The loss of Java is a gripping historical account of the military contest between the Allied and Japanese forces for the Netherlands East Indies in February and March 1942. P.C. Boer makes a significant contribution to the literature on the subject, which has tended to focus on the battle of the Java Sea or the air operations in the East Indies. Drawing upon a wide array of Dutch and English-language sources, Boer's study brings the complex nature of the clashes into sharp focus and highlights areas of the campaign that historians have previously not investigated in significant detail. He examines in depth the air, land, and sea battles between the two sides, and connects their military implications to the overall contest for Java. Especially noteworthy is his accentuation of the combined and joint defensive operations mounted by the Allies against the Japanese. Equally significant is his argument that air power played a vital role in deciding the outcome in Java: The loss of Java is traditional military history and Boer narrates that story well.

Boer is concerned with tactics and strategy rather than the socioeconomic structures of the warring parties or the impact of war on Javanese civil society. He focuses on four key aspects of the campaign. These are the quest for air superiority over Java, the battle of the Java Sea, the air and land contest for the important airbase at Kalidjati, and the fight for control of Bandoeng. The Dutch and Allied forces did not offer token resistance, but actually put up a stiff fight. They sought to resist the Japanese for as long as possible in the hope that greater numbers of American, Australian, and British reinforcements would arrive to fortify the Allied positions in Java. If they held out against the Japanese, a stronger Allied force would stand a better chance of repelling and rolling back the Japanese invasion. To that end, the defenders believed that if they managed to cripple the Japanese air force and gain air superiority, they would expose the invasion fleet to air attacks. That circumstance would likely give the Japanese pause, buy the defenders time, and enable the Allies to regroup and hold Java.

The Japanese forces’ lines of communication and resources were stretched to the limit, to be sure. But their pilots acquitted themselves well when they engaged the Allied fighters. With the Japanese in no mood to surrender the initiative or to permit reinforcements to make a timely arrival, they consistently went on the offensive. Boer notes that the Japanese forces that landed in West Java did not enjoy vast superiority in numbers. But Japan's superior air forces and aggressive tactics compensated for its relative lack of numbers. Bold and willing to take risks, the Japanese deployed their combat units and made audacious moves into areas like Eretan Wetan. The manoeuvres enabled them to outflank the defenders and sustain the advance.

The prize was Bandoeng as much of the Allied military and civilian assets were concentrated there. To capture the city, however, the Japanese understood they needed to first maintain their command of the air. And such control would be advanced by the capture of the airbase at Kalidjati. If the Japanese understood this, so did the Dutch. What followed were violent clashes between the two sides involving light tanks, mobile infantry, and aircraft to take the airbase. Scholars have written about this phase of the campaign, but Boer's description of the manner in which the air and land forces complemented one another, and enabled the Japanese to secure and hold Kalidjati is remarkably detailed and illuminating. Equally revealing is his account of the Japanese forces’ successful capture of the Tijater pass. Again, Boer examines this phase of the campaign in minute detail and persuasively argues that air power was decisive in the Japanese victory. The fall of the Tijater pass would pave the way for the Japanese to move on to Bandoeng and bring the campaign for the Netherlands East Indies to a conclusion.

There is little doubt that Boer's study is a product of prodigious research. Some readers in fact will find the information he has unearthed overwhelming. Others will argue that the book would have benefited from further discussion of the military operations on the eastern side of Java. Other subjects that deserve greater scrutiny include the performance of the American air units. Finally, the book's index could do with a listing of events, military units, nationalities, and places rather than merely the names of personalities. It must be said that these suggestions and complaints do little to detract from the quality of the work. The loss of Java as it stands will be welcomed by scholars as a significant contribution to the study of the Second World War in Asia.