Previously, neither the religion nor the national origins of migrant workers were questioned. However, beginning in the 1990s and gathering momentum after the events of 11 September 2001 the image of a ‘foreigner’ corresponds to the image of a Muslim throughout Western Europe. The existence and identity of Muslim immigrants are often perceived in a one-dimensional manner through the window of their religion.
With the deepening of economic and institutional crises within the European Community since 2008, Muslim immigrants appear to have been treated as foreign scapegoats more than any other group. Their presence and constitutionally legitimate social, civic and religious demands are often used to inflame debates, probably hiding other economic, political and social problems within European societies.Reference Manço1
An important part of the European public sees the 18.3 million Muslims living in the EU2 as a uniform body. The multiple internal diversities that may exist within this group of people are scarcely questioned diversities in terms of national and ethnic origin; the native languages they speak; the migration stories they have experienced; education levels and social background; socio-professional differences; length of time in Europe; whether they have access to citizenship of a European country or not, etc. Islam is moreover automatically assumed by a large part of European public opinion as a religiosity principally different from other monotheistic religious thoughts. This is obviously not true. As everywhere else in the world, Islam in Europe is subdivided into multiple denominations that differ in their conceptions of life morale and degree of secularisation. It is thus neither monolithic nor unchanging.Reference Manço3
Ultimately, Europe’s awareness of the immigrant Muslims’ permanent settlement takes place within the context of globalisation while European cultural, political and economic influence has declined globally in tandem with a period of deep crisis of Europe’s economy and institutions. This seems to create a conception of Islam and Muslims as if their presence constitutes a threat to European social order, lifestyle and culture.
This paper focuses on the sociological profile and religious practices of Muslim immigrant populations in Western Europe. Based on quantitative empirical data and some qualitative comments about this population, it aims to highlight Western Europe’s Muslims’ potential of Europeanisation and secularisation in terms of their demographic behaviour and socio-cultural practices.
Muslims in Western Europe
There are just over 18 million Muslims with a migrant background living in Western Europe (excluding illegal immigrants), of whom 32% are from Turkey, 38% from North Africa and 15% from the Indian subcontinent. Muslims from Turkey and the Balkan countries have mainly settled in the German-speaking and Scandinavian countries. Muslims from North Africa are found predominantly in France and in Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain and Portugal). Muslims from the Indian subcontinent live predominantly in the United Kingdom. The Muslim presence in some other countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland, is mixed: coming in more or less equal proportions from North Africa and Turkey.
In Northern Europe, the arrival of low-skilled and poorly educated male Muslim workers from rural areas at the invitation of European countries spans 1950 to 1970. These workers often, but not exclusively, came from former colonies, such as North Africans in France and Pakistanis in the UK. Between 1970 and 1990, the first generation of their working population was gradually excluded from the labour market. This was also a period of both social de-legitimisation of the migrants, following massive unemployment, and also a period of family reunification, with the arrival of wives and children or other children who were born in Europe. Many Muslim adults and elderly immigrants identified most strongly with their own communities. These unemployed, early-retired or disabled workers played key roles in the formation of religious organisations and Islamic social networks in Europe, particularly in the form of mosques, Koranic schools, shops and associations.
The emergence of a new Muslim generation, holding citizenship of their native countries, continues between the years 1990 and 2010. This group was largely comprised of low-skilled young people with social problems (school dropouts, addiction, petty crime), who are in the process of linguistic and cultural assimilation, yet are plagued by socio-economic inequalities, including discrimination in recruitment. A third section of the younger generation of Muslims in Europe are persons from urban areas and who are increasingly educated, who arrived in Europe through marriage to a young Muslim with an immigration background. The qualifications of the people who fall into this category are often not recognised by the European states, condemning them to social and economic marginality.
In Southern Europe, the settlement of male and female Muslim migrants took place between 1980 and 2000, and at least half of these entered illegally, often from urban areas and with a high level of education, including a mastery of different languages and they quickly learnt the language of the host country. Unlike their counterparts in the north of Europe, few Muslims in Southern Europe are naturalised, accordingly they don’t profit from the social security system and are less organised (mosques, schools, shops, associations).
Both in the north and south of Western Europe, a constant feature of the Muslim population is that of a large proportion of young people. Another significant feature is that a large proportion of the group are poorly-qualified and discriminated against in the labour market, affecting even the most skilled. According to a recent study, 23% of the Muslim population in Europe is made up of children aged 0–14 years and the age group of 15–29 years accounted for 27% of the population, while these rates are 15% and 18%, respectively, for the non-Muslim majority population.4
Religious Practices of Muslims in Western Europe
A series of surveys conducted since 1989 in France by Institut Francais de l’Opinion Publique (IFOP) makes it possible to sketch a sociological portrait of Muslim religiosity.5 Although covering only France, the 2011 data references can give a valid indication for the whole of Western Europe.Reference Jeldtoft6
The datasets contain categories of self-identification. Practising Muslims who observe the daily worship account for 41% of the sample. Muslims who are somewhat or very regular in their observance represent 34% of the sample. Survey data also point to the existence of people of so-called ‘Muslim origin’ or ‘Muslim cultural affiliation’, who do not regularly practice their faith with the exception of Islamic holy days. They comprise 22% of the sample. Of those interviewed, 3% claimed ‘no religion’ or to be ‘non-believers’.
Furthermore, according to the data above, those who self-identified as ‘believers and regular observers’ since 1989 were: women rather than men; people aged over 55; occupationally unskilled; residents of small towns rather than big cities. Of these distinctions, age appears to be the most significant explanatory variable.
The opposite picture emerges when considering the ‘Muslims by culture’: they were men rather than women; young people under 25 years; skilled rather than unskilled workers; graduates of higher education rather than those with less education; residents of cities of over 200,000 inhabitants rather than small communities. The matter of professional qualification seems to be the most important determining variable for self-identification in the category of ‘Muslim origin’.
The survey results about the practice of Friday prayers – the most important worship in Islam – are especially interesting. In Islam, attendance at mosque on Friday is compulsory for men. However, the attendance of the noon prayer rate is only 25% for the whole of the Muslim sample. Even for the self-identified ‘regular practising Muslims’, the rate of attendance at the mosque for the Friday prayer does not exceed 48%. Thus, according to these results, only half of those who self-identified as regular observers actually practice in the mosque, even though it is a fundamental religious obligation. It is the same for Muslims in the over 55 years age category, only 41% of people in this category attend mosque on Friday.
The fasting month of Ramadan is the most social and the most festive ritual of Islam. This ritual is social because it is ‘visible’ or observable in a non-Muslim milieu. Even those who never pray can fast, offering an excellent way for Muslims to enact their presence in Europe. In the IFOP survey in 2011, 71% of respondents said that they fasted during the previous month of Ramadan and 9% said they had fasted for part of the holy month. The presence of fasting amongst under 25 years old is remarkable: 73%, that is to say, more than the average of the sample. Data from old versions of this survey show that fasting for Ramadan has been increasing since 1989.
In addition to age, it is interesting to note that the practice of attending Friday prayers and observing fast days shows distinct patterns according to socio-professional categories and places of residence; the least skilled and residents of small towns are more likely to practise these two important rituals of Islam. However, the most remarkable finding of this survey is that fasting during the month of Ramadan is more important than practising the weekly Friday prayer – probably because there is collectively more fun after breaking the long daytime feelings of hunger and thirst.
Understanding European Muslims’ Socio-cultural Practices
Social identities are formed and have evolved via the ‘show your significance and exist’ motto given to people by current societies. This means the statement of a claimed difference as a result of personal choice. In European societies it is acceptable for individuals to express themselves, and personal choices are a priority in postmodern societies. Individuals are aware of the legitimacy of their personal choices, as well as their human and citizenship rights. They are sensitive to the others’ respect for these, and can act collectively to protect their rights, if necessary. People living in such societies can socially exist and be accepted by others, or feel they are being respected, by stating their personal choices in the public arena and defending them within the framework of their constitutional rights. Yet this also entails the extensive popularisation of the mostly artificial, appearance-oriented, fashion-indexed and profit-motived social behaviours.
Within this perspective, religiously sensitive European Muslim minorities progress by highlighting personal and cultural differences and by mobilising and/or instrumentalising their religious belief and contacts for building their social identity. Groups demand equal rights and their legitimacy as citizens by means of prioritising their religious difference from the society they live in. European Muslims use their religion as a tool for social negotiation and compromise to defend their ‘identity politics’, so named by American social scientists in the 1980s. Muslim activists are thus not necessarily fanatic or extremist, rather they affirm their identity in a way compatible with modern democratic society. There are plenty of examples to support this fact: Muslim women, representing a different femininity, demanding to wear headscarves in the school and work places; asking for same sex doctors in the hospitals; Muslim families demanding halal food to be provided in the cafeterias (schools, workplaces, hospitals, etc); Muslim groups demanding a mosque from the state or municipality by asking for support in line with what has already being done for other religious groups, and so on.
The term symbolic religiosity, suggested by American sociologist Herbert GansReference Gans7 in the 1970s, means sharing the fun parts of religious life and making them a priority for religious identity. Today in Europe, it can be easily observed that such consumerist behaviours in religiosity are developing through the performance of some alternative religious practices instead of regular prayer. This process can also be seen on behalf of European Muslims; for example, the changing meaning of Ramadan dinners and social, cultural and business activities such as the ‘Ramadan bazaar’ organised at night during Ramadan in Muslim neighbourhoods; tourism (particularly Umrah and tours organised to European cities that are important for Islam, such as Granada, Sarajevo and Istanbul); the recent common practice of celebrating ‘holy birth week’ (the prophet Mohammed’s birthday) during the Easter week across Europe, and so on.
Fundamentalism is a form of religious individualisation. It is in the same vein of as postmodern motto ‘create your own religion’; a faith that satisfies the individual’s own interest and desire; a form of religious lifestyle gained and built by his/her own effort. It also means a return to the holy source of religion. This act is realised by the individual’s owning of and reflecting on the holy texts. Fundamentalism aims to purify the religion from the ‘pollution’ created by the historic sociocultural traditions and human impact. Fundamentalism, apart from its negative meaning presented by the press and public opinion, is an individualist, intellectual, reflexive and normative type of religious belief. For the postmodern religious person, to understand and reflect rationally on religion is as important as the performance of religious ritual duties. The fundamentalist understanding as described above is often observed amongst second- and third-generation European Muslims.
Moreover, whilst mobilising their religious identity in regard to social status and equal citizenship rights, European Muslims follow similar trends of postmodern religious understanding and lifestyle, which has also been observed amongst other religious believers by the Western sociologists of religion for the last three decades. Fundamentalism and symbolic religiosity should be regarded as an ideal type and/or theoretical model for such religious identity and behaviours. Although traditional religious identities and lifestyles continue to exist, postmodern forms such as fundamentalism and symbolic religiosity emerge in a mixed form of individual and group social reality. Unique to each individual’s understanding and desire to mix them personally, postmodern identities and behaviours show great variety.
As a whole, the Muslim minority in Europe (and particularly a religiously sensitive section within this minority group) has more recently shown significant progress in harmonious social adaptation in the context of both citizenship and socio-economy. These Muslim people’s religious lifestyles are becoming more closely aligned with the European mind-set and local social behaviour sets. Some other findings from a recent research study include: the birth rate of western European Muslims is rapidly decreasing; and first marriage age, divorce rate, and the number of 60+ year-olds are increasing.8 In short, European Muslims’ demographic practices are Europeanising. By preserving their religious differences, these people tend to become European as much as the Europeans; nevertheless, they are not accepted by the majority who makes them ‘other’.
Ural Manço is professor of sociology at Aksaray University in Turkey. His research topics are migration, religion, religious and ethnic identities, cross-cultural relations, urban issues and social work.
