The ninth claimant contended that, as the ‘successor’ to the First Holy Saint of Sikhism and, therefore, the spiritual leader of the Nirmal Sikh community, he had the power to remove and appoint trustees of two gurdwaras used by members of that community. The Court of Appeal had agreed to strike out the claim on the grounds that it was being asked to pronounce on non-justiciable matters of religious doctrine and practice and had subsequently refused leave to appeal on the same grounds. However, in doing so it had acknowledged that the matter was ultimately for the Supreme Court – which duly gave leave.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal unanimously. On the issue of the justiciability of matters of religious doctrine, the court noted the dictum of Lord Bingham in R (Gentle) v Prime Minister [2008] 1 AC 1356 to the effect that, although there were issues which judicial tribunals had traditionally been very reluctant to entertain because they recognised their limitations as suitable bodies to resolve them, if a claimant sought enforcement of a legal right the courts had the power to decide the matter. The court noted that in both England and Scotland judges would not adjudicate on the truth of religious beliefs or on the validity of particular rites; however, where a claimant sought the enforcement of private rights and obligations that depended on religious issues, a court might have to determine such religious issues as were capable of objective assessment.

Unincorporated religious communities were voluntary associations in law and their constitutions were civil contracts by which members agreed to be bound. The courts would not adjudicate on the decisions of an association's governing body unless there was a question of some infringement of a civil right or interest. However, doctrinal and liturgical disputes were non-justiciable unless they engaged civil rights or interests or reviewable questions of public law. The governing body of a religious voluntary association had to act within its contractual powers and if, for example, it sought a union with another religious body ultra vires its constitution, a member of the community could invoke the jurisdiction of the courts to restrain it. Similar considerations applied where a member of a religious association was dismissed or disciplined and claimed that the association had acted ultra vires or in breach of due process. The jurisdiction of the courts was not excluded because the cause of the dispute was a matter of theology or ecclesiology; the role of the court in such circumstances was to keep the parties to their contract. There was a clear line of authority which contradicted the proposition that a court could treat as non-justiciable a religious dispute where the determination of the dispute was necessary in order to decide a matter of disputed legal right; and unless the parties could resolve their differences the court might have to adjudicate upon matters of religious doctrine and practice in order to determine who were the trustees entitled to administer the trusts. [Frank Cranmer]