Fawaz Gerges has produced a major contribution to our understanding of the phenomenon of global jihad. He conducted interviews with scores of jihadists during 1999 and 2000 and examined numerous books and articles that jihadists themselves published as late as 2005. Unlike many other analysts, he stresses the importance of distinguishing between national jihad and transnational jihad, and he demonstrates that the latter arose out of the failure of the former. He also argues convincingly that the indiscriminate violence employed by global jihadists such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Musʿab al-Zarqawi has been widely condemned by national jihadists as well as by nonjihadist Islamists.
Gerges begins his study by reviewing the major developments of the 1970s and 1980s. By the middle 1970s, Sayyid Qutb's revisions of the classical doctrine of jihad had become influential, particularly among young Egyptians. Qutb's goal had been to target “apostate” Muslim rulers who were not enforcing the shariʿa. Muslims who were inspired by Qutb in this regard were “national” jihadists, for they were focused on the need to replace the “near enemy” (their corrupt government) with an Islamic state. Governments began cracking down on the growing jihad movement during the 1980s, at the very time that the Soviet Union was trying to conquer Afghanistan. Thousands of young Muslims from throughout the world poured into Afghanistan in order to help defend the dar al-Islam against invasion by infidels, and Muslim rulers encouraged them to go to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets rather than to cause trouble at home. After the Soviets evacuated Afghanistan in 1989, many of the “Afghan Arabs” returned home fired with enthusiasm and equipped with military skills. Religious militants made their most serious challenges in Egypt and Algeria, triggering bloody confrontations that resulted in thousands of deaths.
The major contribution of The Far Enemy is to link the fate of these religious militants to the rise of global, or transnational, jihad. Bin Laden had been forced to leave Saudi Arabia in 1991 due to his anger at the Saudi rulers for selecting the Americans, rather than Bin Laden's followers, to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait. He moved his base of operations to Sudan, where he remained until 1996, when Sudan yielded to American pressure to evict him. Returning to Afghanistan, he issued his “Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.” Meanwhile, the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, who had worked closely with Bin Laden in the jihad against the Soviets a decade earlier, was also experiencing frustrations, as the Egyptian government had gained the upper hand in its battle with both Tanzim al-Jihad and the much larger al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya. With no hope of success in Egypt, al-Zawahiri merged his Tanzim al-Jihad organization with Bin Laden's group. Al-Zawahiri, a longtime advocate of attacking the near enemy, thereby made a major shift in strategy by endorsing Bin Laden's program of attacking the “far enemy.”
Gerges demonstrates that al-Zawahiri's decision to join with Bin Laden in his war on America was made unilaterally, without consulting other members of Tanzim al-Jihad, and that many of the group's members resigned in protest. Bin Laden's declaration of war on America and his 1998 fatwa to kill Americans were received with misgivings and outright condemnation by jihadists in numerous other organizations. National jihadists knew that an attack on the United States would unleash vast economic, military, and intelligence resources against activist Muslims everywhere, whereas Bin Laden was seemingly in the grip of utopian fantasies regarding his own power and the moral and military weakness of the United States.
The attack on the World Trade Center resulted in further widespread condemnation of Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri by national jihadists. Some criticized the attack on the basis of moral principles, while others were angry because of the complications that it caused jihadists who had no intention of fighting the Americans but who were now the object of a furious and hard-hitting “war on terror.” Americans in their anger made no distinctions between jihadists and Islamists, much less between national and transnational jihadists. American hostility compromised the status of national jihadists who had sought asylum in Europe, and it entailed greater American support for the near enemy: now the United States thought it had a vested interest in cooperating with Muslim governments—and Israel—in crushing potential threats from Islamic activists of all kinds. Gerges surveys a wide range of literature published by national jihadists that is bitterly critical of the transnational jihad.
The Far Enemy is a significant work and is essential reading for anyone who wishes to understand the trajectory of jihad movements over the past three decades. Unfortunately, the book's bizarre organization creates major problems for readers, thereby compromising its effectiveness. The book begins with a prologue, which is followed by a rambling and repetitive introduction, much of which comes across as the first draft of a prospectus submitted to a publisher. All of the chapters contain material that is repeated in other chapters. The cumulative effect creates the impression that the chapters were written by several authors who used the same research notes. One of the most egregious—but by no means unique—examples is the duplication of extensive block quotations and commentary on pages 107–9 and 235–36. It is beyond comprehension how a prestigious press and a respected scholar could have allowed a manuscript to be published in this condition.
