Justin Crowe has written an accessible, thorough, and compelling history of the institutional development of the US Supreme Court and the federal judiciary it sits atop, from their inconspicuous inception in February 1790 to their current status as, perhaps, the most powerful judiciary in the world.
Crowe's first theoretical claim is that this transformation has been “continuous” and “evolutionary,” rather than “preordained,” “spontaneous,” or “revolutionary.” It has been accomplished through “judicial institution building,” which the author defines as “the creation, consolidation, expansion, or reduction of the structural and institutional capacities needed to respond and intervene in the political environment” (p. 8). According to this “developmental account of judicial power” (p. 15), judicial institution building has had a constantly upward trajectory, but the timing of successful reforms has often been prompted by facilitating significant events, such as pivotal elections, major territorial expansion, or wars. Second, he argues that judicial institution building has been pursued and accomplished by politicians, rather than by Supreme Court justices “wielding the power of constitutional interpretation” (p. 3). Politicians have consistently viewed the judiciary as a “useful regime partner” (p. 17) that could help them “further some end that would otherwise be difficult or even impossible to realize” (p. 11) and have consequently adopted empowering legislation—usually called “judiciary acts”—which institutionally equip judges to rule. In other words, according to Crowe, “the process of judicial institution building … has not been removed from or contrary to politics but deeply embedded within it” (p. 272).
The book's empirical chapters are chronologically organized into six periods that cover different stages of the institutional development of the US federal judiciary, and also roughly correspond to major stages in American political development.
Chapter 2 discusses the establishment of the federal judiciary in the broader historical context of the period from George Washington's inauguration to the end of Thomas Jefferson's first presidential term in 1805. Chapter 3 covers the reorganizations—many attempted, fewer successful—of the judiciary during the first half of the nineteenth century. This period was characterized by rapid territorial expansion in the West, as well as intense political contestation over the relative power of the federal government vis-à-vis the states and a growing rift between the slave-owning South and the free North. Chapter 4 analyzes the empowerment of the federal judiciary through the expansion of its jurisdiction and the centralization of its power, as well as its gradual transformation into an “arm of the Republican Party” (p. 172) during the Civil War and the Reconstruction period. Chapter 5 traces the restructuring measures, adopted during the Gilded Age and the Progressive era. The abolition of the circuit courts, the creation of a new tier of courts of appeal, and the systematization of all judiciary-related acts into one document were aimed at improving the performance of an increasingly overburdened and inefficient judicial branch. Chapter 6 documents the pivotal interwar and New Deal years when the federal judiciary assumed its modern structure and role—a self-governing, bureaucratized institution led by the Supreme Court, which championed continued judicial empowerment and successfully lobbied Congress to provide legislative support for its goals. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the further bureaucratization and specialization of the federal judiciary during the post–World War II era that was necessary in order to “keep pace with the increasing size—and increasing number of functions—of the federal government in both domestic and foreign policy” (p. 267).
In addition to thoroughly documented case studies of the adoption of each piece of consequential legislation, each chapter contains a useful discussion of the process of judicial institution building, organized around answers to three questions: 1) Why was judicial institutional building pursued? 2) How was it accomplished? And, 3) What did judicial institution building achieve?
I imagine that this book would be a welcome addition to any graduate or undergraduate syllabus on the American judiciary, as it offers a clear, highly readable, and, in certain ways, provocative story about the consistently synergistic and cooperative, rather than tense and hostile, relationship between judges and politicians. By focusing on the political origins of judicial empowerment and tracing the legislative measures through which judicial institution building has occurred over the centuries, Building the Judiciary enriches the scholarly literature, which sees the Supreme Court as a largely political institution (e.g., see Robert Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,” Journal of Public Law 6, no. 2 [1957]: 279–96; Keith Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, 2009).
As a student of comparative judicial politics, however, I will focus the rest of my comments on the “cross-over appeal,” so to speak, of Crowe's book to a wider audience of scholars who study the institutional development of courts around the world. It is an addition to the must-read list for anyone grappling with the question of how powerful judiciaries emerge. Despite focusing exclusively on the American case, Building the Judiciary does not have a tone of “American exceptionalism” and offers many useful insights to the comparative judicial politics scholar. Clearly, hardly any modern judiciaries face the early American challenge of how to incorporate newly added territories into a country's judicial system. But many newly independent states have to meld together disparate regions, with different economies, different institutional legacies, different visions about the desired nature of the new state, and distrust about their partners in this project. Thus, his discussion of judicial institution building in the early republic is relevant and useful for understanding the judicial development in newly emerged states, especially in postcolonial settings. Crowe's analysis of the role of the American judiciary during the Civil War and the Reconstruction period may be illuminating for those studying reconstruction efforts in contemporary post–civil war settings, such as Bosnia, Congo, Libya, and so on. The discussion about the development of judicial self-government at the end of the New Deal era is especially instructive for anyone following current debates on rule-of-law promotion, which emphasize the importance of an institutionally insulated and self-governing judiciary to judicial independence.
The first lesson that comparative judicial politics scholars can draw from the American case, as presented by Crowe, is that during the early iterations of the interaction between a court and the political incumbents, a cautious court fares better in the longer run than a courageous court. Put in the context of early judicial institution building, the famous Marbury and Stuart decisions suddenly reveal the US Supreme Court in a new light—not as a power grabber that invented its power of judicial review but as a cautious institution that was well aware of its vulnerability and weakness and therefore sought compromise (p. 76). This argument is consistent with some studies of postcommunist constitutional courts, which also find that avoidance of confrontation with the incumbents is a winning strategy for courts in new democracies (e.g., see Lee Epstein, Olga Shvetsova, and Jack Knight, “The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government,” Law and Society Review 35, no. 1 [2001]: 117–64).
A second generalizable implication of Crowe's analysis is that judicial self-government and institutional insulation from the other branches may not be indispensable to the creation of powerful and independent courts. The American federal judiciary functioned well, grew in power, and delivered numerous independent and highly consequential decisions for a whole century and a half before it achieved organizational independence in the late 1930s. Until then, “the federal judiciary did not have full control over its own administration or any control, for that matter, over its own finances” (p. 226). Prior to 1935, the Supreme Court did not even have its own building, but was housed in the Capitol with Congress (p. 226).
Thirdly, and most broadly, comparative judicial politics scholars can conclude from the American case that judicial empowerment is a drawn-out, incremental process that is unlikely to be achieved swiftly through institutional engineering.
Putting the American case in comparative perspective makes Crowe's account of early judicial development particularly interesting and thought provoking. American politicians apparently showed some deference to informal norms and formal institutions even in the earliest period. For example, in 1801, the Democratic-Republicans refrained from immediately replacing the Federalists' last-minute appointees with their own appointees (p. 64). Later on, even though he faced a southern-dominated Supreme Court, Abraham Lincoln did not behave as a court curber but chose to pursue a long-term strategy for influencing the court (p. 141). These events cannot be attributed solely to the constitutionally-enshrined life tenure because many countries have these guarantees in their constitutions, yet politicians do not respect them and find ways to circumvent them, and justices have been nudged, coaxed, and forced into early retirement (e.g., see discussions on the Argentinian Supreme Court in Matias Iaryczower, Pablo Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi, “Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935–1998,” American Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 [2002]: 699–716). Lincoln's behavior is especially puzzling given that the confrontation between the two factions was so strong that civil war eventually did break out. Even if Lincoln did not know that the war was inevitable, why did he have a long time horizon during such a volatile and uncertain period? Can we identify systematic conditions through comparative analysis that can tell us when politicians are able to prioritize long-term goals over short-term goals, even in the presence of high uncertainty?
My final set of questions relate to the argument that politicians' main motivation for building up the judiciary consistently over time has been their view of the court as a “partner in, and enforcer of, national policy-making” (p. 133). Crowe comes back to this point often throughout the book and offers ample evidence to support it from each historical period discussed. In certain parts, however, he alludes to instances in which politicians tried to punish the courts and failed, without fully elaborating on why these particular politicians would see the court as less of a partner and more of an adversary. For example, why did the Populists' 1896 campaign to punish the Court end as an “ineffectual and transient bluster” (p. 188)? And why were the courts “continuously under political attack” (p. 207) in the 1910s and 1920s? Is it the case that opposition politicians often promised to attack the Supreme Court, but once they became incumbents, they saw the potential benefits of having an institutional ally in the Court?
These questions raise the issue of the independence of the judiciary from the other branches—a concept that is outside the focus of this book, but is important to the story about the interplay between judges and politicians. If incumbents pursue institution building as a method for achieving judicial empowerment and judicial empowerment is a tool for accomplishing incumbents' policy goals, then is there room in this conceptual picture for an independent court? Indeed, in the discussion of the first decade of the US judiciary's existence, Crowe argues that “although the development of an independent and autonomous judiciary is taken for granted in the twenty-first century, it may not have seemed possible, let alone probable or inevitable, during the early years of the nineteenth century” (p. 78). How did judicial independence develop in the later periods? Why would politicians who are looking for an institutional ally in the judiciary tolerate individual judicial decisions that go against their short-term preferences or long-term interests? Why would the Court ever produce such decisions if it is well aware that its institutional empowerment is in the hands of the incumbents in the legislature? Addressing these questions could be the next step in developing the research agenda on the “partnership” between the judiciary and the other two branches of government.
Building the Judiciary is excellently written and accessible to readers who may have no background in American politics. I highly recommend the book to comparative judicial politics scholars who want to learn about the institutional development of the American federal judiciary.
