In this book, Maxwell A. Cameron develops an account of the character traits of public officials, which he summarizes as “practical wisdom.” His starting point is the inability of political institutions to address “many of the biggest collective challenges of our times” (p. 1), which he attributes to the failure to understand that “institutions require people with the will and skill to serve the common good” (p. 2). The aim of the book is to provide such an understanding. Cameron uses an interpretive approach, arguing, in a reflexive move, that the social sciences are themselves institutions that require wise practitioners (pp. 21–28). He draws on numerous examples to examine institutions from the perspective of those who inhabit them.
To illustrate the dangers of institutional failures, Cameron discusses the example of the 2013 Lac-Mégantic train disaster in Quebec, in which a series of mistakes by different individuals (the railway engineer, the rail traffic controller, and so on) led to a catastrophe with 47 dead (Chapter 1). A core element of Cameron’s diagnosis of what went wrong is the relentless profit maximization by the train company, which “lacked a safety culture” (p. 8). The same pressures to cut costs and the same assumptions about human nature that reigned (and still reign) in many private companies also mar many public political institutions, Cameron’s main focus (see p. 19). That is why he continues his argument with a broader critique of “competitive utility-maximizing” (Chapter 2). His core claim is that it “excludes the knowledge, feelings, and skills that are necessary for the construction of the common good” (p. 29) by excluding deliberation, communication, and judgment. In addition, it fails to take into account the physical and biological limits of human nature and our planet (p. 35). For utility maximizers, the existence of common goods can only lead to the Hardian “tragedy” (see Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162, 1968). But human beings can also come up with (Elinor) Ostromian solutions for “governing the commons” (pp. 34–41). Cameron contrasts Aristotle and Hobbes in describing these different approaches, also drawing on anthropological research on the prosocial tendencies of human beings (pp. 47–49), which he connects to Adam Smith’s 1759 account of sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Cameron presents his alternative approach to human agency in Chapter 3. It focuses on the necessity to balance various goods, based on the quite plausible assumption that there are “perfectly defensible— indeed essential—notions of the good” (p. 56) that go beyond the summation of individual utility. Such an account of agency can accept pragmatic rules that leave sufficient space for discretion, but do not require slavish obedience (pp. 64–71). Cameron discusses institutions and practices (pp. 71–78) in ways that are very reminiscent of Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue, 1974) and defends this account against a number of objections. One could have added that sometimes other forms of agency, such as strict obedience to certain prohibitions, or even some limited forms of maximizing can also have their place in institutions. But in Cameron’s defense, we have enough accounts of such forms of agency, whereas the kind of wise balancing of different goods that he describes has received less attention.
In Chapter 4, Cameron gives flesh to the bones of this account by discussing case studies of three politically engaged individuals. The first is Michael Ignatieff, an academic who entered Canadian politics and later on reflected, very self-critically, about his lack of practical political judgment regarding understanding the “priority of the particular” (p. 84), “establishing his credibility with voters” (p. 88), and framing his statements in appropriate ways (p. 89). The second is Lloyd Axworthy, a former Canadian foreign minister who served as chief of an electoral observation mission and, in a critical moment, helped curb illegitimate foreign influence (pp. 90–95). The third example comes from local politics: Liz Evans is a psychiatric nurse who played a key role in improving the health services and support infrastructure for drug addicts (pp. 95–99). These portraits of individuals and their struggles are among the most fascinating parts of the book; they make one wonder whether moral exemplars should play a larger role in how we teach and think about morality.
But why has an understanding of institutions as requiring wise practitioners, which has a long historical lineage, faded into the background in recent decades? For Cameron, it is the neoliberal unleashing of competitiveness that deserves to be blamed: it undermined deliberation and practical wisdom while promoting unhealthy levels of competitiveness and partisanship. In Chapter 5, he describes the ascent of neoliberalism, focusing on its “reliance on competition not only as an engine of growth, but as the basis of democracy, freedom, and prosperity” (p. 102). He critically notes that it is not even clear that the policies suggested by neoliberals have been successful in supporting growth (p. 107). Instead, they have led to levels of social inequality that are dangerous for democracy (pp. 107–14). The chapter ends with a sharp critique of the Citizens United decision that made possible the unlimited influx of money into U.S. politics (pp. 117–19). Chapter 6 continues the discussion of U.S. politics, focusing on the hyper-partisanship created by “the ethos of competitive utility-maximizing,” which “found its apotheosis in Donald Trump’s successful bid for the US presidency” (p. 121). With deliberation, compromise, and cooperation shoved to one side, democratic institutions can hardly function well. Cameron suggests, as a possible countermeasure, the schooling of politicians, discussing a summer school program for students as a promising example of training individuals in empathy and the search for compromise (pp. 138–40).
As an alternative, and bringing together strands of literature that had previously been rarely connected, Cameron discusses in Chapter 7 the relation between the capabilities approach and work on the quality of democracy. Wise practitioners could draw on these ideas when balancing different goods in political decision making. Cameron concludes with reflections on the kind of scholarship that is needed to grasp what matters about institutions. Such scholarship, he argues, cannot avoid embracing certain values. It must practice virtues such as “courage, integrity, and determination” (p. 162), and it must ask questions about the common good.
Cameron’s book is clearly argued and beautifully written, and it uses well-chosen examples. It is an intellectual pleasure for those who already accept the premise: the necessity for virtuous individuals within institutions. But—and this will be its greater achievement—it may also convince others, who so far have not yet paid much attention to the character of politicians. Cameron makes a convincing case for the claim that institutions are never “people-proof” (in the memorable line of John Hardwig, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 88 (12), 1991, 707). All too often, institutional design does not achieve what it is supposed to because it does not take into account the motivations and perspectives of those who inhabit the institutions. When institutions do not achieve their goals, the instinctive reaction of those trained in economics (or in the kind of political science that also relies on the assumption of competitive utility maximizing) is to say let’s have more control, more incentives. In times in which ever more fine-grained control and incentive setting by way of digital tools are on the horizon, the questions Cameron raises become ever more urgent: Where should we bet on rules and incentives, and where should we bet on character and judgment?
Let me note two points of partial disagreement. In his account of how neoliberalism came to power, Cameron arguably does not give sufficient weight to the fact that, at the time, at least some institutions (some universities might be examples!) were cliquish and governed by old-boy networks, without any attention to merit. The attempts to measure achievements objectively, by introducing rules and incentives, broke up some of these structures, and paradoxically gave women, nonwhites, and foreigners greater opportunities to attain positions. Although I certainly do not want to defend the introduction of “neoliberal” measures into every public institution, one should not idealize the past; in any case, the arguments from alleged fairness and objectivity are important for understanding why even many well-meaning people at the time could be won over by some neoliberal arguments.
Second, although Cameron’s focus on wisdom, judgment, and character is extremely important, especially in contrast to the focus on incentives today, character is not a completely independent variable. Institutions shape people, and to improve people’s character, changing institutions may be as important as schooling individuals. For example, hyper-partisanship in politics seems to be made more likely by first-past-the-post systems; in proportional voting systems, the need to build coalitions and to find compromises creates a counterweight to the competitiveness of electoral campaigns. In addition, wise regulations for campaign funding and media formats can contribute either to more competitive or more collaborative styles of politics. These kinds of complex interrelations between institutional settings and individual virtues deserve attention as well.
But these are minor quibbles with a book that is, overall, an extremely important and timely contribution to the discussion about institutions. And given how central institutions are to almost all questions of political theory and political science, one must wish it a wide readership.
