Thomas Sowell, Rose and Milton Friedman Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, is a distinguished generalist and public intellectual who has written widely and influentially on civil rights, race relations, education, and political ideology. His thirty-two books include works on race and economics, basic economics, and Marxism; Say's Law (Princeton 1972) and Classical Economics Reconsidered (Princeton 1974). His thirteen journal articles are almost entirely focused on the history of economic thought and include essays on Karl Marx (AER 1960; Economica 1963; CJEPS 1967), T. R. Malthus (CJEPS 1962), the general glut controversy (OEP 1963), Veblen (OEP 1967), Samuel Bailey (Economica 1970), and J. C. L. de Sismondi (HOPE 1972). After training in economics at Harvard and Columbia, Sowell studied with George Stigler in Chicago, taking the doctorate in 1968. His publications in the history of economic thought, “the field which first attracted me to economics” (p. viii), are evidently productions of this early and fruitful stage in his career. Apart from his contributions to New Palgrave, all appeared before 1975.
The book under review contains eight essays, the first four of which are reprinted from his 1974 volume: “Social Philosophy of Classical Economists,” “Classical Macroeconomics,” Classical Microeconomics,” and “Classical Methodology.” The fifth chapter, on Sismondi, is reprinted from HOPE 1972. The last three essays are newly written for this volume: “The Enigma of John Stuart Mill,” “The Mysteries of Marxian Economics,” and “Thoughts on the History of Economics.” Yet even these deal for the most part with interpretative controversies of three or four decades ago, and with only two exceptions contain no reference to any secondary literature after 1977. The question must therefore arise—at any rate for those scholars working in the history of economic thought at the present time—whether anything of value has been written about “classical economics” since that date. Has there been “progress” in our sub-discipline: progress in the sense that we know and understand more about the political economy and the economic analysis of Adam Smith, Malthus, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Marx & Co. than did our predecessors in the 1970s? Or is the history of economic thought like literary studies, in which unpredictable and seemingly arbitrary changes of fashion sweep away the work of the oldest generation for a time, until some later generation brings it back to life again in rebellion against its immediate seniors?
One can answer that question properly only by a detailed comparison of each of Sowell's eight essays with the subsequent work of major contributors such as Samuelson, Negishi, Morishima, Hollander, Blaug, Eltis, Kurz, and Salvadori et al. in the history of “classical” economic analysis, and of Winch, Skinner, Faccarello, Steiner, Chremaschi, Samuels, Forget, Levy, and Peart et al. in the intellectual history of “classical” political economy. This is obviously impossible in a brief review. But a few examples may help. Sowell has ignored the work of all his successors but he has not been completely ignored by them. Eltis (Reference Eltis1980) built on Sowell's exploration of unbalanced growth paths, gluts, stagnation, and “oscillations” in Malthus's macroeconomics. Sowell's work on Say's law is cited in the Blackwell Companion to the History of Economic Thought (2003, p. 326). Are there other insights in these essays that ought to be remembered and incorporated into current history of economic thought? And on the other hand are there passages that their author would not have allowed to be reprinted had he been aware of present-day scholarship?
In my opinion, the least dated of the material in this volume is the 1972 article on Sismondi and the newly-written chapter on Marx. Though the former has been before the public for thirty-six years and has not been superceded, it seems not to have had the effect it deserves, not only upon textbooks (which are almost always decades behind the times), but in serious discussions of the general glut controversy. It is still not generally realized, for example, that Sismondi formulated a period analysis of macroeconomic disequilibrium a year before Malthus's similar, but analytically less coherent treatment in 1820. Sowell's account of the complete failure of the Ricardians—locked into the static conceptual framework of Say's Law—to get the point, and of the blinkered dogmatism with which J. S. Mill simply dismissed Malthus and Sismondi in his famous and influential textbook (pp. 137–40), is well worth reading (or re-reading). As for Marx, this new essay seems largely concerned to fight old battles with Paul Sweezey over “crises,” “underconsumption,” and the Hegelian framework of Marx's thought. But its exposition—especially of Marx's much misunderstood method of “successive approximations”—would be of value to all but the most learned Marx scholars today. However, though the essay on Mill is also newly written, and refers to one of the two post-1977 sources in this book (The Complete Works of Harriet Taylor, ed. J. E. Jacobs and P. H. Payne, Indiana University Press, 1998), and though many shrewd and valid points are made, the innocent reader might suppose that Friedrich Hayek had spoken the last word on Mill, and that the vast secondary literature in recent decades (above all the widely acknowledged work of Joseph Hamburger) had never existed. Sowell's correct identification of Mill's intellectual elitism in Liberty was first clearly explained by Maurice Cowling (Reference Cowling1963).
Among those parts of this book which have been clearly superceded by modern scholarship, Sowell's view of Malthus is the most conspicuous. As already noted, he gets Malthus's suggestive but incompletely worked-out analysis of general gluts right. But had Sowell read Winch on Riches and Poverty (Reference Winch1996) and Hollander on Malthus (Reference Hollander1997) he would have scrapped many portions of this collection and started again. Our entire conception of Malthus, of his place in political economy and indeed of “classical” political economy itself, has been utterly transformed by more than three decades of high-level research of which these two works are the culmination (Waterman Reference Waterman1998). Malthus is now center-stage, Ricardo on the sidelines. Anything that might usefully be labeled “classical economics” is the heterogeneous and often mutually incompatible work of members of the “English School” from 1798 to the end of the nineteenth century, including both J.-B. Say and Karl Marx. Though Wealth of Nations is the starting point, Smith himself was not a “classical economist” since diminishing returns—which are the DNA test of “classical” theory, though implied in one passage (p. 56)—are not integrated into his analysis. Moreover, increasing returns to scale, which are central to Smith's optimistic, pre-Malthusian view of the economy, are largely absent from that of his successors. Malthus is thus the hinge on which the history of economic thought turns, inaugurating a gradual, century-long mutation of “political economy” (the science of wealth) into “economics” (the science of scarcity).
It would be tedious and unamicable to identify other parts of Sowell's work that have not stood the test of time, especially since every chapter contains many true and illuminating insights that we can all profit from being reminded of. Enough has been said to indicate the nature both of the virtues and of the shortcomings of this book. How each reader nets these out may be largely a matter of taste.
