Public awareness and interest formation

In terms of our first operational criterion – widespread societal awareness of international institutions including the formation of diverging demands and concerns regarding these institutions – data on individual attitudes at country level and cross-country comparison support our claim that major international institutions are politicized substantially.

Single-country evidence from Germany (we do not know of similar data for other countries) indicates that German citizens are strongly aware of international institutions. Data presented by Mau (Reference Mau2007, 190) suggests that about 55 percent of the German population assigns key importance to international institutions for managing globalized political problems while only 11 percent do so to the German federal government. Similar results presented by Ecker-Ehrhardt (Reference Ecker-Ehrhardt2011) show that the wider German citizens perceive the geographical scope of problems to be, the more they expect international institutions to be able to solve them. According to the same data, between 56 and 73 percent of the German population consider major international organizations like the EU, the World Bank, the IMF, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the G8, and the United Nations (UN) to be very influential on what happens in the world, compared with only 40 percent who see a similarly strong influence by the German federal government (Ecker-Ehrhardt and Weßels forthcoming). In other words, German citizens not only believe that solving globalization-induced problems by international institutions is desirable, they also credit these institutions with having substantial influence in world politics.

While we lack similar data for other countries, various global surveys suggest that single-country evidence might tap into a substantial global awareness of international institutions.Footnote 2 Several studies using data from the World Value Survey have shown that the attitudes of a majority of the world's population toward the UN are measurable and consistently structured (Norris Reference Norris2000; Furia Reference Furia2005). The most recent data gathered by Gallup in 126 countries – representative for about 95 percent of the world's population – suggests that about two-thirds of the survey respondents (Gravelle Reference Gravelle2011, 8) hold measurable attitudes. Thus we have at least some indication for global awareness of one core institution of global governance, the UN.

Regarding contestation – that is, the forming of diverging demands and concerns – evidence from Germany again suggests that its citizens have formed conflicting attitudes to major international institutions (Ecker-Ehrhardt and Weßels forthcoming). There is also strong empirical evidence for a causal link between the perceived influence of international institutions by the German public and its increased criticism of the non-transparency, exclusiveness, and selectiveness of these institutions, coupled with a propensity to protest actively against them. Even though various global surveys have shown that a majority of the world population has a positive attitude toward the UN (Furia Reference Furia2005; Kohut et al. Reference Kohut, Wike, Carriere-Kretschmer, Holzwart and Poushter2009), all of these studies also consistently point to a significant amount of negative evaluation. For example Gallup results suggest, that about 28 percent of those who hold any attitude at all toward the UN disapprove of its leadership (Gravelle and Ray Reference Gravelle and Ray2011). This polarization provides strong evidence for there being widespread politicization in terms of conflicting preferences.

In general, then, survey evidence on politicization is unsatisfactory in many ways, including a lamentable lack of comparative data of a truly global scope that allow in-depth analysis of attitudes toward a representative set of international institutions over time. However, given what we do have, the evidence strongly supports our main conjecture that at least the most prominent international institutions have established themselves as important addressees for demands and that they are under critical scrutiny by broad sections of the population. This can be taken as an initial indication of the politicization of international institutions.

Public mobilization of demands and concerns

Public awareness and the formation of popular demands and concerns are used by many groups to contest international institutions – that is, their policies and procedures – in the public realm. What first comes to mind are the activities of the anti-globalization movement – a hybrid mix of local action groups, trade unions, political parties, church groups, and NGOs. Their particularly effective mode of expression is transnational protest such as those events that have taken place on the fringes of major government conferences. The growth of these and similar protest events has been impressive. Whereas in the early 1990s fewer than five occurred per year, by 2005 the number had risen to about 25 (Pianta and Zola Reference Pianta and Zola2005). Attendance per event, however, has not shown a similarly linear development. The estimated number of participants at World Social Forums, for example, varied from 20,000 in Porto Alegre in January 2001 to 155,000 in the same city in January 2005. Some 115,000 people attended the summit in Belém in January 2009 (Rucht forthcoming). There have been similar fluctuations in the number of protesters during G8 summits from Birmingham (1998) to Heiligendamm (2007; cf. Gronau et al. Reference Gronau, Nonhoff, Schneider and Nullmeier2009, 124).

But the politicization of international institutions cannot be reduced to the criticism of globalization. Also included must be the activities of NGOs in the environmental, human rights, and development policy fields, who confront changes in international governance with a mixture of information campaigns, direct persuasion, and media exposure. The success of NGOs as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink Reference Finnemore and Sikkink1998; Liese Reference Liese2006) lies not least in the politicization of the object of decision making, arousing broad public interest in the demands addressed to institutions. Examples are the security policy campaigns against the production and spread of landmines or small arms, or for the establishment of an ICC. Some campaigns in the human rights and environmental fields have also sought to generate public pressure against national and international institutions. The total number of transnational NGOs, which has risen dramatically over the past decades (from about 1000 in 1995 to more than 3500 today), indicates a significant growth in such activities, even though many of these organizations are concerned with implementation and monitoring.Footnote 3

Also indicative for the politicization of international institutions is the increased presence of, and activities by, traditional interest groups and associations. The growing numbers of representatives from such organizations in governance centers beyond the nation state, like Brussels, Geneva, or New York, can be taken as evidence for the stronger orientation of these groups toward international institutions. Data presented by Weßels (Reference Weßels2004) and Tallberg et al. (Reference Tallberg, Beach, Naurin and Tiilikainen2011) suggests that the number of interest organizations active on the European level has grown steadily over recent decades (see also Aspinwall Reference Aspinwall1998). Case study evidence from a variety of OECD countries also indicates that Western pressure groups react to a variety of denationalized problems by directing their attention increasingly to international institutions (Zürn and Walter Reference Zürn and Walter2005; Nölke forthcoming).

Several Studies (e.g. Kriesi et al. Reference Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier and Frey2008) show that national parties, too, contribute to the politicization of international institutions. The handling of international affairs has come to shape the structure of party landscapes in Western European democracies (e.g. Marks and Steenbergen Reference Marks and Steenbergen2004; Hooghe and Marks Reference Hooghe and Marks2008). The conflict between those in favor of ‘integration’ (i.e. the opening of national societies, economies, and politics to global contexts), and those who seek ‘demarcation’ (i.e. the national isolation in immigration and trade matters or political integration issues) has become a crucial aspect of party politics (Kriesi et al. Reference Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier and Frey2008). Right-wing populist parties have proved to be the most vehement defenders of national identity against incursions by international institutions, the challenges of globalization, and cosmopolitan thinking; but they share this position with others. The politicization of originally international affairs thus finds expression in the party systems of Western European democracies and even beyond (Ecker-Ehrhardt Reference Ecker-Ehrhardt2010a).

Even governments contest international institutions in the public realm. Regarding European integration, for instance, governments regularly seek to shift the blame for inaction or bad policy to the supranational level, while claiming the policy successes for themselves (Gerhards, Roose, and Offerhaus forthcoming). We increasingly observe that Third World countries ally themselves with societal critics of international institutional policies and procedures. The world trade regime is a prominent example of such an attempt to foster popular politicization: governments of the global South have publicly contested this regime since the 1960s (Hudec Reference Hudec1987; Stiglitz and Charlton Reference Stiglitz and Charlton.2005).Footnote 4 At the 2003 Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Cancún, governments of the developing countries formed a coalition, the G20 on agriculture, and they successfully campaigned in public against further liberalization of international trade in the absence of improved access to agricultural markets in developed countries (Narlikar Reference Narlikar2006). Likewise, governmental actors are vocal critics of the UN Security Council. The end of the Security Council's Cold War paralysis and its subsequent increased interventionism have raised questions about its legitimacy. In UN General Assembly debates, states publicly point to the lack of participatory and transparent procedures, the unfairness of the Permanent Members’ veto power, and the Council's insufficient performance (Binder and Heupel Reference Binder and Heupel2011).

In sum, the extent of politicization of international institutions is considerable; its growth is apparent in both individual attitudes and public mobilization. In effect, we are witnessing a new level of public contestation of international institutions. Although political debate over the mandates of, and decisions by, international institutions is not omnipresent, it is becoming increasingly broad. Politicizers range from local action groups and a multiplicity of civil society organizations, companies, and associations to parties and governments; they politicize in the media (cf. Statham Reference Statham2010) and in the streets (cf. Imig Reference Imig2002).

The state of current theorizing

Politicization of international institutions is not an established concept. Therefore, there is not a fixed set of competing theories to explain it. Nevertheless, there are different accounts that focus on social processes that are similar to or constitute some part of what we have conceptualized as politicization. These accounts offer different explanations for this phenomenon (see also Rixen and Zangl Reference Rixen and Zangl.2010; Schmidtke Reference Schmidtke2011). First, national backlash emphasizes identity and national opportunity structures; second, resistance to neoliberal dominance points to neoliberalism and injustice as core explanations; and, third, capacity refers to the diffusion of instrumental knowledge and values akin to the Western model, and stresses international opportunity structures as well.

The national backlash view points to resistance to international institutions and the creation of a new societal cleavage between cosmopolitism and anti-cosmopolitism, which is seen to be triggered by increased migration, the weakening of the welfare state, and limits to self-determination (e.g. Kriesi et al. Reference Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier and Frey2008). This perspective focuses mainly on the social costs of growing economic and cultural interdependence for at least some groups in established welfare states, and their resort to borders as means of protection (Zürn Reference Zürn1998, chap. 9). Globalization, it is argued, has had far-reaching repercussions for mass politics by producing conflicts between the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ on a highly competitive world market, resulting from intensified exchange relations between societies. Even though strong welfare institutions may have eased tensions to some extent, national backlash is assumed to be the driving force behind this process (Burgoon Reference Burgoon2009). Accordingly, growing insecurities lead to negative attitudes toward globalization and a shift to protectionism (Scheve and Slaughter Reference Scheve and Slaughter2004; Mayda and Rodrik Reference Mayda and Rodrik.2005). And scholars of domestic politics now converge on Rogowski's (Reference Rogowski1989) seminal claim that economic interdependence has had a significant impact on the structure of domestic conflicts.

Negative attitudes toward international institutions are seen to be part and parcel of a more complex syndrome of exclusive nationalist backlash, which includes economic protectionism, xenophobic reactions to immigrants, and a strong aversion to international institutions. Evidence presented by Burgoon (Reference Burgoon2009) support the notion that higher rates of migration have a significant impact on preferences for what he calls ‘nationalist autarky’. Kriesi et al. (Reference Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier and Frey2008) explain in much the same way the reconfiguration of European domestic cleavage structures by using a three-dimensional concept, in which economic and cultural demarcation go together with a rejection of European institutions. The rise of right-wing populism in most European party systems is the most visible expression of this development. The growing unwillingness of national parliaments and the general public to subscribe to limitations to national sovereignty and thus to the circumvention of national political processes is another indicator (Hooghe and Marks Reference Hooghe and Marks2008).

National backlash is an only partial expression of what we describe as politicization, but it is an important one. By stressing the negative repercussions of globalization, national backlash could explain a considerable part of politicization. However, what this perspective overlooks is the extent to which international institutions are accepted as necessary and desirable, as reflected in the attitudes of, and practices by, broad and growing segments of the European population. National backlash as an explanation cannot account for the fact that there is growing resistance to, but increasing support for and political use of international institutions; and this view ignores transnational-level mobilization for and against international institutions.

A second important argument emphasizes rising resistance to neoliberal policies and Western dominance in international institutions (Armstrong, Farrell, and Maiguashca Reference Armstrong, Farrell and Maiguashca2003). Like national backlash, this view also focuses on the neoliberal content of many international institutional policies. Unlike national backlash, however, the anti-neoliberalism argument concentrates on a different set of actors, namely, the so-called anti-globalist protesters who respond to a perceived imposition of policies whose distributional effects are highly unequal and favor a new transnational capitalist class (della Porta Reference della Porta2007). At the same time, as growing resistance to Western dominance in international institutions emerges, it becomes particularly visible in the case of some of the rising powers (Zürn and Stephen Reference Zürn and Stephen2010). Broadly speaking, the Global Justice Movement and the Rising Powers are the most prominent actors politicizing international institutions, and they represent quite a different political camp than do their right-wing extremist counterparts in Europe. Unlike nationalistic right-wingers, proponents of anti-neoliberalism/anti-Western dominance propose global re-regulation of neoliberal capitalism and more equitable global representation to eliminate Western hegemony (Rajagopal Reference Rajagopal2003).

By stressing neoliberalism and injustice as drivers of anti-globalization protests, the anti-Western dominance view also accounts for a considerable part of what we describe as politicization. But this explanation, too, has serious shortcomings. It overlooks the fact that, at the same time, there is broad recognition of international institutions and that there has been successful use of international authority on the side of emancipatory forces in issue areas like the environment and human rights. Sometimes these efforts have even pushed through international regulation against some Western interests. We argue, however, that resistance to international institutions and utilization of them are two sides of the same coin. The new cleavages produced by international institutions often run counter to more simplified depictions like ‘the West versus the so-called Third World’ or ‘the transnational capitalist class versus the rest’.

A third perspective points to a dramatic change of cognitive, cultural, and technological conditions as an explanation for politicization. This capacities perspective adds a more modernization-theoretical aspect to our understanding of politicization. Thus, international institutions encounter changing cognitive capacity and normative sensitivity for defining various facets of globalization as problematic or as global political issues. Most notable among the proponents of this view is James Rosenau who emphasized an ongoing ‘skill revolution’, which he plausibly expects to expand ‘people's horizons on a global scale’ (Rosenau Reference Rosenau2003, 52, 232 ff) in terms of cognitive capacities to understand global complexities. Similarly, Hainmueller and Hiscox (Reference Hainmueller and Hiscox2006) have argued that higher-level education in most OECD countries implies an exposure to intellectual discourses, which may add to such skills by constructing the social realm as a globalized and complex entity. In any case, empirical research has demonstrated that more educated individuals tend to identify more transnationally (Jung Reference Jung2008) and to expect more from international institutions in terms of solving important problems (Mau Reference Mau2007), although differences between the more and the less educated have been shown to be surprisingly small (Furia Reference Furia2005; Ecker-Ehrhardt Reference Ecker-Ehrhardt2011).

While the skill revolution has presumably fostered the emergence of ‘transpatriates’ (Koehn and Rosenau Reference Koehn and Rosenau2002), modern communication technologies have dramatically changed the possibility to sustain activist networks (Rucht Reference Rucht2004). Moreover, the transnationalization of media systems has created new opportunities to mobilize societal demands directed to the international level of politics (Wessler et al. Reference Wessler, Peters, Brüggemann, Kleinen-von Königslöw and Sifft2008).

Such cognitive mobilization involves the diffusion of ways of thinking in society, that is, substantive orientations toward certain attitudinal patterns and world-order models. In terms of broader analytical understanding, these substantive orientations are important in a world that is increasingly seen as a largely integrated universe of action where all observations and information are organized accordingly. These substantive orientations are grounded in normative ideas – more precisely, in universalistic notions of humanity with mutual rights and responsibilities (Lu Reference Lu2000). Consider, for instance, the campaigns conducted by human rights activists. Thus, the rise of global activism has been attributed convincingly in part to the growing cultural and technological capacity to organize a transnational civil society and to mediate and synchronize heterogeneous demands and expectations across borders, supported the political opportunity structure provided by international institutions (Tarrow Reference Tarrow2005).

Again, the capacity perspective provides only a partial account for politicization. It overlooks the fact that not just civil society, but also traditional interest groups ‘go global’, both targeting the same political actors but often with different political goals. The role of national resistance to international institutions falls outside of the scope of this explanation. Not only do more people demand more international regulation; at the same time, more people reject international institutions.

In sum, by pointing to national backlash, anti-globalization protests, and transnational mobilization, the three perspectives presented above grasp important parts of what we call politicization, but each offers a different explanation. Importantly, these accounts fail to consider the underlying premise common to all three perspectives, namely, that international authority exists. This implicit assumption needs to be explicitly conceptualized in order to devise a single explanation that incorporates the insights of all three perspectives.

An authority-based explanation

We argue that international institutions that exercise or are expected to exercise international authority are politicized. Moreover, we claim that the intensity and type of politicization depends on the legitimacy of the affected international institutions. In making this argument, we point to an intimate link between authority and legitimacy; we see them as two interrelated concepts, but not as two sides of the same coin, as the folk definition in IR would have it. In Ruggie's words, for instance, authority ‘represents the fusion of power with legitimate purpose’ (Ruggie Reference Ruggie1982, 382). Hurd (Reference Hurd2007, 60–61) even argues that an institution has authority when an actor ‘perceives the institution to be legitimate’. The problem with these accounts is that they invariably tend to equate authority with legitimacy, making both notions indistinguishable – indeed Hurd argues that ‘the phrase ‘legitimate authority’ is redundant’ (Hurd Reference Hurd2007, 61, footnote 116). If an international institution has authority, it is said, either it must be legitimate, or it is not an authority.

The argument that increased authority produces politicization and thus the likelihood of resistance would be nonsensical if we follow the folk definition according to which more authority means more legitimacy. Therefore, we do not think that the folk definition is useful when we attempt to account for the relationship between authority, on the one hand, and awareness, mobilization, and contestation on the other. The folk definition implies two statements that are counterintuitive; so we consider some re-conceptualization as necessary. The first counterintuitive implication of the folk theorem, is that the more authority an institution has the more legitimate it must be. If, for instance, the European Central Bank is assigned the competence to reject national budgets in addition to setting interest rates, it certainly has more authority; but would that mean that Bank activities are seen as more legitimate by all relevant actors? Probably not, so there is no need to believe that a widened or deepened assignment of recognized competences is the same as the legitimate exercise of these competences. Another implication of the folk definition – that there is no illegitimate authority – is troubling for both normative and conceptual reasons.

Our conceptual distinction between authority and legitimacy rests on the notion that legitimate authority ideally implies two layers of recognition. The first layer is the recognition that an authority is considered per se functionally necessary in order to achieve certain common goods. Therefore, an authority is granted the competence to make certain decisions and judgments, that is, institutions have authority when the addressees of their policies recognize that these institutions can make competent judgments and binding decisions.Footnote 5 This is different from the second layer of recognition referring to legitimacy, which is the acknowledgement of the rightful exercise of authority in the context of a given stock of normative beliefs in a community. According to this view, political authority and rule are legitimate when the norms, rules, and judgments produced are based on shared beliefs about the common good and procedural fairness. To put it differently, ‘a given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs’ (Beetham Reference Beetham1991, 11). Different sources of legitimacy such as transparency, accountability, expertise, participation, etc. are therefore available.

The first layer, that is, authority, already implies an element of recognition, which may be contested. A significant element of nationalist resistance to European institutions, for example, is directed against this first layer of recognition. Generally, however, the degree of recognition is usually higher for the first layer than for the second. While many people in the world do not consider the exercise of authority and rule of their state as legitimate, only anarchists would deny the functionality of the state for a consolidated political community and challenge it as such. This implies that the state, while considered necessary in principle (layer 1), may nevertheless be perceived as illegitimate with respect to the way it exercises its authority (layer 2). In this sense, authority (recognition of layer 1) can exist independently of legitimacy (recognition of layer 2).Footnote 6 However, an authority is unlikely to persist if its decision-making procedures and decisions are seen to be regularly and permanently unrightful. But the recognition of a political authority can endure for some time, even when actors do not see their normative demands for the rightful exercise of authority fully realized. As Haas (Reference Haas1990, 87) pointed out, ‘authority is different from legitimacy. States may grudgingly meet the organization's expectations without at the same time appreciating or valuing them’.Footnote 7

The theoretical separation of authority and legitimacy also makes it easier to conceptualize different distributions of recognition. It is probably safe to assume that absolute consensus by a community of actors vis-à-vis recognition of an authority's legitimacy is highly unlikely, and that such recognition, if it can be observed at all, would happen only very rarely. We are typically left with situations in which the conduct of an authority is seen as legitimate by some and rejected by others at the same time to varying degrees. Even in cases in which the principal recognition of the need for an authority is more or less uncontested, the exercise of authority can be seen by some as unrightful – in other words, the recognition of authority-exercising institutions can vary with respect to both layers.Footnote 8

When the recognition refers only to layer 1 but not to layer 2, one would speak of a legitimacy deficit – something that could not happen if authority were tied directly to legitimacy. When even layer 1 recognition is strongly contested, we would speak of an authority crisis. In short, then, we suggest decoupling (at least partially) these concepts and we argue that an authority may be legitimate to varying degrees. The recognition of the authority of an international institution can thus persist for some time, even when its legitimation is weak. We expect that the degree of legitimacy of an authority affects the level and type of politicization.

What then is the meaning of authority given this distinction and what types of authority can be distinguished? Authority is a central though contested concept both in political philosophy and in empirical social science (Friedman Reference Friedman1990, 56). It has been defined in many ways (Day Reference Day1963; Weber Reference Weber1968; Flathman Reference Flathman1980), often as a hierarchical relationship between a superior and a subordinate. The concept has received increased attention in more recent IR literature (e.g. Cutler, Haufler, and Porter Reference Cutler, Haufler and Porter1999; Hurd Reference Hurd1999; Biersteker and Hall Reference Biersteker and Hall2002; Rittberger and Nettesheim Reference Rittberger and Nettesheim2008). According to Lake (Reference Lake2003, 304; Lake Reference Lake2010), for example, authority is ‘characterized by commands issued by one actor that are expected to be obeyed by a second’. Such accounts contain a significant shift away from traditional IR theory, because they consider hierarchy as a relevant component of international relations and thus go beyond the anarchy paradigm. We share this perspective.

Following a more sociological understanding of the concept (e.g. Parsons and Shils Reference Parsons and Shils1951; Blau Reference Blau1963; Habermas Reference Habermas1981), we define authority broader than just commands expected to be obeyed. According to the seminal treatment by Raz (Reference Raz1990, 2), having authority can mean having permission to do something as well as having the right to grant such permission. But it also signifies an expertise that is considered trustworthy. All of these types of authority can be exercised by international institutions (see e.g. Barnett and Finnemore Reference Barnett and Finnemore2004) and they are therefore relevant for our discussion. A peace-building mission may be authorized to imprison people who carry weapons and the UN Security Council has the right to authorize such a mission. At the same time, expertise provided by the OECD, for instance, in the area of education, is considered as authoritative as well. In this case, authority is based on special knowledge; in other instances it is moral standing that gives international institutions an authoritative quality, as in the case of the United Nations Children's Fund or the UN Secretary General (Ecker-Ehrhardt Reference Ecker-Ehrhardt2010b). Many international institutions (as well as NGOs) therefore exercise authority in the international realm in a way that goes beyond commands.

All of these instances of authority have something in common: those who recognize authority defer their own judgment or choice without being necessarily forced or persuaded to do so. It is not the appeal of what is substantively argued or the force behind a command, but the recognition of the one making the argument or giving the command as a trusted source of orientation, which produces adherence. Authority is an important source of power but one that is marked by ‘unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither coercion nor persuasion is needed’ (Arendt Reference Arendt1970, 45). Such deference to authority without being forced or persuaded does not necessarily imply mindlessly surrendering judgment and blindly following orders. What is suspended when deferring to an authority is a careful elaboration or test of the claims made by that authority.

Defining authority broadly as deference of one's own judgment and choice to a recognized authority without being necessarily forced or persuaded to do so, means that it is necessary to distinguish between at least two types of authority (Friedman Reference Friedman1990), for they are based on different logics of legitimation. We want to label the first type epistemic authority. Epistemic authority is based on having special knowledge or moral expertise. It implies that the views expressed by an individual or an institution are recognized as trustworthy (an authority). Epistemic authority rests on the assumption that knowledge and expertise are unequally distributed, but that there is a common epistemological framework that allows us to judge this inequality. An epistemic authority does not need to persuade people in all instances. It is not the quality of the argument, but the quality or reputation of the person or institution, which is decisive.

In terms of legitimation, epistemic authority is not very demanding. In modern times, epistemic authorities always compete with one another. The subjects who defer to epistemic communities are essentially free to decide whom they consider an authority, that is, whom to believe. In the case of pure epistemic authority, layers 1 and 2 collapse and, in this case, authority and legitimacy would go hand in hand. This changes to some extent if epistemic authority interacts closely with political authority, that is, when an international institution is assigned the task of authoritative interpretation of facts and norms. In this sense, for example, Greenpeace's emergent authority in environmental matters requires much less legitimation than, say, the politically assigned authority of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).Footnote 9

This leads us to our second type of authority, namely, political authority. In this case, prescriptions, rules, and orders are recognized as collectively binding. Political authority is usually exercised by individuals who act in the name of an institution (in authority). Political authority rests on the assumption that someone should be entitled to make authoritative decisions in order to advance the common good and to avoid chaos. Political authorities are not bound to the Pareto criterion. They are entitled to make decisions, which may go against the (short-term) interest(s) of some community members. Political authority therefore depends on a common normative framework that provides a shared understanding of what the common good really is. A political authority may have both persuasive and coercive powers, but its power extends beyond the use of coercion and the need to be convincing in every instance.

Regarding the relationship between force and political authority, one may distinguish between two subtypes of political authority based on levels of recognition. The fact that x obeys y at the first level means that x accepts y's right to make collectively binding decisions. This is first level political authority. On the second level, x even accepts the right of y to enforce collectively binding decisions if they are not complied with. This difference mirrors the distinction between a state's jurisdiction to prescribe rules and its jurisdiction to enforce them, as used in international law. International institutions exercise almost exclusively level-1 political authority – the United Nations Security Council is the major exception. In most of the other cases, there may be pressure to comply with the demands of the political authority (horizontal sanctioning, shaming, fines), but no real enforcement. In other words, international institutions often exercise authority, but mainly the soft version of it.

Since political authority implies the right to make collectively binding decisions, the legitimation of the exercise of this authority is much more demanding than in the case of epistemic authority. This is even more so the case if political authority includes recognition by the subjects of the power to enforce these decisions. In both cases, political authority is embedded in beliefs about how institutions exercising political authority must behave in order to advance the common good without compromising the freedom of the subjects unnecessarily. In return, subjects recognize in principle or in practice the right of the political authority to make decisions, even when these decisions are sometimes inconvenient or uncomfortable.

To sum up this conceptual discussion and return to the international level, an international institution has authority when the direct and indirect addressees recognize in principal or in practice that that institution can make competent judgments and binding decisions (see also Cooper et al. Reference Cooper, Hawkins, Jacoby and Nielson2008, 505). Authority beyond the nation state does not necessarily require autonomous international organizations. International institutions to which member states delegate autonomous decision-making power (e.g. the ICC), and international institutions without such formal delegation of power (e.g. the Council of the EU) can both possess authority in the defined sense.Footnote 10 If an executive agreement or practice gives a majority of states the right to act in the name of common norms, we consider this as international authority as well.Footnote 11

Most importantly, we insist that the legitimacy of international authority can vary in terms of degree and in terms of the necessary legitimating sources. Different types of authority require different forms of legitimation. Accordingly, political authority in general is more challenging than epistemic authority. More specifically, political authority that includes the right to enforce binding decisions is the most demanding (rule) and epistemic authority that is not politically delegated is the least demanding (credibility). Legitimacy-deficient international authorities can be expected to encounter high levels of resistance; legitimate international authorities, on the other hand, can be expected primarily to be used to achieve certain policy goals. We illustrate some of these hypotheses in the following section, before we articulate in more detail several propositions that link the occurrence of politicization to different types of authority and their legitimacy in the concluding part of this article.

Rule setting and majority decision making

International institutions that set rules via majority decision-making exercise political authority. Depending on the degree of legitimacy that an international institution has, one may expect it to be either utilized extensively or highly resisted if its legitimacy is contested. Majority decision making increases the ability of international institutions to act by nullifying the vetoes of individual states and overcoming blockades. Majority decision making is not a practice limited to just a handful of well-known organizations like the EU, the UN Security Council and General Assembly, or the World Bank. Today, roughly two-thirds of all international organizations with at least one participating great power have the possibility to decide by majority (see Blake and Payton Reference Blake and Payton2008). Even if decision by majority is actually used far less often than it is formally available (Breitmeier, Young, and Zürn Reference Breitmeier, Young and Zürn2006, 125), its availability nevertheless exerts pressure on veto players, increasing their readiness to seek compromise. The result of majority voting, therefore, is that the probability increases that individual states will implement measures, even when doing so runs counter to those states’ original will or intent.

To the extent that the authority of international institutions rests on majoritarian decision making, the transparency and fairness of the decision-making process become prime concerns of societal actors and minority states. Since the expansion of qualified majority voting in the European Council of Ministers, for instance, societal criticism has targeted the confidentiality of preparatory papers and proceedings as well as the opacity and disproportionate access of lobbying groups to Council negotiations (e.g. Ucarer Reference Ucarer2009). The European Transparency Initiative was launched explicitly to tackle such legitimacy concerns, although the Council has proven to be more reluctant to respond than others (the European Commission, for example).

Information disclosure has also been a priority of transnational advocacy addressing the World Bank. Receiving states, NGOs, and parts of the Global Justice Movement (della Porta and Tarrow Reference della Porta and Tarrow2005) justify their demands not only by alluding to the enormous impact of the World Bank's projects and policies on local communities, but also by drawing attention to voting power inequalities between members and pointing to the Bank's substantial leverage over loan recipients – in particular, those of Multilateral Development Bank loans (Nelson Reference Nelson2009). Past and current criticism of international authority goes well beyond issues of lacking transparency; however, it repeatedly insists upon fairness in terms of equal inclusion in the negotiation process of those affected by the decisions of such an authority. The lack of representativity on the United Nations’ Security Council, which is further intensified by the veto power of the permanent members, is particularly blatant and has been condemned by societal actors and governments (Binder forthcoming). The exclusion of entire regions from the crucial processes of preliminary and parallel negotiations in the WTO's Green Room has also triggered frequent calls for more representative decision procedures (cf. O'Brian et al. Reference O'Brian, Goetz, Scholte and Williams2000; Krajewski Reference Krajewski2002).

Monitoring and verification

Monitoring and verification often involve epistemic authorities. We expect that such institutions will be less politicized than rule-setting institutions. Therefore, it can come as no surprise that monitoring and verification as well as the related possibility of discovering instances of non-compliance with rules are increasingly carried out by agencies that are not directly under the control of states. In general, the need for monitoring is greater if international norms no longer just apply to the borders between countries but, instead, begin to regulate activities within the boundaries of sovereign territories. Whenever such behind-the-border (Kahler Reference Kahler1995) issues are at stake, mutual observation by the states party to an agreement is often not sufficient to guarantee compliance. Thus, the need for independent actors who process and make available information on treaty compliance is growing steadily. Such information is increasingly provided by the international secretariats of treaty systems (Siebenhüner and Biermann Reference Siebenhüner and Biermann2009) and autonomous organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to name just two prominent examples (Dai Reference Dai2007, 50–53). These are cases of politically delegated epistemic authority. NGOs may also function, more or less informally, as monitoring agencies. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, for instance, are important actors for monitoring compliance with human rights standards. In general, Jonas Tallberg and colleagues have shown that, since the 1980s, the access of NGOs to international policy processes has increased significantly (Tallberg, Sommerer, and Squatrito Reference Tallberg, Sommerer and Squatrito2011).

But has this trend in increased monitoring led to the politicization of such agencies? A number of remarkable instances of politicization suggest that the authority to monitor and verify international rule implementation is tightly coupled to growing societal expectations that lead to public criticism whenever these expectations are not met. But the overall level of politicization has remained limited.

The IAEA is widely acknowledged for its expertise in monitoring the peaceful use of nuclear energy, not least in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Nobel Prize Committee honored this organization in 2005, confirming societal expectations that the IAEA could ‘prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes’ and could ‘ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way’. But despite its sterling reputation, the IAEA has been criticized repeatedly. In 2006, after worldwide public attention was drawn to several reports on the health impacts and environmental consequences of the Chernobyl accident in 1986, a campaign led by Greenpeace and several anti-nuclear NGOs attacked the IAEA for ‘whitewashing the impacts of the most serious nuclear accident in human history’ (Greenpeace International 2006), and called for more effective monitoring. In the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in March 2011, culminating in the disastrous Fukushima nuclear accident, the IAEA has once again come under fire for downplaying the effects of that catastrophe.

Western publics recognize some UN agencies and actors, like the UN Secretary General, the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (UNHCR), or the World Food Programme, as among the most credible sources of information on humanitarian crises. This recognition has been highly influential on how Western publics make up their minds over complex issues such as the Darfur conflict (Ecker-Ehrhardt Reference Ecker-Ehrhardt2010b). At the same time, these agencies have been criticized repeatedly for alerting the world to some crises (e.g. Somalia or Kosovo), but failing to do so with others (e.g. Rwanda or Myanmar). Similarly, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its successor, the Human Rights Council, have been regularly criticized for applying double standards and addressing human rights violations selectively – for example, focusing on Israel but ignoring the Palestinians (cf. Terlingen Reference Terlingen2007), or catering to great power interests by refraining from addressing human rights abuse by Russia, China, or the United States. Such instances of public criticism of international authority are necessarily selective in themselves, but they support our basic claim: namely, that widespread recognition of monitoring authority is a necessary factor for politicization because societal actors explicitly call upon this authority when they demand more effective and less selective monitoring.

Rule interpretation

Regarding rule interpretation, we find a significant increase in the number of international judicial bodies dealing with collisions between international and national law, and between conflicting international regulations. In 1960, there were only 27 quasi-judicial bodies worldwide; by 2004, this number had grown to 97. If we narrow the definition and include only those bodies that meet all of the prerequisites for formal judicial proceedings, then only five such bodies existed worldwide in 1960, their number climbing to 28 by 2004Footnote 13 (see also Alter Reference Alter2009). For example, the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Body (WTO-DSB) decides in matters of controversy over the application of rules in international trade, while the ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. These institutions produce legally binding decisions that cannot be easily revised by their members. In this sense, they exercise a form of political authority that claims to be epistemic authority.

In line with our general argument, it can be shown that societal actors politicize judicial authority as well, and that the level of politicization is expected to lie in between that of political authorities and that of purely epistemic authorities. Even though civil society has been one of the driving forces behind the institutionalization of the ICC, and even though the legal authority of the Court has been in general positively received, the ICC has met with stern criticism vis-à-vis a number of its investigations – among them Uganda, the Central African Republic, and Namibia (e.g. Baines Reference Baines2007; Glasius Reference Glasius2008) – whereby the Court was accused of being selective by focusing on ‘the losers side’ of civil war. Civil war victims have also criticized the court harshly, maintaining that their expectations of receiving justice were disappointed by the ICC's focus on higher ranking individuals accused of war crimes, by its lack of outreach, and by the protracted pace of investigation (e.g. Clarke Reference Clarke2007). Ad hoc tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have been similarly criticized (see e.g. Spoerri and Freyberg-Inan Reference Spoerri and Freyberg-Inan2008). The same holds for the WTO-DSB. Civil society actors have greatly exploited the opportunity to attend selected panel meetings or to file amicus curiae briefs with that body; this is a strong sign of public awareness and mobilization (e.g. Eckersley Reference Eckersley2007). In the meantime, however, evidence suggests that civil society actors’ inclinations to take part in WTO-DSB proceedings have subsided. This is because civil society access to the DSB proved to be less effective than these actors had initially anticipated, for having their own expertise heard during proceedings, especially toward later stages of the process involving the WTO's Appellate Body (e.g. Van den Bossche Reference Van den Bossche2008). In sum, we observe that increased authority in rule interpretation also comes with increased politicization in terms of substantial public awareness and contestation on normative grounds.

Rule enforcement vis-à-vis states

Only a few international institutions have the capacity to enforce their own decisions, thus exercising the strongest form of political authority. Nevertheless, we can observe that the practice of levying material sanctions against violators has increased. For example, jus cogens (independent and binding international law not requiring the consent of states) in the meantime reaches beyond the prohibition of wars of aggression to include inter alia the prohibition of crimes against humanity, genocide, and apartheid. In the same vein, under Chapter VII authority, the Security Council makes use of coercive measures against the will of affected governments or parties to a conflict (Philpott Reference Philpott1999, 586), including military humanitarian intervention, economic sanctions, or ‘robust’ peacekeeping operations (Binder Reference Binder2009). From 1946 to 1989 only 3.4 percent of Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This number rose to roughly 38 percent between 1990 and 2008. By 2008, about 62 percent of all Security Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII authority (Johansson Reference Johansson2009).

But developments of this sort are not just limited to the area of security policy. For instance, the Treaty of Maastricht provides for the possibility to impose fines on states that infringe EU directives or violate regulations. Similarly, the WTO dispute settlement system provides for compensatory tariffs in cases of non-compliance. And, since a good two decades, the World Bank has increasingly employed conditional loans – that is, loans that are tied to the recipient state's fulfilling certain conditions, like carrying out specific economic or political reforms (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye Reference Mosley, Harrigan and Toye1995).Footnote 14

There is considerable evidence that the acquisition of enforcement authority by international institutions has led to a very high level of politicization. Regarding the UN Security Council's willingness to legitimize the use of force, societal actors have repeatedly campaigned against UN non-action in cases like Myanmar or Darfur as instances of inappropriate selectivity (Binder forthcoming). The same holds for the conditionality built into the World Bank's or the IMF's structural adjustment programs, which have served as focal points for NGO campaigns and global justice activism ever since (Park Reference Park2010).

Implementation

The implementation of international regulations is frequently left to member states. Nevertheless, some institutions such as the World Bank or the WHO implement their policies directly (Abbott and Snidal Reference Abbott and Snidal1998, 12–13) and therefore exercise a strong form of political authority. Likewise, UN agencies in the field of humanitarian assistance or development aid have gained significant implementation authority. Transitional administrations that were set up after the end of the Cold War in Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo, or East Timor, for example, represent a special type of implementation authority; to establish them, UN took on far-reaching executive, legislative, and judicial powers (Caplan Reference Caplan2004). In these cases, we also would expect high levels of politicization, even though input opportunities for those directly affected by UN authorities have been relatively few.

Societal actors have indeed repeatedly contested implementing authorities, stressing legitimacy concerns as well. Consider, for example, the Sudanese refugees’ three-month-long protests at the UNHCR's Cairo office in late 2005 (Moulin and Nyers Reference Moulin and Nyers2007). Refugees not only demanded aid and official recognition of their status as refugees according to the Geneva convention, they also insisted upon inclusion in the UNHCR decisions affecting them.

In much the same way, transitional administrations have been contested by subjected citizenries forced to accede to post-conflict rule by international actors. Prime examples in the literature include Timorese frustration with United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, who were accused of failing to involve and integrate the local population sufficiently in the reconstruction of government structures. Similarly, local communities and international advocates alike contested United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo , pointing to questions of inclusion and accountability (e.g. Chesterman Reference Chesterman2004; Ford and Oppenheim Reference Ford and Oppenheim2008).

Regarding the World Bank, NGOs have successfully mobilized for more openness and accountability since the early 1980s, culminating in the ‘50 Years is Enough’ campaign in 1994. Politicization led various member states – including the United States – to pressure for institutional reform of the Bank's internal policies regarding the disclosure of information and the inclusion of civil society actors in project planning and implementation (e.g. Park Reference Park2010).