Stephanie Cronin, in her introduction to Armies and State-Building, states that “this is a book about armies, not wars” (p. 14). Indeed, the book is about the organic relationship between army building and state building across the Middle East and North Africa. It covers this subject in Iran, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia, and touches on aspects of the subject in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, Tunisia, and even to a lesser extent Morocco, Syria, and Libya from roughly the 19th to the 20th century. Throughout the book, Cronin demonstrates her erudition and skill in writing a comparative history of military reform in the region.
The book consists of seven chapters, three of which (including the introduction and the conclusion) provide a comparative analysis of military reform practices in the Middle East, such as the formation of nizam-i cedid regiments based on conscription, the institution of ministries of war, the setting up of military schools, as well as the impact of these reforms on the different paths various countries have taken particularly after World War I. Cronin shows how the history of conscription in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia has been influential in their divergence from other Middle Eastern states such as Iraq and Iran in forming authoritarian and modernist regimes. Moreover, the author is concerned with providing historical insight into post-Arab Spring political developments in the Middle East as well.
The country-specific chapters of the book, which deal with Iran, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia, can be read as stand-alone essays. Chapters on Iran and Afghanistan end with thorough conclusions providing explanations for the contemporary political developments. We learn that resentment against foreign military missions in the Qajar period and the 1979 revolution in Iran are linked (p. 82), and that the consequences of British (in the 19th century) and Soviet (in the 1950s–70s) assistance to the army of Afghanistan are examples upon which the current US/NATO military presence have built (p. 123). Following Cronin's account, the different route that the Saudi rulers took in the early 20th century—by not pursuing military modernization to transform society but maintaining the existing patronage system based on family and tribal ties (p. 206)—is linked with the Saudi National Guard's entering Bahrain at the invitation of al-Khalifa family in 2011 (p. 239).
The book is highly readable not only for nonacademics and engaged lay readers on the contemporary Middle East, but also for experienced students and scholars, who would benefit from the comparative perspective presented by Cronin. The latter group would be familiar with comparisons of Egypt, Iran, and the Ottoman State with respect to their military reforms. Nevertheless, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia are less explored cases and their addition to the picture both enriches the comparative character of the analysis and provides new sources of information.
Cronin's contribution involves employing a critical historiographical method that does not base itself in reproducing the duality between the “West” and the “Orient” as is done in quite a number of the histories of modernization in the Middle East. She also does not take the societies under study as monolithic entities. These two points are in fact related. Cronin sheds light on the power struggles in the societies where military reform took place. The “competitive emulation between warring polities” (p. 21) is what gives different organization and path to the military reform practices in countries under study. While in its “ideal form” the formation of a permanent, national army based on conscription is the recipe for building direct allegiance with the central state and the ruler in Cronin's history, she shows that this ideal form has limited existence in practice. The limits of national conscription in Afghanistan and conscriptions to early 19th-century nizam regiments in Iran (p. 60) point to mechanisms of power renegotiation between local elites and the central government, as well as the nonlinearity of this process. Cronin makes it clear that early 19th–century Middle Eastern rulers’ search for political consolidation has been similar to that of their counterparts during the “military revolutions” of 16th- to 18th-century Europe (p. 242). Another aspect of this multilayered analysis is the class dimension that Cronin successfully underlines in her story (p. 26).
The author is a distinguished historian of 20th-century Iran. This explains the thoroughness of her two chapters on Iran, where she covers Iran's military history from the Qajar period until the revolution of 1979. Her analysis here is nuanced and multilayered. This is not the case with regard to Afghanistan, however. In her chapter on Afghanistan, where she tells a different story of a “repeated cycle of failed state-building,” (p. 84), the author gives the main agency to the heads of states and members of the ruling elite rather than the various segments of society or multiple “warring polities.” Therefore, the chapter focuses more on the actions and decisions of Amir Dust Muhammad Khan, King Amanullah, and particularly Prime Minister Muhammad Daud of the Musahiban family. Muhammad Daud's Pashtun identity and nationalist inspirations are taken to be explanatory for the pre-Saur revolution military cohesion (p. 111). However, the way this Pashtun identity was instituted and operated still needs more explanation.
This book does not narrate the history of military revolutions or nizam mania as a story of linear advancement or increased efficiency. The author makes it clear that building standing armies was not only costlier, but did not bring as many victories as other modes of military organizations. Cronin argues that the strongest opposition to European attacks was not by the nizam forces but by militant Sufi-brotherhoods with charismatic leaders (p. 26). The comparative military strength of Iran before the Abbas Mirza reforms of the early 19th century, the resistance to King Amanullah's top-down reforms implemented by Turkish advisors in Afghanistan, and the tribal khans’ persistent and active involvement in the recruitment practice of the army show that the history of military reform in the Middle East is more a history of negotiations and renegotiations of power among various segments of society than one of rationalization and efficiency.
The book claims to “reinterpret scholarly understanding of the character of military reform in the Middle East” (p. 14) and to build a bridge between the historical understanding of armies in the region and the contemporary political analysis of the post–Arab Spring developments, such as the implosion of the Syrian state and the renewed political prominence of the Egyptian army. Building partly on secondary literature and partly on Foreign Office documents of the British National Archives, this book successfully achieves the former, while it provides useful clues for the latter claim, which can be elaborated in further studies. It is an important contribution to the comparative study of the modern Middle East for readers both in and out of the academy.
