In the Shadow of Sectarianism examines the sectarianization of the Shiʿi community in Lebanon during the French Mandate period. The history of the Shiʿa of Lebanon during the Mandate era remains a relatively understudied topic, and Weiss' book is an important contribution to the subject. At the time of its publication, In the Shadow of Sectarianism was only the third English-language monograph to deal exclusively with the Mandate period of Lebanese Shiʿi history (Rodger Shanahan, The Shiʿa of Lebanon: Clans, Parties, and Clerics [London: I. B. Tauris, 2005]; Tamara Chalabi, The Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil and the New Lebanon: Community and Nation-State [1918–1943] [London: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2006]). Weiss' work is not a history of the Lebanese Shiʿa, however, but rather an examination of the reciprocal processes by which the French-formed Lebanese state sectarianized the Shiʿa, and how those same Shiʿa came to behave as sectarians during the Mandate period. According to Weiss, “the French colonial state contributed to rendering the Shiʿi community . . . more visible, more empowered, but also more sectarian” (pp. 3–4, emphasis in original) by sanctioning religious practices that had been forbidden under the Ottomans and by establishing Shiʿi legal institutions. At the same time, Weiss argues, the Shiʿa were themselves making sectarian demands upon the newly established Lebanese state. For Weiss, the “colonial and elite strategies of divide and rule” represent “sectarianism from above” while “demands for sectarian rights and religious recognition” represent “sectarianism from below” (p. 11). By placing the beginnings of Shiʿi sectarianism and sectarianization in the early 20th century, Weiss' work provides important historical context for understanding the emergence of the organized Shiʿi political movements Amal and Hizbullah in mid- to late 20th-century Lebanon.
Weiss' analysis is concerned with the process of sectarianization understood as simultaneously internal to the Shiʿi community as well as an external effect of the French Mandate's project for the Lebanese state and the official recognition of Shiʿism as a distinct sect that was a part of it. These dual processes of sectarianization took place within the “quintessentially modern conditions of publicity, the nation-state, and improved communications technology” (p. 62). To understand the effects of official recognition of Shiʿism, Weiss begins by outlining the marginal and oppressed conditions of the Shiʿa in Jabal ʿAmil (present-day South Lebanon) during the period of Ottoman rule, when the community's Shiʿism was illicit and the outward enactment of associated rituals was forbidden. From the premise of a silenced Shiʿi community under the Ottoman Empire, the remaining chapters examine the various effects of official recognition of the Shiʿi sect during the French Mandate and how Shiʿa used that official recognition to their own ends. Chapters 2–6 look at different facets of the relationship between the Shiʿi community, sectarian legal institutions, and what Weiss terms the practice of Shiʿi sectarianism. These chapters examine debates between Shiʿi ʿulamaʾ on newly sanctioned public rituals surrounding ʿAshuraʾ, Shiʿi demands to have Muslim or Sunni cemeteries and awqāf recognized as specifically Shiʿi, and the Shiʿa's engagement with sectarian legal institutions established during the Mandate.
Though the work is billed as a social history, it is more accurately described as an institutional history of Shiʿi sectarianism. The social aspects of Weiss’ analysis are used principally as evidence relating to the Lebanese Shiʿa's use of sectarian legal institutions. Weiss' discussions of attempts by the Shiʿa to have awqāf and cemeteries designated as Shiʿi explain more about the growth of sectarianism as a legal framework within Lebanon than they do about the social history of the Shiʿa at the time. Weiss' most significant contribution is his examination of previously unused records from the Jaʿfari courts in Beirut and South Lebanon established in 1926. The Jaʿfari court records are not tapped as a window into the daily lives of early 20th-century Shiʿa—the obvious object of a “social” history. Instead, the court cases examined in Chapter 5, by far the most interesting and original chapter of the book, are examined as incidences of Shiʿa being sectarian by relying on sectarian legal institutions to achieve their goals. Though Weiss provides quite a bit of detail in recounting the court cases, these details on the lives of Mandate-era Shiʿa are secondary to the broader thrust of Weiss' analysis of sectarianization. In other words, the chapter provides the reader with a sense of how sectarianism's institutional manifestations played a role in the lives of Shiʿa during the Mandate era, but less so of the lives of the Shiʿa per se. It is not so much the social history of the Shiʿa that is under examination as it is the history of sectariansm and its institutional forms, with the Shiʿa serving as a particular case study.
The focus on institutional Shiʿism of Mandate-era Lebanon does not detract from the quality of the work, however, for the bulk of the chapters are, in fact, concerned with sectarian legal institutions. An exception is the curiously titled first chapter, “The Incomplete Nationalization of Jabal ʿAmil,” as it is concerned with the Ottoman era, when official Shiʿi institutions did not exist in the region. This chapter is meant to provide a social history of Shiʿi Jabal ʿAmil under the Ottoman Empire. Weiss relies mostly on European travelogues to provide a description of the condition and position of the Shiʿa at the end of the Ottoman period. Unfortunately, while Weiss is critical of these sources, his critique does not provide a thorough counterbalance to the ideas they put forward. Rather than gather a sense of the community's history, let alone social history, during this period, the chapter's principal effect is to give the reader the impression that on the eve of the Ottoman Empire's demise the Shiʿa were viewed by Europeans and Arabs as filthy, passive, xenophobic, and undeveloped.
The lack of focus on social history in the remaining chapters is not problematic in itself. Trouble arises when Weiss does not take into account imbalances of power between the Shiʿi community and the French-backed Lebanese state, between the Shiʿa and other communties, and within the Shiʿi community itself. For example, Weiss uses Jaʿfari court records to demonstrate how the Shiʿa approached these legal institutions as Shiʿi sectarians. Such an analysis seems to ignore the fact that alternative institutions attached to the state were not available, and that informal, communal adjudications lacked enforceability compared to adjudications from the state's courts. It is unsurprising that sectarian legal institutions, as the only institutions with the potential to enforce decisions, would be relied upon as a means of recourse. Within Weiss' analysis, this falls into the category of “sectarianism from above.” By not considering the imbalance of power, however, legal institutions are portrayed with a more passive role in the production of Shiʿi sectarianism by merely providing a venue for sectarianism to be played out. Attention to the imposed and ineluctable nature of these institutions would provide a clearer image of Lebanese legal institutions' active role in producing sectarian legal subjects and sectarianism in general. Demands for Shiʿi control over awqāf and cemeteries do appear as sectarian in nature but can be argued with equal force to have been attempts by the community to establish and maintain control over its internal affairs at the very moment those sorts of social divisions were being codified through the process of state formation.
Finally, by failing to take into account the imbalance of power between the French Mandate's project for Lebanon and the Shiʿa, Weiss glosses over the fact that the sectarian legal structure established by the French Mandate required that citizens approach institutions as sectarians. Though Weiss terms these institutions as “sectarianism from above,” it is the Shiʿa who use them who appear to be largely responsible for producing sectarianism. Sectarian demands on the part of Shiʿa are interpreted by Weiss as evidence of their sectarianization without any possibility that these demands reflect a cynical awareness on the part of Shiʿa that the sectarian idiom was the only one to which the French Mandate could or would respond given its legal structure. In fact, French archival documents indicate that Shiʿi self-identification as merely Muslim was considered a dangerous and subversive attitude by the Mandate authorities. These interpretive problems may relate to Weiss' attempt to provide “historical agency” to the Shiʿa in the historical process of their sectarianization, which he terms “sectarianization from below” (p. 231). By focusing on this “sectarianization from below,” Weiss leaves himself little room for anticolonial and antisectarian perspectives amongst the Shiʿa such as the consistent demand for Jabal ʿAmil's reattachment to Syria which would involve transforming the Shiʿa from one of the largest communities in Lebanon to a small minority within an independent Syria. According to Weiss, outright anticolonial and antisectarian political actions were “rare” and “exceptional” compared to the norm amongst the Shiʿa of this period (p. 33).
These conceptual problems aside, Weiss has written a remarkable work on the institutional history of Shiʿi sectarianism during the French Mandate. In the Shadow of Sectarianism is an important contribution to our understanding of Lebanese Shiʿism in the early 20th century. Weiss' analysis is also a much-needed development in the study of Lebanese Shiʿism, as it outlines the active role that the Shiʿa played in the production of sectarianism rather than inflating the roles of individual historical figures. Situating the beginnings of sectarianization earlier than have others, Weiss is absolutely correct to point out the significance of this period to contemporary events. More importantly, by looking further into the past than the mid-20th-century, Weiss has gone a long way to restoring “historical agency” to the Shiʿa of Lebanon.
