The origin of this study goes back fifty years to the Jabal al-Akhdar War, which ended in 1959 marking the dissolution of the Imamate in Oman. Until this time there had been a bifurcation of leadership that was split between the Imamate, based in the interior as a religious authority, and the government of the Sultanate, based on the coast as a more autocratic authority. This divide hindered the government because the Imam and his cadre of religious scholars exercised great autonomy, which in turn undermined the Sultan's political authority. In 1955 Sultan Sa'īd bin Taymūr made a concerted effort to dissolve the Imamate by eroding Imam Ghālib b. Alī al-Hinā’ī's support. The Sultan imprisoned or exiled two dozen religious scholars, while others were offered work in the judicial and educational systems in an effort to affirm and incorporate their expertise and leadership into service of the entire nation. The remainder worked for both the Sultan and the Imam in an interim capacity until the Imamate was finally dissolved.Footnote 2 This was not accepted quietly, and rebels in Jabal al-Akhdar fought unsuccessfully to re-establish the Imamate. Once defeated, the division between competing concepts of religion and state ended and a new course for the country was established.Footnote 3 This has left its marks on Omani culture by initiating economic and political integration during a time of great modernisation funded by a booming oil industry.
As Oman entered this new era, the educational system was based on a traditional approach consisting of several stages in which one began with classes in mosques and proceeded to private study with scholars. Support came in the form of private endowments that were managed by local authorities established for this purpose.Footnote 4 It was during this period that Muscat emerged as a centre for religious education, which attracted scholars from around the country and eventually developed to a level competitive with older schools in Nizwā, Rustaq, Izkī and Bahlā.
The context of Muscat's educational development is particularly important alongside the changes that were taking place on the political and social fronts. It was during this time that al-Būsa'īdī's rule over Zanzibar ended (1963), placing additional pressure on the Omani government to deal with a population influxFootnote 5 when 50,000 to 70,000 Omani expatriates sought to return to Oman or other Arab countries in the Gulf.Footnote 6 Adding to the complexity of the situation were the attempts of sympathisers of the Imam to restore the Imamate through its recognition by Arabian countries as the legitimate government in Oman and to declare the United Kingdom a colonising country.Footnote 7
With the discovery of oil in the 1950s and 1960s, the significance of the relationship between the central interior of Oman and the coast grew as increased attention was given to the Empty Quarter and surrounding areas, which had previously been at the periphery of governmental and foreign interest. Nomadic tribes began to play an important role in the political and demographic makeup of the country and the nascent economic change.
The 1960s saw the emergence of several ideologies as a result of Omanis travelling abroad for educational purposes. Communism, Ba'thism, Arabic nationalism, and Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, all became part of Oman's political landscape. This diversity introduced competing ideologies that, in turn, would introduce tensions to a relatively stable social environment. This was also true in other Arab countries, though its impact in Oman came later. Traditional structures were preserved longer in Oman and competing outside influences were abated by British protection of the Gulf during the 1960s. On the macro level, both the role of Great Britain and the ultimate infiltration of new ideas were signs of a shift in relationships and power dynamics between Islamic countries and the West in the post-Second World War era.
In 1970 came a turning point in the development of religious learning in Oman. This is the year in which Sultan Qaboos bin Said began ruling Oman, and it inaugurates the period in which religious education adapted to the formation of a modern state with a diverse population. In assessing this transition, there are several researchers, such as Eickelman, Wilkinson, and Peterson,Footnote 8 who have understood the historical nature of religious learning and society as self-contained because of the apparent isolation of Ibadi settlements — Ibadism being the dominant Islamic tradition in Oman. Though this is a factor to consider, one must also see the larger milieu in which Oman was one of the more active nations in the peninsula in terms of outward expansion. The trade that resulted created interplay between the more cosmopolitan coast and the Ibadi settlements of the interior. This explains why scholars in more remote locations were able to make wider contributions in religion and science. Even when the Omani capital was moved from the interior to Muscat in 1792, the Ibadis had remained the main source of religious knowledge for the country.
Essential to understanding the changes taking place with the reign of Sultan Qaboos, one must grasp the immense significance of religion in the Islamic world and the tension in the modern era between so-called fundamentalism and more liberal religious leanings. At the core of this tension is the relationship between religion (and hence religious learning) and the state. Therefore this article will undertake an examination of governmental and non-governmental documents, including official policy toward religious education, in an attempt to assemble a cohesive overview of the historical relationship as well as an analysis of changes in religious learning in relation to the different phases of state development.
Religious Learning and Government Institutions:
When Sultan Qaboos began ruling the new government in 1970, he had to resolve the economic, political, and social problems then present. This was no easy task. He faced conflict in the south of Oman from Communist rebels, and he faced the regrouping of the Imamate forces in the neighbouring countries against his new government because they considered Oman to be too closely allied with Britain. These issues were resolved when Oman joined the United Nations and the Arab League.Footnote 9
It was during this time that the new government took on the task of establishing schools with academic degrees that combined modern studies within traditional and historic frameworks. The Ministry of Education was established in 1971 and prescribed a similar level of public schooling to that in other Arab countries.Footnote 10 Islamic studies were made compulsory for the first grade through to the twelfth grade, and the Lebanese curriculum was adopted as a model for other subjects, until it was replaced by the Qatari curriculum. Then, in 1977, a curriculum was developed by the Oman's Ministry of Education. With regard to Islamic studies, although Ibadism is the dominant Islamic tradition in Oman, there are a substantial number of Sunnis and a small yet prominent community of Shi'a. To promote unity and avoid sectarianism, Oman's Islamic Studies curriculum aimed not to favour one tradition over another, but rather to focus upon the basic principles of Islam upon which all Muslims agree.
In assessing these developments, Eickelman has asserted that the new educational curriculum was designed to enforce current religious and cultural values. Though this might be interpreted to be a new emphasis in which present-day religious and political influences are used to shape the core teaching of religious materials, Oman already had a long history of this. Therefore this does not represent the break with tradition that it may appear to be at first glance. Additionally, education in Oman already possessed a strong connection between teacher and pupils, and the Ministry of Education sought to preserve these positive aspects of the system.Footnote 11 The Ministry, thus, implemented the new curriculum by utilising but also updating traditional teaching methodologies.
While Islamic studies were being integrated into the public school system, the traditional system also continued. To oversee this, a specialised department for Islamic studies was established at the Ministry of Education, and the focus remained solely on Islam since it was the dominant state religion. The department exercised control over Islamic schools at selected mosques in five towns, Nizwā, Bahlā, Izkī, Sināw, and Bidiya. The schools in the mosques continued as before for the elementary level (seventh to ninth grade). However, the high school level (tenth to twelfth grade) was optional and available only in the city of al-Watiyah in Muscat.Footnote 12 The mosque schools were different from the ordinary schools in the Islamic and Arabic language curricula, which did not teach music nor art. The goal of allowing them to continue according to their old ways was to preserve traditional school structures while introducing modern progress so that tradition was not discarded too suddenly in those cities. Still, in 1996, these schools were closed due to either the weakening of the Islamic curriculum or the weakening of the department managing it.Footnote 13 The Ministry of Education, however, still maintains a specialised department that continues to manage Islamic studies, but the teaching of Islam is now part of the gradual, albeit slow, reformation process being led by the state.
The Ministry of the Royal Court assumed a role in educational reform when a separate department was established to manage the Sultan Qaboos Grand Mosques and the schools for Qur'anic studies associated with them. The Grand Mosques were built from the Sultan's resources in several cities in Oman. In 1988, it established the four Sultan Qaboos Institutes of Islamic Studies at Khasab, Sohar, Ja'alan and Salalah, which initially taught both secondary school level classes and four-year university degree courses. Between 1996 and 1998 all university level courses ended because there was no longer a need for them with the establishment of other higher education options in the country. The secondary school level remains operational today,Footnote 14 and the department that oversees them is now called the Sultan Qaboos Centre of Islamic Culture, which coincided with the opening of the Grand Mosque in Muscat in 2001. The Mufti serves as the chairperson of the centre with representatives from the Ministries of Education, Higher Education, Endowments and Religious Affairs, and Sultan Qaboos University. The Sultan Qaboos Centre assumed many duties from these Ministries that may have previously related to these schools, and thus are the conservators of the legacy of the traditional schools.
Another institution important in the development of religious education is the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs. It took its initial shape in 1971 and became known as the Ministry of Endowments and Judicial and Islamic Affairs in 1981.Footnote 15 When certain judicial departments were separated in 1997, in an effort to create broader recognition of minority religions and minority Islamic traditions, it became known as the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs. The Ministry has supervised an Institute of Islamic Judicial Sciences, established in 1976 to produce the Sharia judges of Islamic law. It was renamed by Royal Decree in 1986 as the Institute of Jurisprudence and Oratory, and from 1999 it became officially known as the Institute of Sharia Sciences.Footnote 16 Another institution, the College of Sharia and Law, was established in 1997 under the supervision of the Ministry of Higher Education and then in 2006 the college was renamed the College of Law and placed under the supervision of the Sultan Qaboos University. The establishment of two such institutions allowed each subject its own domainFootnote 17 and was accompanied as well by the notable admission of women. The number of students in these institutes is smaller than in formal schools, and each institute has undergone frequent change. Although these changes may seem to marginalise religious education, it provides the government with good control over the parameters of such education.
These changes represent a larger trend in Omani society that has allowed it to address competing ideologies and incorporate diverse religious opinion in the development of the country. Such change could have represented a challenge to formal religious representation and created unease between religion and state, but this was not the case in Oman. As in many other Muslim states developing in the wake of independence from colonialism, Oman created a Ministry to deal with religious matters and encouraged a class of ulama to be the official spokespersons of Islam.Footnote 18 In Oman, however, these religious scholars work within the framework of the government, inhibiting the emergence of a class of staunchly political Muslim thinkers and activists, which tends to characterise Islamic states where unique space within the governmental framework is not carved out for religious scholars. Since the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, many Muslim thinkers in several Arab countries have occupied their thoughts with the possibility of restoring the Caliphate, while Oman has had relatively little difficulty with the concept of a nation-state. One reason for this, however, could be that the predominantly Omani tradition of Ibadism has been independent from the Islamic empire for twelve hundred years.Footnote 19
The Ifta Office
The first Mufti was appointed in 1973, marking the first phase of the plan to organise religious scholars under government control. For the previous fourteen centuries, religious scholars had been Ahal al-hal wa al ‘Aqid (the people of binding and loosening).Footnote 20 Now the judicial authority of the religious leadership would fall under the auspices of the government. In the early years, the Mufti's office and the judicial system maintained an Ibadi influence, and the scholars and judges employed were religiously educated. This change began to reinforce the presence of the government and strengthen the influence of the scholars, who began by prescribing the rules of Friday prayer in all districts and villages. The current Mufti, Sheikh Ahmad b. Hamad al-Khalili, was one of the supporters of this reform.Footnote 21 Eickelman has noted significant changes in Ibadi ideology since the 1950s, which continued to blend the political and religious dimensions in Ibadi thought.Footnote 22 The government began to administer and regulate religious institutions as part of the governing systems, as did other Arabic governments, be they liberal, Communist, or monarchical. Religion, thus, became part of the state governance.
While the Mufti was not contributing directly to the educational system, he was considered the religious authority in Oman and for the Ibadi community worldwide. Oman, therefore, became the religious educational centre of the Ibadi communities in eastern and North Africa.Footnote 23 When challenged by recent developments in inter-Islamic debate, the Mufti's position allowed him the dual options of exerting either his state-given religious authority or the authority of his Ibadi heritage. When, in the 1980s, a debate occurred between the Omani Mufti and the Saudi Mufti, ‘Abd al-Aziz b. Baz, each naturally appealed to his respective Ibadi and Wahabi background and to the resultant political positions thus afforded.Footnote 24
The Mufti is now the chairman of many departments in religious education. As noted earlier, he is the chairman of the Sultan Qaboos Centre of Islamic Culture, which falls under the authority of the Ministry of Royal Court, and he is the head of the Institute of Sharia Science under the authority of the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs. Interestingly enough, however, the Omani constitution, called “the White Book” and formed by Royal decree in 1996, does not include the position of Mufti and its attendant authorities.Footnote 25 This is curious given that the government decreed a central Ifta Secretary and assistants for the country, and the decree is widely supported by the majority of Omanis.
Non-Ibadi Muslims still look for other sources of ifta. The Shi'a have their own authority in the city of Matrah and they are scattered in some counties of the Batina region. The Sunni Shafi'is are primarily in Dhofar and Musandam regions, as well as in the city of Sur in eastern Oman and in towns such as Barka and Liwat along the Batina Coast, while the Hanafi are mostly in Batina Coast where they are predominately Balushi. There are Hanbali in some counties of eastern Oman and also some in the al-Dhahira region as a result of the Wahhabi campaign in the nineteenth century.Footnote 26 The tribes either settled in remote places in the centre of Oman or continued as nomadic tribes along with others who came from outside of Oman. Despite the plurality of traditions and the lack of formalised authority, to a large extent, over the centuries the Ibadis have preserved the authority of religious knowledge and all have accepted plurality in leadership, illustrated by three centuries of alliance between the Hinawi and Ghafiri tribes to avoid an environment of religious division. The government, too, supports these tribal customs and through the Ministry of Interior works to modernise systems for a secure state.
Religious Education between New Ideologies and Traditional Approaches
As mentioned before, during the 1970s the government was pressured on two fronts. The first was the Imamate, even though it officially ended in the mid-1950s. Eickelman recounts that even though the populace was no longer interested in the Imamate, the government still had reservations concerning the interior of Oman, the former centre of the Imamate.Footnote 27 The second was the pressure from groups of young students who had adopted the liberal ideologies that resulted in the political factions of 1960s, such as Arab nationalism, Ba'thism, and Communism.Footnote 28 Eventually their revolts and rebellion were defeated in December 1975, and they were later disbanded when relations with southern Yemen were established in 1983. During this period – the 1970s – the Sultan employed Islamic terminology to explain his position vis-à-vis the rebellion.Footnote 29
Nottingham's work shows the evolution undergone by religious institutions in settings affected by societal changes, noting that religious systems are closely intertwined with the life of the society. Changes that occur in social systems, therefore, affect the entire social makeup including the religious system.Footnote 30 Since the Omani government has always endeavoured to preserve the revival of traditional religious knowledge, rather than the liberal and the reformed, its policy prefers not to import outside ideologies or external religious authority. Thus, traditional knowledge has been treated as a part of cultural identity. The Ministry of National Heritage and Culture has managed to publish Omani manuscripts, among which Ibadi works formed the majority, so that these works are available for learning and research. However, the government never adopted one Islamic school of thought as did many other Muslim countries. It emphasises that it is secular while maintaining that the religious tradition in the country is Ibadism.
The government established regulation for religious institutions and has helped to modernise the legal system in which the traditional approach recognises religious scholars as judges. Initially, the modifications added secular judges to the legal system, introducing criminal law in 1970s and then commercial law, but leaving family matters to the traditional system under religious jurisdiction. In 1997, it combined all laws under the one judicial system. As a result, judges preside over one system of law and thus all judges have to have a command of all laws.Footnote 31 In one's education to become a judge, one may begin with either a religious or a more secular legal foundation but, through a defined process of appointment, one gains competency in all areas of law. This more expanded view is evident in the Personal Status Law dealing with marriage and inheritance, which is rooted not only in Islamic law but in legal principles that appeal to Muslims from different Islamic traditions, as well as to non-Muslims.Footnote 32
Certain challenges face efforts to both modernise and preserve traditional religious education methods. Recently several schools were established in the manner of the traditional Islamic madrasah, with the best known ones in Sināw and Bahlā. These schools do not have accredited certificates and are not part of the formal education system, and in most cases they are open only in the summer and offer Islamic theology, jurisprudence and Arabic grammar. While, in the past, these traditional schools used to provide links in the educational ladder of scholarly teaching, they may fail to meet the broader demands of modern curricula. This raises the question of the compatibility of traditional schools with formal comprehensive modern education.
Communication advances have affected religious education in the whole country, regardless of location. For example, Arabic channels have exposed religious issues on various levels, creating direct links with audiences and serving as publicity for religious figures. In Oman, people have deferred to national and regional religious scholars, but the internet now provides an unchecked opportunity for people to seek advice and representation on religious issues. The disadvantage of this is that much of what is found on the internet is not necessarily credible. This medium has been the conduit for the publishing and promotion of books on controversial issues in religious affairs. However, the internet remains a limited resource for Oman's scholars and their students as they are often technologically illiterate. The most enthusiastic adoption is found in using it solely as a tool for communication rather than research.
Increasingly, secondary school graduates prefer to complete their higher education abroad as the local universities have low capacity and a smaller range of subjects are offered. Eickelman assumed in 1981 that Omani students studying abroad in other Islamic countries would be the group most influenced by Islamist ideologies, such as Ikhwan al-muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) and Al-Wahhabiya (Wahhabism),Footnote 33 while assuming that students studying abroad in Europe and the U.S. would also be influenced. In fact, many of the exchange students to Islamic countries were greatly affected, and upon their return they started networking and creating political parties that adopted those ideologies while receiving funding from outside Oman. This was also the case in many Arab states during the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Afghanistan and Gulf wars, resulting in a chaos and uncertainty that proved fertile ground for new ‘fundamentalist’ movements. The ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian Revolution have been particularly influential in the last two decades, producing Islamic paradigms for political approaches. On the grounds that externally-funded political organisations are illegal in Oman, the students involved in these religio-political movements were arrested in 1994, but the government gave all of them pardons and set them free in 1995,Footnote 34 providing a positive example for dealing with such a dilemma within the region.
But ideological movements continue to be a problem. Faced with these challenges, Oman has sought measures to prevent the perversion of religious belief into politically ideological movements. One such check was a strict policy on charities to avoid the creation of channels which fundamentalists use to move their funds. Soon afterward, in 1996, the government established the Society of Aid Activities to manage and organise fundraising and charitable aid internally and externally, aiming to prevent terrorist activities through charitable causes. To accomplish this, part of the restrictions for charitable activity is that only registered charitable organisations can engage in charitable works, and no such activities can be used for religious purposes, only humanitarian ones.Footnote 35
Since the early 1990s, religious fundamentalists, against the backdrop of the theory of the clash of civilisations, have found justification for religious conflict to the extent of a war between Islam and the West. These clashes occurred in the decade preceding September 11th 2001, but this event inaugurated a new chapter in the Islamic world. All of this led to a concern regarding religious education, especially after the Afghanistan and Iraqi wars in which Arabia became embroiled in clashes between fundamentalists and their governments. The reverberations of this were felt through bombings, assassinations, expulsions, and conflict with local and national authorities. This is evident in the ideologies of Bin Laden and other fundamentalists who hold a strong oppositional identity against the West.
These developments encouraged the Omani government to change the educational curriculum of Islamic studies, supporting a cultural rather than a religious approach. In 2006 the Ministry of Education introduced a new curriculum that shifted the focus from dogma and doctrine to Islamic culture and civilisation. The expanded purview allows students to see their relation to the broader culture around them, and it precludes a myopic view of Islam's relation to the rest of the world. Globalisation has created greater interdependence and interconnectedness between diverse cultures and societies, and the Oman government considered it important for students to be able to understand these changes from an Islamic point of view. Where fundamentalists seek to pit tradition against development and modernisation, Oman draws upon its tradition as a platform for progress.
Still, challenges continue to exist. In 2005 a religious group was convicted of trying to overthrow the government of Oman. It comprised a small number of university academics, civil servants and Islamic scholars. They were found guilty of setting up an illegal organisation, raising funds and recruiting members. The aim of the plot, state prosecutors argued, was to overthrow the government of Sultan Qaboos and establish an Islamic state. Lawyers for the defendants argued that their clients were innocent as they had only been trying to spread the teachings of a conservative strand of Ibadism, they then appealed to the fact that most Omanis are Ibadis. In the end, the Sultan issued an order to release them.
A thorough analysis shows that, as Eickelman had predicted, many of those involved had been educated in other Arab states and influenced by fundamentalist ideologies. Most of this group had studied in Jordan and through their academic endeavours were in contact with the Muslim Brotherhood at the universities there, which in turn they combined with traditional Ibadi political approaches via the Imamate. Though they used Ibadi ideology to justify their actions, it represents a distortion of Ibadi thought. Ibadism is an ideological approach that provides ways for Islam to adapt to changing circumstances, which includes modernisation. The fundamentalists are Islamic revivalists who eschew any room for adaptation but instead want to return to a perceived ‘golden era’ where the sole law and guiding force is strictly-interpreted Sharia. Therefore, revivalist ideologies and Ibadi thought ought not to be equated.
Another group that had a significant public influence was the Al-Da'wah wa al-Tabligh. The group started its activities in early 1970s and expanded in the 1980s and early 90s. This group consisted of ordinary people, the affluent, and businessmen. The group acquired considerable influence through its ideologies, but it has since been weakened by constraints put in place by the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs after September 11th 2001. This follows similar actions and precautions taken by the government in religious education after the attack on the Great Mosque in Mecca in 1979, and the student arrests of 1994 mentioned above. In attempting to overcome any extremist movements,Footnote 36 the government exercises great care in how education treats political and religious views. This internal focus has become very important in precluding the development of religio-political ‘fanaticism’ in the country. With this internal focus, the government paid little attention to the war in Afghanistan (1979–1991) or to the Balkan War (1992–1996), both of which had a considerable effect on the internal affairs of countries involved. Indeed, a lack of involvement, which resulted in Oman playing a minor role in Islamic politics at that time, may have helped it to avoid the radical Islamic movements and terrorist groups that emerged internationally in response to such events.
For many Omanis religious values lie at core of their identity, and this has been the basis upon which they have adapted to trends in society. Omanis remain inspired by their religious identity as they engage with their social and economic environments, and, thanks to the diversity of people in Oman, their personal convictions are also diverse. As Oman has modernised with burgeoning urban populations, civic room is maintained so the hegemony of one perspective does not diminish the place of others. Pluralism is respected, and in most major cities such as Oman's capital, Muscat, a heterogeneous mix of mosques, churches, and Hindu temples are to be found. Similar trends can be seen in the city of Salalah in the south despite its distance from the major northern cities. On the Batina coast, the city of Sohar exhibits an extensive diversity due to its historical development and concomitant values. These characteristics are also evidenced in cities in the interior, such as Nizwā and Rustaq, which are considered a stronghold of Ibadism. Rural communities, on the other hand, have retained a more uniform Islamic character. Having said this, there remains a great deal of integration between people with different backgrounds and ethnic origins, as opposed to religious orientations. This is part of the complex tribal framework of Omani society. The government continues to avoid segmenting or segregating ethnic groups and minorities; hence its support for the abandonment of the terms ‘Islamic’ or ‘religious minority’ in the Conference of the Islamic World.
There is also a concern for the development of other, non-Muslim, religions that have people who desire to observe their worship and practices in the country. These groups, Christian and Hindu being the predominant ones, are registered with the Director of Religious Care, a department of the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs that oversees the religious needs of non-Muslims. This provides the opportunity to be recognised as a part of the broader concern of the Ministry and the Sultanate as provided in Oman's Basic Law.
It is undisputable that immigration of foreign labour to the Gulf has created a new demographic phenomenon, though Oman has experienced far less immigration and a more modest it ratio of immigrants to locals than its neighbours.Footnote 37 In designated areas, foreigners are now able to buy property and establish permanent residence in the country. This results in the need for critical religious and cultural changes to accommodate the needs of the newcomers. In Muscat there are now churches from a broad segment of denominational backgrounds, including the Reformed Church in America, which has been in Oman for over one hundred years. The church has links to a non-profit institute, now called the al-Amana Centre, which is still remembered by its historic acts of medical and educational work dating back to 1893.Footnote 38 An interesting and natural development is that the commercial aspect of Christmas has become increasingly popular in stores over the past ten years. Though Christian teaching is done at the churches as part of their worship, sometimes aspects of Christian teaching and culture are expressed through Christmas celebrations in expatriate schools such as the American International School of Muscat, the British School, or the Filipino School. There are even carol services in lobbies of the major hotels.
In conclusion, religious education in Oman may seem to be of only passing concern, but one must remember that the government has come to link it with security, economic development and human resource issues. Thus, significant development has been seen in the span of less than thirty-five years, during which time the Omani authorities have initiated a number of fundamental changes in the relationship between religion and the state – for example, providing religious space within the state framework by linking the former with culture rather than politics. By doing this and creating a respect for diversity of cultures, the government has indicated that it has no intention of proselytising non-Muslims. Religion and politics are considered separately, which effectively distances fundamentalism and its associated issues from the purview of mainstream life. This has been to the government's credit, with the only remaining question being whether this trend can be sustained.
