I have taught history courses on Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, as well as several variations of a course titled ‘History of Fascism’, aimed at both undergraduate and graduate students at a variety of New England institutions of higher education, both private and public. This has stemmed from my own research interests in Second World War and the Holocaust in Latvia, for which fascism is a connecting thread in both historiography and popular consciousness. My teaching on the subject, since 2020, has occurred in the context of ‘the fascism debate’, a historiographical debate that sharpened during the 2010s and broke containment from academia following the Brexit referendum and 2016 US presidential election.Footnote 1 With that in mind, I want to share my assessment of some of the challenges and prospects of teaching about fascism in the United States this decade.
With course catalogues broadening to include new offerings on non-Western history as well as a steep relative decline in tenure-track searches for historians of modern Europe, fascism represents an intriguing outlier. Many of my courses filled to the registration cap and some beyond that; when I taught an undergraduate history course titled ‘Nazi Germany’ at Amherst College in fall 2021, I had fifty registered students and dozens more on a waitlist clamouring to be let in. Especially in visiting positions where I was substituting for a tenured historian who had retired or transitioned to administrative duties, this signalled pent-up demand from students that was no longer being met by course offerings. Though student demographics in these courses tend to be majority white and male (as when I teach courses about war), I take this as an opportunity to expose these students – who might be expecting a purely political or military history focus – to social, cultural and gender history.
Anecdotally, I have encountered many syllabi about fascism that focus entirely on Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. This not only represents just a narrow pair of national cases but also excludes multiple ‘varieties of fascism’, as conceived by Stanley Payne, including Spanish Falangism, the Romanian Legionary (Iron Guard) movement, Szalasi’s ‘Hungarist’ or Arrow Cross movement and various ‘abortive undeveloped fascisms’.Footnote 2 Nazi Germany offers perhaps a uniquely robust historiography as well as a wealth of primary sources that have been translated into English, making it a natural focus in the classroom. Yet in the 2020s, teaching about all the ‘varieties of fascism’ expressed historically in various countries through both secondary and primary sources is more possible than ever.Footnote 3 One of the biggest obstacles in an American classroom to teaching this history and assigning research papers – a lack of foreign language mastery to read primary sources – is finally being mitigated.
In all versions of my ‘History of Fascism’ class, taught to undergraduates at Brown University in 2020 and at Amherst College in 2022, as well as to graduate students at the University of Massachusetts, Boston in 2025, I expose students to ‘varieties of fascism’ beyond the usual emphasis on Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. To this end, I have consistently assigned readings on the Franco regime in Spain, the Salazar regime in Portugal, Austria’s Ständestaat and the Romanian Iron Guard. Many students have responded with substantial curiosity towards the latter case. Typically lacking any background knowledge about Romania, they are exposed to a fascist movement that stands out for its Christian mysticism, chaotic violence, surprising electoral success and dramatic downfall after integration into the regime, leaving a lasting impression in many cases. Furthermore, as noted by István Deák, ‘Romania was one of only two German satellites … to attempt to organize its own Final Solution,’ a genocide pursued with great vigour before voluntarily being wound down by its dictator (and erstwhile partner of the Iron Guard), Ion Antonescu, ultimately protecting a large number of Romanian Jews in the Regat (the old Romanian kingdom) and southern Transylvania by resisting Nazi requests for deportation.Footnote 4 Engaging with this history has helped to stretch students’ thinking about anti-Jewish violence, acting as a foil to the Holocaust as organised by the Nazis. A graduate student that I taught in fall 2025 completed a research paper on Romania, analysing gender in the Iron Guard through the perspective of women who supported the movement; she resourcefully managed this by having a Romanian classmate translate some primary sources for her, in effect performing original and cutting-edge research in an environment where many other students write their papers on well-trodden ground.
My own research focus has been on Latvia, a country with even less familiarity than Romania among American college students. Teaching about Baltic fascist movements and authoritarian regimes can illustrate and elucidate concepts in clear and convincing ways. Though Payne and others characterise National Socialism as a generic ‘variety of fascism’, to students, it is deeply entwined with Germany and the Nazi Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei; NSDAP), if not overshadowing all other fascist ideologies in the popular imagination, including Italian Fascism. In this context, an article by Matthew Kott on Latvia’s Pērkonkrusts (Thunder Cross) movement has been edifying for students. Kott borrows from Roger Griffin to argue that the palingenetic ultranationalism of Thunder Cross, when combined with its völkisch racism, classifies its ideology as national socialist; however, the fact that Thunder Cross was Germanophobic in addition to its antisemitic orientation highlights how Thunder Cross was a form of national socialism not merely derivative of Hitlerism.Footnote 5 One graduate student at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, saw Thunder Cross as representative of ‘fascism’s transnational adaptability’, i.e. that national socialist ideas originally developed in Germany for Germans could be repurposed elsewhere, even assuming forms hostile to the local German population in that new environment. Many other graduate students found themselves in agreement with this argument.
In neighbouring Estonia, The Union of Participants in the Estonian War of Independence, also known as the Vaps movement, represents an interesting case for teaching about the first two (of five) stages of fascism identified by Robert Paxton, ‘(1) the initial creation of fascist movements’ and ‘(2) their rooting as parties in a political system’.Footnote 6 While Andres Kasekamp considers labelling the Vaps movement as fascist to be ‘problematic’, he ably demonstrates how they built mass popular support and shepherded the amending of the Estonian constitution to transform it into a presidential system with strong executive powers, only to have their movement crushed by the 1934 coup d'état by Konstantin Päts, who assumed these new powers while integrating some Vaps policy issues and ideological principles.Footnote 7 Students, most recently my graduate students at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, drew from this example to consider the central role of veterans’ movements (though in this case, technically not of First World War, rather of the Estonian War of Independence that immediately followed it) in forging fascism and how movements with extensive public support could be crushed and co-opted before they could even attempt a seizure of power, Paxton's third stage.
Likewise, I find that the case of Latvia’s Kārlis Ulmanis, which shares many similarities with Estonia’s Päts, helpfully challenges students’ preconceived notions of fascism. Ulmanis and his Farmers’ Union had echoed proposals for a stronger executive originally put forward by Thunder Cross, then launched a coup on the pretext of the dangers posed by Thunder Cross (as well as another movement similar to the Vaps, Voldemārs Ozols’s Society of the Cavaliers of the Order of Lāčplēsis and Freedom Fighters ‘Legion’, along with the Communist underground) and finally consolidated an authoritarian regime influenced by European fascism.Footnote 8 Historians remain divided on characterising Ulmanis’s regime as ‘fascist’ or not, with many contemporary Latvian historians such as Deniss Hanovs, Aivars Stranga and Valdis Tēraudkalns rejecting the label, but Jordan Kuck emphasising transnational fascist influence on Ulmanis and considering his regime to be fascist. Students are often surprised to learn that Ulmanis’s regime was dictatorial, personalist, corporatist and ethnonationalist, yet did not perpetrate a single political killing and modelled its youth movement after the American 4-H club (Ulmanis was a graduate of the University of Nebraska), rather than the Hitler Youth or League of German Girls. I also had occasion to remind my students that such transnational connections went in both directions; former Thunder Cross ‘chief’ Gustavs Celmiņš immigrated to the United States in 1950, where he taught at Syracuse University and St Mary’s University and gave lectures to the US military about the Soviet Union as a rebranded ‘leader of the resistance against the Nazi occupation’ and ‘a refugee from Bolshevism’.Footnote 9
One increasing challenge is getting students to understand the historical conditions that enabled the rise of fascism from the 1920s to 1940s. Even if elections and referenda nominally endured under fascist regimes, fascist politics were not merely expressed through voting. Rather, fascism (as with communist and social democratic politics) was a lived experience of associational life and comradeship. Simulations can help to convey this; I have repeatedly deployed the lesson plan, ‘Choices in Weimar Republic Elections’, adapted from Facing History & Ourselves, which has been effective in a variety of classrooms.Footnote 10 After providing background information about Weimar Germany and reviewing party platforms from the NSDAP, Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands; SPD) and Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands), students are provided profiles of eight fictional German voters of differing economic, ideological and professional backgrounds, including both men and women. Working together in pairs or small groups, students work to decide for which of the three above parties each profile would have voted in 1932. Though the lesson plan generally yields insights about the growing appeal of the NSDAP, I have increasingly found that the United States’s two-party system, its big-tent parties that lack a formal membership model, and the absence of a labour party mean that classical mass politics in Europe can be hard to convey to American students.
Today, the apparently increased levels of politicisation and participation in American politics pose a paradox for my students across institutions, whether they are highly active or apolitical. The 2020 election witnessed the highest voter turnout in 120 years; the 2024 Kamala Harris campaign sought to mobilise voters by warning of the dangers of fascism.Footnote 11 Recently, I have found Anton Jäger’s Hyperpolitics conceptually helpful for decoding ‘polarized, paranoid, zero-sum, American political life’ of the 2020s.Footnote 12 Mass politics – involving high levels of both politicisation and institutionalisation – of the mid-twentieth century has been superseded by the high politicisation but low institutionalisation of 2010s antipolitics, followed by 2020s hyperpolitics. Certainly, norms, institutions and liberalism more broadly are under threat in the West and rhetoric and symbols redolent of fascism seem to be multiplying, but the classic conditions for enabling fascism – severe socio-economic crisis; an ascendant, revolutionary left that threatens property relations; and masses of brutalised and embittered combat veterans – are absent. By incorporating a chapter or two of Jäger’s Hyperpolitics into my future syllabi, I hope to provide students a heuristic framework to contextualise the fascist threat in the interwar period and the very different political circumstances we face today.
While Eastern European history has been fertile ground for teaching students about fascism, I have come to believe that reorienting their gazes back towards American history can also generate some insights. There is a small line from Paxton in his classic text, Anatomy of Fascism, which has cast a large shadow. On fascist precursors, Paxton argues that ‘It may be that the earliest phenomenon that can be functionally related to fascism is American: the Ku Klux Klan.’Footnote 13 Since writing this decades ago, the ‘fascism debate’ and its historiographical forerunners have provided more basis for going beyond the classic 1919–45 “era of fascism,” pondering the historical question, ‘did it happen here?’ as well as the more presentist, ‘can it happen here?’. Works like James Q. Whitman's Hitler's American Model have enabled sustained comparisons between Jim Crow and the Nuremberg Laws (as well as American and Nazi German eugenics and immigration laws), which I have applied in the classroom. For undergraduate students, this helps to de-exoticise Nazi Germany and builds on the greater knowledge and affective connections that they often possess on American history; graduate students were frequently able to balance the revelations of transnational connections provided by Whitman with grounded critique of the limited causal relationship he described. I typically save this segment for the end of the semester, so that they can apply their accumulated knowledge on fascism to the United States, though coming in it seems that they would often prefer to tackle this first.
Some students whom I taught at private liberal arts colleges and public universities self-identified as anti-fascists. Excepting those active in mass membership organisations such as the Young Democratic Socialists of America who took my courses, I suspect that their engagement was of the ‘online … deinstitutionalized, impermanent’ type described by Jäger, where ‘atomization and acceleration go hand in hand’.Footnote 14 So that they may think carefully about their own standpoints and critically assess historical rhetoric and strategy, I assign my students readings from different strands of anti-fascism: socialist (via the SPD’s Rudolf Hilferding); anarchist (via Gerhard Wartenberg, recovered from a British anarchist zine); liberal (via Thomas Mann); and Christian (via Paul Tillich). Each time I teach, however, most students gravitate towards the final text I assign, a short 2010 manifesto by former French Resistance fighter Stéphane Hessel, Time for Outrage! Footnote 15 Hessel’s work feels timely to many students; ironically, to Jäger, it is the perfect embodiment of 2010s left-wing antipolitics, inspiring Occupy Wall Street, a movement that I personally witnessed but is now an obscure historical footnote for my current students.Footnote 16 More recently, my students were surprised to learn that ‘Antifa’ was not the name of any real organisation or network in the United States. Its September 2025 designation as a domestic terrorist organisation by the Trump Administration, however, indicates further challenges in teaching on this topic.
Not all of my students enter as convinced antifascists. A student at one liberal arts college asked me for my assessments of the far-right commentators Curtis Yarvin (also known as ‘Mencius Moldbug’) and Costin Alamariu (more widely known as ‘Bronze Age Pervert’), not because he perceived them as a fascist threat, but rather because he was a follower of their output on the social media app then still known as Twitter. This represents another tension in the field of fascism studies. Since I do not understand Italian, I have been able to read the fascist philosopher Julius Evola only due to efforts by a transnational alt-right publishing house to translate and republish his work. Every day on social media, students are encountering terms and concepts rooted in this kind of alt-right and neo-fascist appropriation, occasionally bringing them up in the classroom. Thanks to figures like Jordan Peterson, ‘Cultural Marxism’ went from an obscure term deployed by fringe organisations to a common phrase now seen in right-wing media critiques of academia; its antecedent, ‘Cultural Bolshevism’, first emerged among the Nazis and was later popularised outside Germany by Evola in the 1930s, who continued to warn of it in the postwar.Footnote 17 More recently, the problem is not limited to pseudointellectuals and influencers; as Ali Breland points out in The Atlantic, ‘The official social-media channels of the Trump administration have become unrelenting streams of xenophobic and Nazi-coded messages and imagery.’Footnote 18 Even my first-year students at Rhode Island College immediately grasped the resemblance. Thus, I am provided with many teachable moments, though typically thorny and unwelcome ones.
Antipolitics and hyperpolitics are not the only forces shaping student perspectives. In fall 2025, I taught an interdisciplinary first-year seminar at Rhode Island College titled ‘Fascism: What Does It Mean to Us Today?’, which was intended to orient new students, many of them first-generation and few among them pursuing humanities or social sciences degrees, to higher education. Beyond needing to familiarise them with the basic principles behind conservatism, liberalism and socialism before even attempting to define and analyse fascism, I was startled by the degree to which my students were not only apolitical but broadly disengaged from current events. Their only expressed political orientations – generalised hostility or disdain towards Donald Trump, revulsion at both the violent detentions by ICE and the assassination of Charlie Kirk – reflect their videocentric social media browsing habits. As Generation Z favours images and especially video over text, fascism's aestheticisation of politics and the endurance of fascist aesthetics in the form of camp came to mind. As I struggled in the 2025–6 academic year to get my students to complete their assigned readings, like Sam Kriss, I began to wonder what form politics will take as illiteracy returns. Kriss suggests that violence will persist but in forms increasingly incoherent to traditional political and ideological conceptions; however, I fear that fascist energies will be spread even more readily under these conditions, even if mass politics remains absent.Footnote 19 Visual analysis of fascist propaganda usually yields active participation in the classroom, but I hope to draw from Walter Benjamin and Susan Sontag for more practical media literacy lesson plans in the future.
In various courses, students seemed to anticipate my final judgement about whether Donald Trump is or is not a fascist, occasionally posing the question directly. Like Paul Lerner, I believe that my job is to promote critical thinking and provide students with knowledge and skills, rather than resolve an ongoing political debate for them.Footnote 20 At the conclusion of my first-year seminar at Rhode Island College, I divided students into two groups and asked them to debate this question themselves in class, removing myself to the position of observer; this was anxiety-inducing for some students but ultimately led to productive engagement with this question, where they were able to draw on lessons from across the semester. If pressed, my personal assessment about Trump, a ‘no, with a but’, could disappoint all sides of the ‘fascism debate’.
But I also see an opportunity in the classroom in response to these ‘yes or no’ questions about fascism today. Paxton’s model emphasises how fascism emerges from ‘a succession of processes and choices’.Footnote 21 By avoiding a checklist model of fascism, students are thus forced to reason through to their own conclusions. Though political concepts frequently emerge downstream of scholarship, students, as actors outside the classroom in politics and civil society, should not necessarily feel shackled by the rigid theoretical definitions of political scientists or the empirical, deeply contextualised research of historians. Like another controversy that students have sought me to act as a judge on – the question of genocide in Gaza – I have found it helpful to remind them both that genocide has a very specific legal definition (and a copious body of scholarship surrounding it) and also that genocide is a process, where prevention might require intervention before it reaches a legal threshold, receives a definitive judicial ruling or achieves a scholarly consensus. Coursework on fascism (and genocide) is thus not necessarily a basis for inaction; rather, it provides students the knowledge for judgement and the tools for analysis, which can then be applied outside the classroom by those who collectively recognise dangers, whatever labels we apply.
Harry C. Merritt is an adjunct professor in the Department of History at Rhode Island College in Providence, RI, USA. From 2023 to 2025, he was a postdoctoral fellow in History and Holocaust Studies at the University of Vermont. His research focuses on nationalism, interethnic coexistence and violence, and foreign occupation, centring on the history and memory of Second World War and the Holocaust in Latvia. Merritt’s book, Latvian Soldiers of World War II: Fighting for the Homeland in Nazi and Soviet Service, was published by Oxford University Press in 2026.
