ‘which cannot be resolved by giving the medical profession more money’. But deep and sustained distributional pressures can themselves generate constitutional debate: the British Medical Association launched a review of alternative health care funding models in the middle of the last major NHS-funding crunch (British Medical Journal, 2000). Indeed, history suggests that budget crunches typically generate the NHS’ existential crises – in 1951, 1968, 1976, 1987–1989 and 1999. And some commentators believe that Britain will at some point soon be plunged back into a debate on the fiscal sustainability of its public health care system, given austerity-induced funding constraints over the coming decade (Roberts et al., Reference Roberts, Marshall and Charlesworth2012).
That is a debate that the United States is already having. On Medicare, partisan opinion clusters around two poles: Medicare as Victim [of the broader health care sector's cost and quality pathologies (Emanuel et al., Reference Emanuel, Tanden, Altman, Armstrong, Berwick, de Brantes, Calsyn, Chernew, Colmers, Cutler, Daschle, Egerman, Kocher, Milstein, Oshima Lee, Podesta, Reinhardt, Rosenthal, Sharfstein, Shortell, Stern, Orszaq and Spiro2012)] vs Medicare as Villain [with an outmoded benefit design, misaligned consumer incentives and distorting effects on care delivery from politically manipulated pricing (Antos, Reference Antos2012; Landon et al., Reference Landon, Zaslavsky, Saunders, Pawlson, Newhouse and Ayanian2012; Roy, Reference Roy2012)]. Marmor is firmly in the Medicare as Victim camp. Thus, ‘difficulties of Medicare are similar to those of American medicine generally’ and ‘crisis talk – allegations to the effect that times are extraordinary, and extraordinarily dangerous – is in fact a quite ordinary tool of interest-group politics’.
Marmor points out that Medicare's so-called excess cost growth per person of around 1.5–2% per capita is comparable to the rest of US health care (Congressional Budget Office, 2012a). He criticizes conceptual confusion surrounding talk of ‘bankruptcy’ of the Part A Hospital Trust Fund, and notes the unreliability of previous long-range forecasts. He implies that what matters is overall health care spending growth, not tax-funded Medicare spending per se. And in that regard, he would doubtlessly be reassured by the recent reappearance of William Baumol, arguing that his famous ‘cost disease’ is in fact non-life-threatening. Therefore, while productivity gaps mean that the relative costs of labor-intensive services such as health care will continue to rise, so too should our ability to pay for them (Baumol, Reference Baumol2012).
A less sunny line of reasoning would emphasize three further considerations. First, the US population aged 65 and older is projected to increase by 87% over the next 25 years, compared with an increase of just 12% in the working age population aged 20–64 (Congressional Budget Office, 2012a). Thus, even if per person excess cost increases in Medicare are modest, the increased number of beneficiaries will drive substantial spending growth. At the same time, the proportion of the population contributing payroll taxes to help fund it will fall. Second, PPACA already mandates substantial reductions in Medicare's future provider payment increases, which in the judgment of the CMS chief actuary will probably not be sustainable (Foster, Reference Foster2010). Third, a number of US economists believe that projected Medicare spending increases will produce greater negative economic consequences if the funding source is taxation, independent of other concerns about overall national health expenditure growth (Nordhaus, Reference Nordhaus2008). Raising taxes by the requisite amount would, according to some analysts, require ‘precipitous’ increases which ‘exerts a structural drag on the economy…’ (Baicker and Chernew, Reference Baicker and Chernew2011). The alternative of increasing deficits would raise borrowing costs and affect the long-run growth of the economy (Congressional Budget Office, 2012b; Standard and Poors, 2012).
The implication is that, notwithstanding their recent shared success in legislating new health reforms, both Britain and the United States are about to reenter a period of heightened debate on the economic underpinnings of their respective health care systems.
Such a debate will doubtlessly be informed by what Klein describes as ‘a highly sophisticated body of theory that proved to be highly contagious, as transmitted by globe-trotting economists’. It is to be hoped that the debate will also continue to benefit from Marmor and Klein, generating well into their official retirements the typically contrarian but stimulating observations so clearly on display in this collection.
Simon Stevens is President of the Global Health division at UnitedHealth Group; a trustee of the Nuffield Trust in London; and a director of the Medicare Rights Center, a New York-based consumer nonprofit. He served as the British Prime Minister's Health Policy Adviser at 10 Downing Street and the UK Department of Health from 1997 to 2004. He writes here in a personal capacity.
