Amidst the phenomena that we associate with globalization—relaxation of trade barriers, increased flows of goods, services, and investment, the retreat of the state from many areas of economic governance—there is one process that has received scant attention by comparative scholars, namely, the dramatic opening up of domestic banking systems to foreign ownership. This process has advanced so rapidly that it has led to a veritable foreign takeover of the banking systems of many middle-income countries whose banks were in the hands of domestic state and private actors not two decades ago. The foreign capture of the banking systems of middle-income countries—the dreaded, yet hoped-for arrival of the “barbarians,” in Leonardo Martinez-Diaz's allusion to Constantine Cavafy's poem—occurred against the preferences of otherwise liberalizing political elites, which considered their countries' banking sector a strategic asset to be left under domestic ownership and control. Martinez-Diaz's Globalizing in Hard Times tells the story behind the process of foreign capture of banks in four of these countries: Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Korea.
The book's argument is laid out in seven chapters, four of which (Chapters 3 through 6) are devoted to a reconstruction of the financial histories of these countries over the past couple of decades. In all four case studies, Martinez-Diaz emphasizes a similar narrative arch, as he explores the interaction among political elites, domestic bankers, and a coalition of international financial institutions, foreign banks, and the U.S. government during different stages: Financial repression, which remained in place throughout the 1970s, was followed by the first attempts at liberalizing banking activities in the 1980s and 1990s. These attempts were tightly controlled by domestic elites, who resisted pressures from foreign liberalizing forces (whose preferences and strategies are inspected in Chapter 2) and imposed a schedule of gradual and limited opening of the banking sector. Eventually, the designs of political elites were trumped by devastating banking crises, some of them accompanied by sudden capital flow reversals. Martinez-Diaz argues persuasively that banking crises should be seen as critical junctures during which the bargaining positions of governments, domestic and foreign bankers, and international financial institutions are reshuffled. Invariantly, the end result of the four crises under discussion was a much more generous de jure and de facto opening of the financial sectors than originally planned by domestic political elites, though some variation, particularly in the de facto openings, exists across these cases.
As Martinez-Diaz is quick to point out in Chapter 1, the observation that economic crises often lead to policy reform is not particularly novel. In fact, the advice of never letting a serious crisis go to waste, as Rahm Emanuel would have it, has achieved the status of common wisdom. The author further echoes Dani Rodrik's indictment about crisis-based explanations as both tautological and inherently nonfalsifiable. Thus, to salvage the book's crisis-based explanation, Martinez-Diaz contends that “reform does not always follow crisis” (p. 17) and that only extremely bad banking crises can furnish the critical junctures during which political elites can contemplate economic reform. There is no question that the banking shocks that rocked Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Korea during the mid-to-late 1990s were “extremely bad situations.” At the height of these countries' respective crises, banks were saddled with large amounts of nonperforming loans, depositor runs prompted governments to extend deposit guarantees, and financial insolvency led to government takeovers of major banks. With the partial exception of Brazil in 1994–96, which avoided the curse of a twin banking and capital account crisis, the cases studied by Martinez-Diaz are, thus, some of the most onerous banking crises in recent history.
The decision to study four banking crises with relatively low degrees of variation in their magnitude somewhat compromises the escape from tautology and nonfalsifiability of Martinez-Diaz's crisis-based explanation. After all, these cases are presented as having suffered very similar banking crises that resulted in very similar outcomes, at least all the way up to de jure opening. To complicate matters, the author chose these four particular countries because of their basic similarities: Their political histories included strong central governments and long spells of authoritarian rule; they were all late developers that had broken from the ranks of poor exporters of raw materials and had achieved levels of development that placed them in the same ballpark; their policymakers were alike in their beliefs about the role of the state in the economy; and they were all similarly perceived by international actors as countries of ample business potential. The research design that substantiates the crisis-breeds-reform argument is thus one with limited variation in the main explanatory variable, in control variables, and in the outcome variable.
Although the research design compromises the ability to arrive at causal inferences, it has the virtue of focusing the author's attention on the mechanisms linking crisis to reform. Indeed, where we do find ample variation is in the explanatory capacity of different causal mechanisms linking banking crises to banking-sector opening. Martinez-Diaz explores different motivations that account for the character of de jure opening following banking crises and the eventual form that de facto opening would take in these countries. In Mexico, legislators changed their beliefs about the relative merits of allowing foreign ownership and control of banks (ideational change), and eventually turned the country's financial intermediaries into local subsidiaries of international banks. In Brazil, the imperatives of political survival dictated the government's allowance of the barbarians into the domestic market, though domestic actors retained ample ownership and control of the banking system. Political survival was also a crucial motivation in Indonesia. Finally, external pressure explains reform in Indonesia and Korea; foreign ownership and control of Indonesian banks remained incomplete, whereas in Korea, foreigners bought up vast swaths of bank shares but remain unable to control bank operations.
The efficacy of different causal mechanisms to bring about reform is amply demonstrated in the case-study chapters. These chapters are not undisciplined attempts at making facts fit preconceived notions about the primacy of different mechanisms. To the contrary, Martinez-Diaz clearly identifies ex ante the different sequences of beliefs and actions that ought to follow from the operation of different mechanisms. Because the case-study narratives are tightly constructed and well organized, the evidence underlying the operation of these different mechanisms—most of it based on a large number of interviews and careful reconstruction through analysis of primary documents—is transparent and easily inspected. For example, the analysis of Mexico's politics of opening convincingly demonstrates that external pressure was not only ineffective in bringing about reform but also directly counterproductive. In short, the author delivers a powerful reminder that similar outcomes need not always be the consequence of identical causal links. I find this basic reminder about the need to account for causal heterogeneity in comparative political economy to be one of the main contributions of the book.
The final chapter adds brief accounts of banking policy in other middle-income countries. In a convenience sample of 15 middle-income countries, nine show the kind of pattern of extensive opening following banking crisis on which Martinez-Diaz concentrates (these include Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and South Korea). Two more—China and India—also confirm the basic thrust of the author's crisis-based explanation: no banking crisis, no extensive opening. The experiences of Argentina and South Africa, where political elites liberalized banking systems in the absence of crisis, and Malaysia and Russia, where banking crises were not followed by extensive opening, suggest, however, that crises are neither necessary nor sufficient in accounting for decisions to let the barbarians in. In particular, his account of banking policy in Malaysia and Russia underscores that banking crises are not always constraining, and that they sometimes leave ample room for the expression of the protectionist preferences of political elites.
By elucidating some of the mechanisms that connect crisis to reform, Martinez-Diaz has contributed a volume that furthers our understanding of the circumstances under which banking crises lead to policy reform.
