Why is history not just a series of actions without rhyme or reason, a restless succession of events without order or logic? Why is history, in Hegel's terms, not just the exemplary instance of “bad infinity”? Terry Pinkard's book offers a lucid and persuasive reconstruction of Hegel's response to this question, arguing that history's apparent chaos becomes intelligible once we observe that the principle of the seemingly contingent res gestae is “the infinite end of collective self-comprehension and different ways of being a human subject” (167).
Pinkard distinguishes his “hybrid logic-historicist” interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of history along two axes (235n25): politically, by connecting the realization of spirit to justice (contra, e.g., Michael Rosen's “Freedom in History”) and, metaphysically, by arguing “that the way in which spirit can be said to realize itself in history need not be given the monistic-metaphysical interpretation” of commentators such as Charles Taylor, “which the Heideggerians call an ontotheological approach” (173n6; cf. 191n3).
Rejecting such ontological readings, Pinkard conceives of spirit as “human collective mindedness” and emphasizes “the historicity of subjectivity, that is, the conception of our basic norms being indexed to very specific historical situations” (100). This commitment is clearest in Pinkard's reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit and his treatment of its relation to Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Pace scholars such as Stephen Houlgate, who argue that the Phenomenology should “be understood not as historical, but as logical,” Pinkard reads the Phenomenology as offering something like a historical narrative of the development of “what counted in absolute terms for ‘Europeans’” (196n2, 50).
Pinkard thus moves freely and deftly across Hegel's corpus, presenting in five tightly argued chapters an absolute idealism that is not a spiritualized version of Spinoza, but instead an epistemic theory about the distinctive way in which the world is available to the human. Reading Hegel in the tradition of Kant's Critiques and Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, Pinkard takes Hegel's assertion that “everything hangs on apprehending and expressing the true not just as substance but also equally as subject” to be a statement about the way “the world ‘shows up’ for creatures with a capacity for self-consciousness” (6–7). This claim is the ground of Pinkard's interpretation and the subject of his first chapter, “The Logic of Self-Conscious Animals.”
For Hegel, the subject's apperceptive self-relation means we are “an amphibious animal” that self-consciously inhabits two worlds—the natural and the spiritual. This opposition and our awareness of it transform our nature. Rejecting all mind-body dualisms, which are theoretically tempting given our oppositional structure, Hegel argues that “we are rational animals, who because we are rational animals, put ourselves into a potential opposition to ourselves” (12). To grasp the truth of the rational animal proves to be coextensive with understanding how “substance becomes subject, that is, a material creature who possesses a capacity for a [unique] kind of self-relation” (19). “Self-consciousness thus is constituted by a self-presence that in knowing itself is distinguishing itself from itself while knowing that there is no real distinction present” (22).
In a masterful interpretation of the Phenomenology’s famous “struggle for recognition,” Pinkard demonstrates how and why such self-conscious subjects enter into a “shared normative enterprise” and thereby change “the shape of their respective self-relations and therefore their self-consciousness” (28). This confrontation inaugurates the historical process of uncovering a “space of reasons” as authoritative—the domain of justice. Freedom—defined as being at one with oneself, as acting in accordance with reasons that one can identify as one's own—is thus intimately connected to justice because freedom “ultimately rests on our relations to others, not on some power to step outside of the natural causal realm. [Freedom] rests on the ‘form of self-consciousness’” (38).
“Building an Idealist Conception of History” (chapter 2) explores how this logic of self-consciousness grounds Hegel's approach to history. Confronting the array of different “orders of thought,” which “involve a unity of norm and practice, principle and psychology, and a picture of how that whole fits together,” Hegel wonders whether there is a logic to these “concrete constellations of passions, principles, and practices” that could be understood as manifestations of spirit (40). To answer this requires identifying some unity to the manifestations, which is equivalent to “asking whether there is a purpose, an end—a Zweck—to these various orders of thought” that would provide a single criterion by which to evaluate how well each order of thought embodies that end (41). Such an end would have to be infinite in Hegel's technical sense of a purpose realized in a multiplicity of actions, but never completed, never ticked off the proverbial to-do list. Hegel identifies history's infinite end as that “of Geist making sense of itself,” necessary components of which are “justice, reconciliation, legitimation” (44). Different shapes of life, manifestations of spirit, each attempt to realize this infinite end of self-comprehension, enacting that shared understanding in common commitments and practices.
Having established this theoretical framework, Pinkard turns in “Hegel's False Start: Non-Europeans as Failed Europeans” (chapter 3) to Hegel's speculative narrative of human development beginning with Africa. Here Pinkard is at his most critical. Finding Hegel's Eurocentric biases to have grossly distorted his understanding of Africa, China, India, Egypt, and Persia, Pinkard censures Hegel for wrangling complex, multifaceted civilizations into a framework that fits his preestablished narrative of progress occurring in modern Europe. Thus, for example, although Hegel attends to differences between China and India—the former is governed by a “political atheism” that precludes adequate distinction of “the ‘is’ (the given social world) from the ‘ought’” and the latter is dominated by an abstract absolute, whereby everything is seen “as divine… and everything as in constant change”—the outcome is the same: civilizations in which there can be no conception of progress and which are therefore despotic (62). Persia and Egypt are similarly dismissed for having stultifying conceptions of subjectivity, which preclude philosophy's emergence and are sociopolitically oppressive. Confronting an unknowable ground and “doomed to unintelligibility,” they are unable to make sense of themselves (66).
Hegel judges history to truly begin with the Greek miracle—“the creation of the polis, a new form of social and political organization” (69)—which initiates European development, the subject of chapter 4, “Europe's Logic.” This political achievement is interwoven with a theoretical one: the Greek world—the unifying principle of which was “the sensible intuition of beauty”— “rested on making sense of what it meant to be a sense-making agent” (73, 69). Yet at the heart of the Greek world lay the “insoluble unintelligibility” of slavery as an institution that made their celebrated political freedom possible (75). This incoherence is paradigmatic for how a shape of life contains an incongruity that undermines its self-conception. Pinkard returns to the example of slavery in the classical world on several occasions, as it also proves integral to Rome's undoing.
Pinkard concludes his account of the Greek and Roman worlds by reminding us that contrary to “elegy for Hellas” interpretations (e.g., Judith Shklar), Hegel thought Christianity opened a chasm between the ancient and modern worlds, making all ostensibly edifying appeals to ancient virtue and classical precedent so much cant. Once Christianity brought “the principle that ‘all are free’ to the forefront,” subjectivity was interwoven “with the individual's own inwardness and self-direction” (91–92). Christianity thus lays the ground for the crucial link between individual freedom and political justice, a link which is decisive for Hegel's judgment that “the ancients really did not understand freedom,” since they failed to see “its connection to universality and therefore justice in a broader sense” (156).
Accordingly, and without too much exaggeration, one might read Hegel's speculative history of modern Europe as the development of this link between freedom and justice. Protestantism first deepens the original Christian emphasis on interiority by carving out “an exceptional authority for private conscience,” which converges with the deeper “secularization at work” in the early modern shape of life, furthering the emerging secular and ecclesiastical duality (112). This development—by way of the independent Dutch, who produce a form of modern social-civic and economic life—then culminates in “the twin events of Kant's moral philosophy with its ‘kingdom of ends’ and the French Revolution with its declaration of the rights of man” (127). After such word-historical events “the idea that all are free… became what was at work, actual, wirklich in modern life,” and in terms of justice, “the rule of reason had usurped the rule of domination by the powerful” (127, 121).
While acknowledging that there is something contingent in Rome's rise, its appropriation of Greek ideas and ideals, and in the survival of much of Roman civilization in its transformation into Christianity, Pinkard nevertheless concludes in “Infinite Ends at Work in History” (chapter 5) that the path “from pagan Greece to imperial Rome to Christian ‘Europe’ has a logic to it,” involving a new “ideal of justice” as dependent on “the ‘infinite worth’ of each individual.” The Christian world recognized the singular individual subject as “an infinite end in himself” (147). In modernity, subjects self-consciously appropriate this insight, understanding freedom to consist in “being one's own person, being… ‘bei sich,’ at one with oneself in one's actions” (156). This freedom, however, is not atomistic individualism, for although “the modern moral subject” aims “at the status of rational independence,” asserting “claims about inviolable personal conscience,” the individual is embedded in an ethical life (Sittlichkeit) characterized by dyadic relations embodying practices that enact our dependence on others “for this very moral independence” (157–58).
In sum, Hegel's speculative history is “an examination of the metaphysical contours of subjectivity and how the self-interpreting, self-developing collective human enterprise has moved from one such shape to another in terms of the deeper logic of sense-making and how that meant that subjectivity itself had reshaped itself over the course of history.” Although not a simply whiggish, optimistic view, it does nevertheless envisage progress concerning “bases of human subordination” and reciprocal recognition, expressed in the Hegelian shorthand that history is the movement “from one is free to some are free to all are free” (166). Such political progress rests on a developing comprehension of subjectivity which is “a social and historically indexed status” (167).
Pinkard's account of Hegel's philosophic history as the investigation of different kinds of “self-comprehension of what it is to be a temporal, self-conscious being” (167) will prove provocative to specialists and helpful to students. His mastery of technical details, impressive erudition, and generous engagement with scholarly literature make his work as informative as it is stimulating.
