Elie Podeh explores the origin and evolution of national holidays in five Arab states: Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon (examples of republican regimes) as well as Jordan and Saudi Arabia (examples of monarchies). He traces national precursors in Ottoman times yet focuses on colonial and postcolonial history. His sources include Arab journals, newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, TV programs, websites, and diplomatic correspondence from various archives. Theorists who informed this study include Anthony Smith, John Bodnar, Benedict Anderson, Pierre Nora, and Yael and Eviatar Zerubavel. In the preface, Podeh discloses that “the unjustified judgment of some Israeli scholars” obstructed necessary research funding, yet he did “not succumb to the tyranny of narrow-minded fellow academics” and completed the book anyway: it is, in his words, “a personal celebration” (p. xii).
Podeh wants us to look at national holiday calendars because they reveal “the very inner mechanics of nation building and state formation” (p. 3). Nation–states across the world seek to legitimate themselves by conducting public commemorations at national cemeteries, monuments, or memorials. Much scholarship exists showing the connection between public commemoration and legitimacy in the Middle East, not only, as Podeh mentions, in Palestine and Israel but also in other places. (See, for example, Esra Özyürek's two books, Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey [Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006] and The Politics of Public Memory in Turkey [Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2007] or Amy Mills’ Streets of Memory: Landscape, Tolerance, and National Identity in Istanbul [Atlanta, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 2010] on Turkey; for Lebanon, see Sune Haugbolle's War and Memory in Lebanon [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010], Craig Larkin's Memory and Conflict in Lebanon: Remembering and Forgetting the Past [London: Routledge, 2012], Aseel Sawalha's Reconstructing Beirut: Memory and Space in a Postwar Arab City [Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 2010], or Lucia Volk's Martyrs and Memorials in Modern Lebanon [Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2010].) Historians, political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists have looked at how the past becomes malleable in the hands of political and cultural elites and how it quite often eludes their grasp. These scholars have shown that commemorative rituals and practices change over time, because it is the present that gives the past its meaning. What Podeh offers that has not been done before is a comparative, historical perspective across five Arab states, all in one book.
The comparative perspective is both the book's strength and weakness. Yes, readers will come away with much detailed information about the practices of national pageantry in five Arab states. But what larger significance can be attributed to the fact that all five celebrate a variety of national holidays? Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq have profoundly different historical trajectories, demographics, economies, governments, and regional and international standings; it therefore stands to reason that their holiday calendars and actual commemorations differ. The contrasts catalogued in the conclusion therefore come as no surprise: formal and informal holidays (defined by the closure or operation of government offices and businesses); “soft” and “hard” celebrations (defined by the extent to which they are scripted); “thin” and “thick” calendars (depending on the frequency of holidays in a year); fragmented and cohesive or imposed and consensual commemorations; secular and religious (as well as hybrid) holidays; elite and popular celebrations; and celebrations that border on personality cult (Iraq) vs. celebrations that avoid human veneration (Saudi Arabia). Podeh further explains that “the most common ceremonies and rituals are the laying of wreaths on tombs, prayers and other religious rituals, military and civilian parades and processions, public speeches, inauguration ceremonies, oath taking, the laying of foundation stones, graduation ceremonies, artistic shows and exhibitions, the use of state symbols (flag, anthem, and emblem), the hanging of portraits of the ruler, the use of fireworks and events carried out by—and for the edification of—schoolchildren” (pp. 298–99). Indeed, such is the wide variety of commemorative practices in the Arab world that even this list is not exhaustive. I certainly appreciate the sheer perseverance required to assemble such a voluminous number of examples of ceremonies for each chapter of the book, yet the breadth of the collected data complicates a clear line of argument about “the very inner mechanics of nation building and state formation.” Although this judgment will likely make me a member in Podeh's club of “narrow-minded fellow academics,” the latter might have had a point when they called his project “too broad” and “too ambitious” (p. xii).
In the remainder of the review, allow me to focus on the Lebanon chapter, because I know Lebanese commemorative practices best. Of forty-seven pages in the chapter, seven are dedicated to the Mandate Period (1920–46), which is surprising given that this period was arguably Lebanon's formative one. Podeh presents both the French-proclaimed Independence Day, scheduled on 1 September, and the locally organized counter-holiday: Martyrs Day, held on 6 May. Here we need a much more detailed investigation of the Lebanese power struggles between pro-French elites who got to enjoy seats in the Mandate government and anti-French elites who wanted to realize their vision of an Arab state. There were larger boundary questions at stake: is the Lebanese national community part of a larger Arab nation, or is it somehow different? The discussions that preceded the holiday commemorations would have provided more useful analytical material. Iraqi, Egyptian, and Jordanian elites had to go through similar debates, yet Lebanon's final self-definition as a sovereign country “with an Arab face” presents a unique resolution. A closer look at those twenty-six years of national-identity debates in Lebanon would have revealed a lot about the inner mechanics of nation building that the introduction promised to explain.
Podeh then introduces the reader to independent Lebanon (1946–present) and Lebanon's Independence Day, held on 22 November. Two particular sites mark the end of French Mandate rule: Rashaya Castle and the Independence House in Bchamoun. After 1946, annual delegations of “modest size” were dispatched to head up commemorative ceremonies at both sites without generating a large following. The practice stopped in the 1970s. We are told of various subsequent attempts by Lebanese state officials to celebrate national holidays during the civil war of 1975–90 and the reconstruction period of 1990–2005 in order to impose “normalcy” upon a state in tatters. Then we go back in time to 1979 to learn about Flag Day, an official holiday at the Ministry of Education celebrated in many Lebanese schools. Back to 1946 and Martyrs Day. The original memorial in Martyrs Square disappeared, and a new one was inaugurated in 1960. The ceremonies ceased as the civil war of 1975–90 turned Martyrs Square into a no-man's land, but they resumed in 1995 and stopped again when the memorial's statues were taken away for repairs. On to Army Day, 1945, which was not regularly celebrated until the 1960s, then unraveled in 1975 with the outbreak of the civil war and the disintegration of the Lebanese army, only to be restored in 1991 and celebrated by various army units. Musa al-Sadr Day, Resistance and Liberation Day, and religious holidays are the next commemorations on the list. The Qana massacre of 1996, which galvanized the nation and led to a tremendous show of national solidarity at the mass funeral of the victims, merits only a short paragraph in between. It is unclear how Podeh weighs the significance of each of these commemorative events. Political sponsors placed them on the national calendar, but who attended them? Were they followers of the sponsors or mixed crowds? In the early years after Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, most Lebanese celebrated Resistance and Liberation Day. After the 2006 Lebanon war, it became a day for Hizbullah rallies.
For readers who do not already possess a solid grasp of Lebanese history before delving into the chapter, the chronological back and forth will quickly get confusing. By choosing this nonlinear narrative, Podeh disengages from the larger historical contexts that shaped each holiday and misses the ongoing competitions between ministries, the army, or party elites. Without measuring the impact of holidays inside Lebanon, how do we know whether a particular commemoration actually reflected or actively shaped national attitudes? Did schoolchildren really care about Flag Day in 1979, a year in which their country was disintegrating around them? If they did, then was Flag Day more or less significant to them than was Martyrs Day to children in 1936, 1960, or 1975? Podeh tries hard to find “the national” in all of his examples. In contrast to his argument that “the celebration of holidays in Lebanon has in itself upheld . . . the integrity of the state” (with the disclaimer “at least to some extent”) (p. 254), the reader could easily come away from the book with the sense that “the state” was never in control of these commemorations at all. In other words, there is no clear link between the Lebanese holidays mentioned and “the integrity of the state.” Lebanese national identity has little to do with unified or consensual narratives but instead with narratives that allow eruptions, erasures, and contestations—and a lot of compromises.
The other four Arab states in the study did not have to compromise very much to establish their national holidays, because they were (quasi-)authoritarian regimes or monarchies that were able to set dates and choose rituals for commemoration without much internal opposition or debate. Were the resulting holidays cohesive celebrations of a united citizenry and productive of national identification? If we look at the countries currently destabilized by the Arab uprisings, not to mention those turned upside down by a U.S. invasion, then the answer is “not necessarily.” Arab states that have had firm control over their holiday calendars have not necessarily generated more stability or national sentiment amongst their citizens than states whose calendars were repeatedly reconfigured. Bremer may have abolished Saddam Hussein's holiday calendar upon assuming control of the Interim Governing Council, which was an important symbolic move, but the newly instituted 9 April holiday did not turn Iraq into a nation.
