When a peace agreement is negotiated in civil wars today, there is a seemingly reflexive turn toward democratization as a way to move social conflicts from the battlefield to the halls of parliament; such agreements invariably entail a political transition requiring divisive and inherently difficult electoral processes. Terrence Lyons captures the complex and often contradictory dynamics of elections in the wake of civil war peace agreements in his well-designed, thoroughly researched, and coherently argued book. The principal argument of Demilitarizing Politics is that the conduct of war itself creates institutional structures of conflict that linger into the postwar period and that critically inform postwar electoral politics.

The book is grounded in two significant literatures in comparative politics and international relations: democratization, with its focus on transitional sequences, pact making, and “founding” elections, and peace building, which evaluates how domestic actors and the international community can create conditions for durable settlements after the guns fall silent in post–Cold War civil wars. Lyons's contribution to the literature on democratization and peace building lies in his careful, theoretically informed analysis of the crowning moment of many peace implementation processes: an election event that is usually managed or monitored by the international community through which a country's transition from war to democracy is consolidated.

Elections are pivotal turning points in a peace process, Lyons argues, because they are often a “key culminating event in the peace implementation process” (p. 2). From the international community's perspective, as he shows, they are often an opportunity to pronounce success in peace building and allow for the exit or disengagement of what has become known as complex, multidimensional peace operations.

The study's conceptual orientation is found in neoinstitutional analysis of conflict dynamics that combines structural conditions of conflict (e.g., class or ethnic relations) and agency factors, namely, patterns of collective action that inform how states and rebel forces mobilize and build viable organizations capable of sustained involvement in war. Using a path-dependency perspective, Lyon analyzes the evolution of these structures and agents in the war-to-peace period and the ways the institutional incentives to which they respond are, or are not, transformed during uncertain and turbulent transitions. When state military forces and rebel organizations are “demilitarized” prior to electoral events, elections can further peace and democratization objectives. Here, the author builds on earlier research found in the democratization literature that emphasizes path dependency in transitions from authoritarianism to democracy (e.g., see Adam Przeworksi, ed., Sustainable Democracy, 1995) and demobilization of combatants in peace implementation processes after civil war (e.g., see Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, 2002).

Lyons argues that “to demilitarize entails creating and reinforcing the incentives and opportunities for the institutions of wartime based on violence, insecurity and fear (such as militias, black markets, and chauvinistic identity groups) to transform themselves into institutions of peacetime based on security and trust that can sustain peace and democracy (such as political parties, civil society, and open economies)” (pp. 3–4).

For demilitarization, three conditions are required. First, interim administrations (or transitional regimes) are required, and they must especially organize independent election management bodies. Second, militarized organizations, including the state and rebel forces, must be effectively transformed into viable political parties. Third, demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of forces—security sector reform—must be sufficiently advanced such that democratization norms are not challenged or threatened by military action.

All told, the key to successful transition from war to peace through demilitarization is a function of the incentive structures for the protagonists to develop electoral strategies in the pursuit of their aims, as opposed to incentives to pursue military options. These incentives arise from strategic interaction among war protagonists that build confidence during interim regimes (such as sharing power) and by credible commitment from the international community through security-providing peacekeeping operations. So, much of the analysis must be placed on how the incentive structure for protagonists in war and peace evolves in the critical period of the postagreement phase in the run-up to elections.

Lyons grounds his thematic analysis in seven case studies that illustrate a broader universe of cases of war-terminating elections in the post–Cold War era. The first four cases are illustrations of when lingering institutional structures of the war period that preempt the possibilities of elections reinforcing peace and fostering democracy; these are Angola (1992), Bosnia-Herzogovina (1996), Liberia (1997), and Tajikistan (1999 presidential, 2000 parliamentary). Three other cases illustrate elections that can move both peace and democratization forward because politics, to a larger extent, was further demilitarized before the voting took place; Cambodia (1993), El Salvador (1994), and Mozambique (1994) are found to be relatively more successful.

What explains relative success? In the more successful cases, Lyons finds that “relatively strong interim regimes, consultative processes, consultative processes to manage the challenges of implementation and electoral administration, successful programs to transform militias into political parties, and processes of demobilization that fostered confidence all contributed to a new institutional context that served to create a bridge from war to peace and democratization” (p. 77).

The book's conclusions focus on the importance of electoral management by newly created institutions, by the international community, or in joint election administration structures. These administrative bodies can only be effective, however, when military forces are provided by the international community (i.e., United Nations peacekeepers, according to Lyons's examples). Second, security sector reform is best achieved through joint verification and collaborative structures that involve domestic actors (state forces and rebels) and international oversight of the demobilization process. Third, elections cannot be held off for too long—the peace process, if it fails to progress, becomes vulnerable to war recurrence—but the international community should not endorse or push for elections to be held when demilitarization is insufficient or incomplete.

Demilitarizing Politics is sound research that deserves the attention of scholars and policymakers alike: Both democratization and peace building will remain salient themes in the years ahead. While this book might have more fully addressed important democratization and peace-building concerns, such as electoral system choice and campaign mobilization, election-driven violence, or the presidentialism versus parliamentary debate, overall it provides a well-argued analysis of the centrality of addressing the core problem of security in building sustainable peace through democracy after civil war.