Carol Connell has written an exceptionally clear and persuasive book that will be of considerable interest to analysts of contemporary debates about the international monetary system as well as to financial historians. Her main subject is the meticulous reconstruction of debates on problems of the international monetary system that began in 1963 at the Rockefeller Center at Bellagio on Lake Como under the auspices of Fritz Machlup, and was continued with support from the Ford Foundation as well as from the central banking community, and from Princeton University. The central figures are Machlup and the Belgian-American Robert Triffin, as well as the probably less well-known William Fellner. Connell uses the examination of Fellner, as well as of other figures peripheral to the central Bellagio deliberations such as Edith Penrose, to show how general microeconomic and macroeconomic issues can be brought into the discussion of international money. The central point of the Bellagio discussions in Machlup's view was to bring together economists of different intellectual persuasion, and then to work together in a common framework. He sought “a process whereby participants would collaboratively define the problem they wanted to solve, examine possible solutions in light of the desired outcome, and allow themselves the freedom to consider hybrid or compromise solutions.” At first mostly restricted to academic economists, the group then opened up to policymakers from the IMF and central banks, and by the late 1960s to private sector business economists. It did well in providing a basic framework for analysis (liquidity, adjustment, and confidence), but the solution devised for the international monetary system, which influenced the creation of the SDR (Special Drawing Right) was a disappointment to the economists originally involved in the effort. The group focused too much on the liquidity problem, which seemed to have been solved by the 1970s by the expansion of private credit, and not enough on the adjustment problems (which, as Connell correctly notes, remain a key international vulnerability in the Great Recession).
The book's many virtues include an exceptionally clear depiction of the problems of the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime in the 1960s, and a fine discussion of the evolution of economists’ thinking on fixed versus floating rates. There are also many subtle reflections on what makes policy entrepreneurship successful, on how issues can be framed for policy debate, and on the workings of academic mentorship. There is also an interesting reflection on how the debates on the international monetary order, and in particular the contributions of Triffin, critically influenced the evolution of thinking on European monetary integration. Many of the U.S. participants had a distinctively European outlook also. American observers were often puzzled as to whether Triffin was really an American or a European. The critical insight that Connell brings out and links the international with the European debate was that of Triffin (from Europe and the Money Muddle, 1957, p. 289): “The significance of monetary unification, like that of exchange stability in a free market, is that both exclude any resort to any other corrective techniques except those of internal fiscal and credit policies.” The consequence of this focus is that the Optimum Currency Area discussion, pioneered by some of the participants in the Bellagio discussions (Robert Mundell and Peter Kenen), did not really take a role in the currency controversies.
The book's analysis ends in the late 1970s, at the moment when some of the concerns, in particular with “confidence” were being reformulated in a more precisely focused analytical way by concentrating on how they influenced expectations. The rational expectations revolution only begins in the last years of the book's treatment, and it would be interesting to speculate why the treatment of credibility and commitment seems so disconnected from the earlier Machlupian discussion of confidence.
