Transnational History emerged in the 1990s as a methodological perspective aiming to transcend the nation state as a prevalent unit of analysis. Akin to comparative history, transnational history focuses on transfers between countries and nations, cross-border exchanges and circulation of people and ideas, thus changing our understanding of modern historical phenomena and contributing to the development of global history.Footnote 1 Today there is probably no modern historical subfield that has not heeded the new transnational insights. This review article argues that the history of fascism and national socialism have benefitted considerably from this epistemological advancement, and that this renewal has revolutionised our understanding of these ideologies, movements and regimes. Previously historians believed that fascism had emerged as a solution to the interwar crisis in different European nation states; ‘native’, ‘home-grown’ fascist movements, unique ultranationalist revolutionaries, spontaneously reacted to endogenous national problems and attempted a counterrevolution or national rebirth with different degrees of success. After the transnational turn, historians instead see fascism as a single transnational and global phenomenon that violently expanded throughout Europe and beyond by processes of transfer, mutual inspiration, hybridisation, interaction, entanglement and cross-border exchange.
Historians pioneered the transnational examination of fascism in the mid 2000s.Footnote 2 This trend built upon the earlier work of scholars in so-called ‘comparative fascist studies’.Footnote 3 Yet ‘transnational fascism’ today represents a differentiated endeavour overcoming the limitations of comparison. Comparing ‘fascisms’ usually required isolating self-contained and artificially coherent units of analysis: singular movements and regimes that were considered part (or not) of the ‘generic’ fascist family. This stationary approach tended to conceal the dynamic history of mutual interaction and influence that complicated the tasks of comparison and classification. The transition from comparativism towards transnational history has stimulated a new generation of scholars, leading to numerous contributions such as my own War Veterans and Fascism in Interwar Europe.Footnote 4 The growing numbers of transnational studies like those under review here have opened up new dimensions of historical reality to our eyes, thereby transforming irreversibly how historians see fascism and Nazism. The inadequacy of an exclusive nation state focus or even an international approach to explain the history of fascism becomes patent through the exposition of the crucial levels of interaction that underpinned fascism's expansion over space and its evolution over time.
Arnd Bauerkämper and Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe's volume Fascism without Borders argues that fascism was a transnational phenomenon transcending the classic dichotomy between Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. Fascism spread across borders by means of transfers, exchanges and contacts; it was perceived as a transnational political and social practice by its supporters, fellow-travellers and detractors. The transnational dimension of fascism coexisted, most often uncomfortably, with the fundamental ultra-nationalist character of the numerous fascist movements and regimes in interwar Europe. Intense interrelations did not imply symmetry, continuity or homogeneity across time and space; changing hierarchies, rivalries and internal and international conflicts pervaded the transnational history of fascism. In this regard Fascism without Borders confirms a key storyline: National Socialism and the Third Reich came to replace Italian Fascism in its role of principal inspirator and leader for European fascists. From the United Kingdom to the Balkans and from the Iberian Peninsula to Ukraine, ultra-nationalists and conservatives primarily looked towards Rome and Berlin for ideological inspiration. Yet transfers did not come without alteration. In his opening chapter, Aristotle Kallis, who in the past theorised useful analytical concepts such as ‘fascistization’ and ‘hybridization’, proposes the notion of ‘recontextualization’: a reframing of an object or idea into a new context through active adaptation, filtering, selection and additionFootnote 5. These processes allow us to fathom the ideological and organisational mutations involved in fascism's expansion in Europe. The book uncovers a world of multilateral, polydirectional interactions beyond the Italian and German cases, including contacts between less successful fascist movements. While the volume is unable to offer an overall transnational narrative of the history of fascism in interwar Europe, it does provide a number of pieces that contribute to that goal.
The volume's editors identify two main dimensions in transnational analysis. First, the contributors examine the actors that participated in cross-border networks and interactions. Second, the volume approaches ideology and policy: discourses, symbols and aesthetics flowing transnationally throughout Europe. Writers and journalists, such as Robert Brasillach in France (Marleen Rensen's chapter), were instrumental in the reception, reworking and recontextualisation of fascist and Nazi ideological tenets in other countries. Diplomats such as Oswald von Hoyningen-Huene, German minister plenipotentiary in Portugal between 1934 and 1944, promoted the fascist ideology amongst foreign elites (Cláudia Ninhos). Members of fascist youth organisations in the early 1940s travelled to meet their counterparts from a variety of regions (Goran Miljan). They created emotional bonds of brotherhood that sustained the idea of a new Europe under Nazi domination. Intellectuals with either fascist or anti-fascist convictions collaborated across borders to provide new unified visions of Europe that either aligned with or challenged Hitlerian and Mussolinian geopolitical designs (Monica Fioravanzo, Johannes Dafinger and Silvia Madotto).
Regarding the cross-border flow of ideas and discourses, several contributors employ the notions of ‘fascist model’ and ‘national socialist model’. These models, acting as vehicles for transnational processes, were adapted to various historical contexts. Invariably, fascist political innovations involved a great deal of propaganda and myth. They were also generally based in existing traditions. Yet as the brilliant chapter by Matteo Pasetti shows, models such as the Italian ‘Corporative State’, a project of social and economic transformation, showed a great ‘traveling potential’.Footnote 6 First Salazar's Portugal and then Miguel Primo de Rivera's dictatorship in Spain implemented versions of the Italian statist order for collective labour and economic relations – the corporative model – in the 1920s. Central European paramilitaries such as the German Stahlhelm and the Austrian Heimwehr joined the hype about corporatism in the mid 1920s. In another chapter Anna Lena Kocks demonstrates the attractiveness of the Italian Fascist state-led organisation of leisure through the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro by examining the extent to which British fascists adopted this model.
Another set of transnational discourses and representations that the volume aims to observe is anti-Semitism. Kallis points at the importance of ‘the dynamics of diffusion of anti-Semitism in interwar and especially wartime Europe’.Footnote 7 This author offers valuable comments on the recontextualisation of the Nazi Nuremberg Laws in various countries, including Horthy's Hungary and the Ustaša's Independent State of Croatia. However, his brief analysis remains sketchy. Raul Cârstocea's chapter on Ion I. Moța, a conspicuous leader of the strongly anti-Semitic Romanian fascist movement of the Legion of the Archangel Michael (Iron Guard), only sheds partial light. Cârstocea shows that anti-Semitism was a major motivation for the Romanian legionnaires to interact with foreign movements. However, interestingly, Moța failed to collaborate with the German Nazis, while participating, instead, in the Italian-promoted international fascist meeting in Montreaux (1934). He then volunteered to Franco's forces in the Spanish Civil War – where anti-Semitism was almost totally absent. Cârstocea strangely posits the ‘native character’Footnote 8 of the Romanian fascist movement to account for these choices, but the evidence does not concur. In fact, pragmatic issues, concerns about ‘borders’, national ‘interests’ and ‘states’, to use Moța's own words,Footnote 9 justified his reluctance to engage with the Nazis. In this sense, Rossoliński-Liebe's chapter confirms how such geopolitical considerations fuelled inter-fascist conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. The ways in which Moța sought to string together anti-Semitism and corporatism in his interaction with the European fascists in MontreauxFootnote 10 could have been explored, all the more since Pasetti's chapter highlights the transferability of fascist corporativism. Cârstocea omits that Vasile Marin, Moța's comrade, wrote his doctoral dissertation on Italian Fascism in 1932. Religiosity and anti-communism primarily emerge as motivations for Moța and Marin to volunteer and die in combat in Franco's cause. The Romanians indeed were ‘transnational anti-Semites’, but transnational fascists too. In sum, much remains to discover regarding anti-Semitism as a motivation merging with other ingredients of fascist ideology in the transnational sphere. More active intervention by the editors might have enhanced the internal coherence of the volume, which nonetheless articulates the theoretical and methodological breakthrough of the transnational approach.
A reconsideration of the history of fascism and Nazism from transnational premises demands re-examining the links between the charismatic leaders at their helm. While Christian Goeschel is by no means unaware of the methodological turn towards the history of transfers,Footnote 11 his Mussolini and Hitler: The Forging of the Fascist Alliance leaves this debate in the background. The book tells the story of the Hitler–Mussolini relationship in a more pragmatic fashion, following the safe steps of the Anglophone narrative tradition. Ian Kershaw and Richard J. Evans’s endorsements augurate an entertaining and market-oriented contribution. Goeschel's account does not come without innovative approaches, though. The socio-cultural history of diplomacy, with an interest on symbolism, emotions and gestures, provides new insights on the dictators’ ‘brutal friendship’. Above all, this work investigates the social performance and symbolic construction of an awkward and instrumental alliance. Seventeen personal meetings took place between Mussolini and Hitler, from June 1934 in Venice to July 1944 at Wolf's Lair in East Prussia. Close analysis of these encounters allows Goeschel to highlight the careful staging of the sympathy between the regimes. The book's subtitle, in this sense, is indicative of how the author sees this process: the forging of the Axis alliance implied a substantial degree of falsification. The manufactured outer appearance of the dictators’ friendship contrasted with the inner contradictions between the foreign policy interests of both countries at the time. Goeschel emphasises the hidden tensions involved in the partnership, the mutual distrust, the problems of understanding, as well as the disdain felt by the Nazis regarding the ‘inferior’ Italian race. Contingency and the personal agency of the dictators – especially Hitler's agency, to be fair – are key historical factors in the narrative.
I found Goeschel's book inadequate, if not contradictory, in one regard: assessing the role of ideology in the Mussolini–Hitler relationship and in the Axis alliance at large. Fascist ideology does not seem to concern Goeschel, but at some points the argument is too dismissive of the historical function of ideological inspiration and transfer. Ideology probably played a much greater role than Goeschel acknowledges. In the light of recent research, the assertion that ‘the ideological impact of Fascism on Nazism was in reality quite minor’Footnote 12 needs reconsideration.Footnote 13 The Nazi appropriation of fascist methods (the use of symbolic and physical political violence in the pursuit of power) should be seen as a fundamental ideological turn. Goeschel's claim that ‘Mussolini's anti-Bolshevism lacked the intensity and passion of Hitler's’Footnote 14 will sound odd to historians familiar with Mussolini's rhetoric after the Great War. Both Mussolini and Hitler had been, in their beliefs and ideas, profoundly shaped by the experience of war. And not only the glorification of violence, but also the shared inclination towards military aggression and territorial expansion were important common ideological elements. Aristotle Kallis's publications on this ideological aspectFootnote 15 are unfortunately absent from the book's bibliography, although eventually Goeschel concedes some importance to the common ‘drive for expansionism and war’.Footnote 16 Yet shared anti-Bolshevism as a motivation for the Axis alliance around the fateful year of 1936 is, in my opinion, undeservedly downplayed. It is certainly true that ‘geopolitical considerations’Footnote 17 and ‘strategic interests’Footnote 18 clearly shaped the relationship between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. However, does this imply that ideology was only a superficial, ‘vaguely articulated’Footnote 19 bond? One might turn the argument on its head and suggest that despite profound incompatibilities and conflicting diplomatic interests between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, ideology was instrumental in cementing and preserving the alliance and the self-conscious personal relation between their leaders. British diplomat Ogilvie-Forbes was perhaps not ‘carried away by the propaganda performance’ (as Goeschel believes) in 1937 when he argued that ‘basic ideological similarities rather than common political and strategic interests drove both regimes together’. The diplomat was probably right that ‘these ideological parallels were sufficient for a military alliance’.Footnote 20 More careful engagement with ideology as a crucial point of connection would have deepened Goeschel's narrative.
Theoretical debates aside, the book is outstanding in its readability. The last two chapters, however, overstretch to discuss the diplomatic and military complexities of the course of the Second World War, and the focus becomes blurred at some points. For the specificities of the Hitler–Mussolini relationship remained rather constant through the last stages of the war. By 1940 Mussolini clearly was the subordinated and dependant partner in an alliance that was initiated by Hitler and benefited the Nazis more than the Italian Fascists, even if in the early 1920s Hitler had needed Mussolini more than the Duce needed him.
Contrasting with Goeschel's disregard of ideology, Jorge Dagnino, Matthew Feldman and Paul Stocker's volume on the ‘New Man’ centres on ideas, discourses and images. This book covers numerous national cases during the golden era of fascism, a time when narratives about the emergence of ‘new men’ boomed. The volume collates contributions that vary greatly in quality, focus and approach, but its geographical reach is laudable. It includes thought-provoking studies on Getulio Vargas’s Brazil (Kallis), Salazar's Portugal (Almeida de Carvalho and Costa Pinto) and Romanian fascists (Clark). Nevertheless, predominant description, thin contextualisation, jargon and excessive specialism affect several chapters. In others, the ‘new man’ seems a pretext to discuss other themes. That fascists and right-wing authoritarians in the 1920s and 1930s often aimed for an ambitious transformation of their subjects’ human nature is well known. Here we learn about of the methods (education, propaganda, instrumentalisation of arts, military service, etc.) to implement a variety of masculine and racial models. The volume reveals a surprising wealth of interwar discourses on such bodily and spiritual regeneration. But significant questions about the transnational dimension of this phenomenon remain largely unanswered. Joan Tumblety's chapter admits it ‘remains to establish whether the radical right in France nurtured its own new man in the manner of Mussolini's uomo fascista’.Footnote 21 Some interesting insights do emerge from the volume, such as the paradox that Vargas’s Estado Novo was increasingly inspired by Salazar's Portugal, while the Brazilian regime aimed to produce a ‘new man’ in ways that were anathema to the Portuguese. The volume's structure situates the main source of these discourses in Fascist Italy, revealing a continental and extra-European circulation. However, the introduction gives few insights to help the reader connect all the dots transnationally. The mechanisms of dissemination, transformation and reappropriation of these ideas remain unexplored.
In contrast, these phenomena are painstakingly scrutinised for the realm of social and labour policy in Sandrine Kott and Kiran Klaus Patel's edited volume Nazism Across Borders. This book is the impressive result of a co-ordinated research effort to place the influence of the Third Reich social policy in an international and global context. ‘Fascist internationalism’ – a notion developed in recent times by numerous historiansFootnote 22 – is the key object under examination. The projection of the Nazi model abroad was marked by rivalries between the German Labour Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront; DAF) and the Reich Labour Ministry; they represented different models for internationalisation in the social welfare sphere. Even though the editors aimed to highlight the power of attraction of German national socialist labour policy as something embedded in a strong German tradition, a chapter by Daniela Liebscher shows how much of this Nazi model was copied from the Italian Fascist precedent. The fact that Robert Ley, head of DAF, based his Strength Through Joy (Kraft durch Freude) inaugural speech ‘almost entirely’Footnote 23 on Achille Starace's words about the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro bears testament to the level of Nazi appropriation of Italian fascist ideas. Yet as the Third Reich grew powerful it was the Nazi model that started to influence developments in Europe and beyond, particularly after the crises of 1938 and the occupation of large swaths of European territory during the Second World War. By then Italian fascists had adapted Nazi novelties too. The 1937 adoption of the German marriage loan system into the Italian collection of pronatalist policies is a case in point. Daniel Hedinger's chapter balances transnational influence and national originality in its examination of Imperial Japanese social policy, but it makes clear that the ‘Axis of Labour’ between Nazi Germany and Japan provided substantial content to a fascist alliance that is too often depicted as a sham.
Beyond the core historical cases, the volume studies, in a nearly encyclopaedic way, the exportation and reception of Nazi social policy into numerous countries, in Europe and beyond. Chapters such as the one by Radka Šustrová on the Nazification of social policy in the Sudetenland and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia not only unravel the enormous complexity of these highly bureaucratic processes; they also show the limits of transfers. Implementing external models in new foreign contexts was far from easy, even if some of these contexts followed a similar German-speaking tradition – such as the case of Austria after the Anschluss (Ulrike Schulz) – or they were deemed part of the ‘Aryan race’ sphere – such as Norway (Mats Ingulstad). Ambivalence, public rejection versus covert implementation, misunderstandings and tensions between expectations and realities accompanied the diffusion of Nazi social policy across borders. As Patel and Jill M. Jensen demonstrate, even American New Dealers initially showed an interest in Nazi policies; only later did they make an effort to distinguish their ‘American way’ from Third Reich social policies.
The Waffen-SS, edited by Jochen Böhler and Robert Gerwarth, is another important contribution to the history of Nazi Germany, the Holocaust and the social and cultural history of the Second World War. Previous reviewers have already pointed at the comprehensiveness of the volume, which brings together hitherto regionalised knowledge on the motivations of hundreds of thousands of non-Germans, from the Iberian Peninsula to the Baltic and from northern Europe to Kosovo, to serve in the Waffen-SS and related armed units. The volume focuses on the politics and processes of mobilisation, including studies of memory and justice processes that followed the Waffen-SS experience after 1945. In this review, however, I will focus on assessing the volume's transnational dimension.
While the editors declare their intention to bring the transnational perspective to the book,Footnote 24 they only achieve this objective in a very limited way. That Böhler and Gerwarth start by referring to transnational history as a ‘methodological buzzword’ does not augurate a serious engagement with conceptual and methodological innovation. The shallow preliminary discussion of this field in the introduction delves into the old cliché that transnational history has the ‘danger’ of leading to a ‘happy’ and ‘positively connoted’ history of integration and convergence – a danger that was long ago overcome if it ever existed. Beyond these comments, the introduction does not make the case for any category or analytical tool that could have been utilised to deconstruct the transnational dimensions of non-German participation in the Waffen-SS. The ‘transnational mobility’Footnote 25 of perpetrators is suggested as a relevant theme, but no chapter in the volume is centred on it. No concerted effort emerges to reveal transnational networks, nor to identify the transnational spaces of the European volunteers’ war experience (remarkably, there is not a single map inside the volume). Some practicalities of the international collaboration, such as mutual cultural perceptions and language issues between Germans and non-Germans, are studied by some contributors and they surface sporadically in the textFootnote 26 but not in any systematic and interconnected way that would allow to make sense of these transnational aspects.
The structure of Böhler and Gerwarth's volume gives some idea about how the Nazis perceived the peoples of Europe and how these visions shaped the processes of wartime mobilisation. We learn that the experiences of ‘Germanic’ peoples, southern and Western Europeans, men from the Baltic States, from Eastern Europe, the Volksdeutsche in Southeastern Europe and Balkan Muslims in the Waffen-SS were different and responded to distinct spatial and strategic contexts. However, the mere juxtaposition of a number of regional and ‘national’ case studies, written by experts on these cases, does not produce by itself a transnational history of the Waffen-SS. Only the chapters about Nazi racial theory (Peter Black and Martin Gutmann) and on Waffen-SS veterans’ memory (Madeleine Hurd and Steffen Werther) offer some perspectives interconnecting different ‘cases’. A thematic structure, rather than a country by country examination, would have been needed to provide further insights into the transnational dimension. With these shortcomings, the volume is unable to give any answer to whether ‘a common transnational identity’ did emerge from the experience of collaboration in Europe during the war. Despite figuring prominently in the subtitle of the volume, ‘Europe’ is largely blurred as a concept. This flaw becomes clear if we contrast this volume with the sophisticated contribution edited by Johannes Dafinger and Dieter Pohl.
A New Nationalist Europe under Hitler blends the transnational approach with the growing attention to historical notions of space and territory. The volume deftly combines an examination of ‘concepts of Europe’ with the ‘transnational networks’ created by academics, scientists, students and thinkers between 1933 and 1945. In a well-reasoned introduction, Dafinger and Pohl argue that while ‘Europe’ was a contested concept within Nazi Germany, a völkisch and nationalist European model allowed for consensus between conservatives and the fascist right. This vision of Europe was negotiated and elaborated transnationally. It allowed to unite different groups from different countries in a German dominated continent. Dafinger characterises the meaning of ‘Europe’ that became hegemonic at the height of the Second World War. For the Nazis, Europe was a ‘family of Völker’, ‘a community of destiny’ that needed to be racially pure and liberated from the twin menace of international Jewry and Bolshevism. To be sure, this phantasmagorical version of Europe would be dominated by Germany, even if Nazi propaganda for non-Germans softened this hierarchy. Particularly after the Stalingrad defeat, the invocation of a European spirit served to mobilise individuals from different national groups, such as Dutchmen, to join the Waffen-SS.Footnote 27 Yet the European responses to the Nazi European order were varied. Portuguese dictator Salazar, for instance, judged the Nazi plans with caution and fear for the loss of sovereignty that would happen inside the German sphere of influence (Cláudia Ninhos). These fears were justified. In 1940–1, Nazis such as Werner Best, who prepared draft plans for the racial reorganisation of Western Europe, considered the possibility of dismembering established nation states into völkisch units such as an independent Scotland and equally independent Catalan and Basque ethno-nations.Footnote 28 It was Southeastern Europe, however, that attracted most attention, particularly for the economic role than countries like Greece would have in the Germanic economic sphere (Großwirtschaftsraum): such regions would send agricultural products to the Reich and receive German industrial exports. The strategic interest in Southeastern Europe explains, for example, why so many Southeastern European students received scholarships to visit German universities and research centres even after September 1939.Footnote 29 Anti-Semitism was another element in the Nazis’ academic European networking, as revealed by the number of institutes for ‘Research into the Jewish Question’ created in the continent under German leadership (Dirk Rupnow). Racist beliefs motivated people to move across borders in Nazi-dominated Europe. In his chapter, Impekoven unearths the case of a Swiss medical student who in an application stated that only Germany could provide the ideal environment for ‘comparative studies on human races’ as well as ‘adequate resources to do research on twins’.Footnote 30
In short, Dafinger and Pohl's volume pushes the boundaries of knowledge by incorporating transnational analysis and paying attention to the historical constructedness of space and territory. The book enlarges our understanding of Nazi ideology, Nazi spatialities and geopolitical aims, while providing a narrative about an important chapter in the history of ‘Europe’.
Yet the transnational history of fascism and Nazism was not only a European affair; it was a global one.Footnote 31 Ricky W. Law's monograph Transnational Nazism, a history of cultural relations between Germany and Japan in the lead-up to the Axis, approaches the global dimension of fascism by providing a wealth of fresh and fascinating empirical evidence. The book argues that ‘transnational Nazism’ emerged from the mutual admiration between Japanese and Germans in the 1930s. The author proceeds in two stages. First, Law carefully analyses Japanese media and publications to show the surprising extent to which Japanese people were excited about most things German, particularly after Hitler's seizure of power. Second, Law inspects a large amount of printed and filmic German sources to demonstrate how the Nazis cultivated a notion of Japan as an Eastern counterpart to the Third Reich. Exploring themes such as long-distance travel, telecommunications and foreign-language learning, we learn that Japanese understanding of Germany and the Nazis was shallow, based on prejudices, misapprehensions and myths, but nevertheless paved the way for the German–Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact. German portrayals of Japan, though not free from orientalism, respected the East Asian country as a Westernised power. After Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria depictions polarised between left and right, but the coming of the Third Reich nazified the cultural representation of Japan and the relations with the country. Cultural and geographical distance did not prevent transfer and entanglement; it only simplified the ideas being transferred. This is an important lesson from this book: space and a limited capacity for communication were paradoxically needed for the German–Japanese rapprochement to succeed.Footnote 32
I see two important caveats to the book. First, for boldly coining an innovative and catchy concept of ‘Transnational Nazism’, this phrase remains severely undertheorised. The author uses it to alternatively refer to an ‘ideological outlook’,Footnote 33 an ‘imagined community’Footnote 34 and ‘admiration for Nazi Germany’ and Hitler, simply evidenced by ‘positive coverage’Footnote 35 and ‘fascination with Nazi imagery’.Footnote 36 But the specifics of ideology remain vague. The noun phrase ‘Transnational Nazism’ unduly reifies a fluid historical process (the transfer of ideas), converting it into a pre-existing object that historical actors allegedly ‘adopted’Footnote 37 or ‘articulated’Footnote 38 as though it were a distinct ideological system. Second, the focus on ‘transnational Nazism’ eclipses Italian Fascism throughout the book, the primary origin and important model for many ideological tenets recontextualised in interwar Japan.Footnote 39 The book is excellent for its empirical discoveries, rather than for engaging with historiographical precedents, debates and conceptual tools.
The nearly one hundred authors whose work I have reviewed here arguably represent a wider historiographical ‘consensus’ in the study of fascism. Methodological innovation has allowed historians to reconstruct fascism as a transnational and global phenomenon: a specific ideology and model of political movements and regimes evolving across space and time. Collaborative research and academic internationalisation were needed to transcend the practical obstacles of a transnational approach, such as the necessity of mastering several languages and observing multiple geographical and cultural contexts simultaneously. Further single author monographs and overviews should be written to synthetise the still fragmentary knowledge produced by edited volumes and bilateral analyses, but the approach has reached a point of no return in which narratives can no longer ignore the transnational dimension of the fascist historical experience.
The notion of a ‘transnational consensus’ may not only be a historiographical but also a historical one. Fascists, Nazis and fellow travellers most often perceived their ideologies, movements and regimes as phenomena transcending the bordered limits of nation states. From the seminal post-war moment when fascism was created in Italy, fascists and anti-fascists everywhere saw themselves as part of something larger. Ideology operated as uniting factor, and the leaders of every movement and regime were conscious of the need of establishing contacts and alliances. Visions of ‘Europe’ became mobilising tools for fascists across borders, especially during the period of Nazi domination of the continent in the early 1940s. Fascism was mostly seen as a European phenomenon, but one that projected its power and appeal globally. The ultra-nationalist character of fascism made much to conceal its transnational side, but internationalisation, transnationalisation and globalisation were crucial dimensions of its experience and destructive success. With these insights in mind, the long-held assumption that fascism was essentially a ‘European phenomenon’ would no longer resist critical scrutiny. As a constructed idea – an idea that fascists themselves aimed to define – ‘Europe’ should not be taken for granted as the self-evident unit of analysis for the history of fascism. Transnational historical phenomena did not stop at the borders of Europe – if European borders can ever be defined.
The task of integrating the transnational and global dimension should not be misrepresented as a mere rebranding of old narratives, nor as an obliteration of the rugged and diverse texture of history. Transfers and multilateral influence never implied the exact reproduction of foreign models in new contexts; tensions, rivalries and limitations were defining parts of the tale. With this knowledge, research on fascism no longer needs to be based on impossible ideal types, preconceived definitions and ‘generic’ notions that used to operate as epistemological mould in the past. Different versions of ‘fascism’ or ‘Nazism’ did not emerge spontaneously and independently from different national crises of modernity within nation state units. For ‘modernity’ itself was a transnational affair – global interrelation and interconnection were the landmark of the modern era to begin with. We are now capable of understanding and integrating similarity, difference and diversity across borders in a more complex way, qualifying claims of uniqueness and national ‘special paths’. Transnational research on fascism has produced an irreversible turn. The next accomplishment will be making the transnational approach self-evident or, as Kiran Klaus Patel has put it,Footnote 40 ‘superfluous’. The challenge for historians will be crafting such new narrative, combining attention to difference and particularity with a deep-seated understanding of the transnational dimension and a broader spatial scope. Combining transnational with spatial approaches, spatialising transnational history,Footnote 41 offers possibilities for further advancement and research on the global history of fascism, producing knowledge that is useful for the globalised world of today.
