Continuing his research on the Middle East during World War I, Mohammad Gholi Majd has provided historians with valuable insight into Iraq during these pivotal years. Surprisingly little has been published on the subject, sometimes referred to as “the neglected war” (the title of A. J. Barker's work on the conflict in Iraq, now forty years old). As with his earlier works on Persia, Majd has made use of U.S. State Department archives, presenting an account of the war as seen by American consular officials. These previously unused consular reports cover a wide variety of topics, including the social and economic effects of the war on the local population.
Possibly because of the wealth of primary sources available to him, Majd has chosen to present a narrative account of the war. Analysis and commentary have largely been left for others, who will be able to make extensive use of this book to conduct research into pre-Mandate Iraq. On the occasions when the author's views are made clear, though, they seem to rely wholly on consular reports. At least a passing acknowledgement of relevant published research would have added greatly to the overall impact of what is still an important book. For example, Majd states that “the Turks had tried desperately to avoid war” before citing Ambassador Henry Morgenthau's report dated 7 November 1914, which blamed the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war, for all intents and purposes, on Germany (p. 68). The author's assertion does not take into account the wealth of work that raises doubts about Morgenthau's analysis. In addition, a concluding chapter and a bibliography would have been appreciated.
Having landed at Fao on 6 November 1914, British forces completed the conquest of Iraq four years later to the week, when they took Mosul. Majd, however, shows that this apparent success belied serious failures in British military and political thinking in the early parts of the campaign. The errors and misjudgments made by the British in the first two years, resulting in such infamous military disasters as the siege of Kut from December 1915 to April 1916, stemmed from an initial underestimation of the number of troops required to take the entire territory. The British achieved early successes against an ill-prepared Turkish opposition but, having advanced as far as Ctesiphon in November 1915, were pushed back by what turned out to be valiant and determined opponents. Only after the reverses in late 1915 did the British bring in significant reinforcements. The initial miscalculation stemmed from a lack of clarity over the wider objectives of the Iraq campaign.
The British decision to land in Iraq was based on concerns over their oil interests at the head of the Persian Gulf. The British had found oil in Arabistan (Khuzistan) in 1908. A pipeline was soon laid to transport the oil down to the island of Abadan at the mouth of Shatt al-Arab, where the Anglo-Persian Oil Company set up tanks and refineries. By 1912 Abadan was fast becoming an important port, and by 1914 the British were so concerned about maintaining their oil supplies that military protection was deemed necessary. The subsequent move to occupy Basra, which took only two weeks, aimed to consolidate the vilayet of Basra only, thereby allowing proper protection of the oil assets. As a result of the Ottoman miscalculation that any British attack would be directed at Palestine and launched from Egypt, the British faced only token Turkish forces at Fao and Basra. Spurred on by these early, relatively easy gains and fears that the Russians would beat them to it, the British decided to proceed on to Baghdad with what turned out to be inadequate forces. At the battle of Ctesiphon on 22 November 1915, British forces suffered more casualties in one day than during the entire first year of the war in Iraq.
Majd discloses an interesting report from an American diplomatic official, a Captain Williams, who met General Townshend, commander of British forces at Kut, during his captivity in Istanbul. According to Williams, Townshend was highly critical of his immediate superior, General Nixon, who had ordered the advance on Baghdad against Townshend's better judgment. These views, as well as his negative opinion on the fighting quality of Indian troops, were omitted from Townshend's published memoirs. He also requested that Captain Williams erase them from his report.
As with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the invading force felt sure it would receive at least a neutral welcome from Iraqi Arabs. However, in contrast to the constructive relationships the British enjoyed with the sharīf of Mecca and Ibn Saʿud during the war, the tribes of Iraq were hostile to the British. To some extent this hostility was independent from the wider Ottoman defensive war in which the Turks struggled to mobilize Arab tribesmen. Guerrilla counterattacks against the British increased sharply after their setbacks in late 1915. One interesting British tactic of winning over the local population was to prefer Shiʿa over Sunnis; U.S. consular reports mention rumors that the Shiʿi ʿulamaʾ in places such as Kerbela and Najaf were being funded by the British. British encouragement of Shiʿi religious celebrations after completing the invasion further fueled existing religious tensions.
Iraq in World War I also does much to qualify the ultimate British military success, which rested on technical expertise and, more importantly, overwhelming numerical superiority. The “British” forces enjoyed an almost inexhaustible supply of reinforcements from India, which provided approximately three-quarters of the 900,000 troops required to win the campaign. The Turks, busy defending the Dardanelles, the Caucasus, and Palestine, fielded about half that number in defense of Iraq.
Aside from the obvious addition to our understanding of the military campaign in Iraq, the flow of consular reports in the book paints an image of a country devastated by war about to enter the Mandate period in a much degenerated state. In addition to the loss of human life in fighting, the population was beset with economic collapse, starvation, and disease. Ethnic and religious tensions came to the fore; Christians and Jews deserted the country. Such is the seemingly unending plight of Iraq.
