In the wake of the unrest, uprising, and instability of January and February 2011 in Arab North Africa and parts of the Middle East, Omar Ashour's 2009 volume on the de-radicalization of jihadis is particularly timely. This is especially true since Islamic political and social movements either have been involved in the uprisings, as was the case with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, or stand poised to take advantage of the instability, as with al Qaeda in Yemen. Ashour's book is tightly written and packed with historical, political, social, and religious data. It sheds light on the process of radicalization of Muslims and Muslim movements into jihadism, as well as the process by which de-radicalization occurs. Ashour relies on state-based case studies of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Group and al Jihad (also in Egypt), and the Algerian examples of the Islamic Salvation Army, the Armed Islamic Group, and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. Given recent events in the Middle East and the Maghreb, as well as ongoing United States concerns and operations in the Middle East and Central and Southeast Asia, Ashour provides a wealth of information for scholars of religion and politics and for scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, foreign policy, and diplomacy.

Ashour posits that the radicalization of Muslims into jihadists is rooted in a combination of social structure and social learning. Essentially, Muslims who become radicalized are subjected to institutional and associational pressures that drive their behavior toward extremism. Institutional pressures from government, the military, society, and the economy are coupled with what is learned from primary associations and affiliations (family, friends, religion, and education), creating a radicalization process. This radicalization occurs through a combination of real and imagined/constructed grievances, which leads to behavioral definitions that are favorable for radicalization, extremism, and violence, as well as behavioral definitions that neutralize prohibitions against violence.

The focus of Ashour's book, the de-radicalization of jihadis, occurs on three levels: ideological, behavioral, and organizational. Ideological de-radicalization occurs when extremist movements invert their ideologies and repudiate the use of violence to achieve socio-political goals. Behavioral de-radicalization takes place when jihadi movements just repudiate violence without changing their underlying ideology. Finally, organizational de-radicalization happens when jihadi movements dismantle the armed wings of extremist movements without splintering the movement itself.

Ashour argues that there are three general types of de-radicalization: comprehensive, substantive, and pragmatic. When jihadi groups de-radicalize in all three ways, they achieve comprehensive de-radicalization. When only ideological and behavioral de-radicalization occurs and is accompanied by a splintering of the movement, substantive de-radicalization has taken place. De-radicalization is pragmatic when movement behavior and organization are de-radicalized without an ideological repudiation of violence as a legitimate tactic.

In addition to the levels and types of de-radicalization, the overall process has four necessary and sufficient conditions: state repression, selective inducements, social interaction, and leadership. State repression refers to governmental efforts to force compliance through negative sanctions, civil liberties violations, or state induced terror; this is the classic “stick.” Selective inducements are international, governmental, or domestic offers of rewards to jihadi movements for positively changing their behavior, giving up violence, and moving from extreme to more moderate positions; here we see the classic “carrot.” Social interaction refers to the exchanges between a given movement and its constituent members (internal), as well as between outside actors, the movement as a whole, and members of the movement (external). Leadership refers to the type and quality of the radical movement's leaders. In particular, charismatic leaders who have broad support and acceptance within the movement are indispensible to the de-radicalization process.

Ashour's research clearly indicates that the jihadi de-radicalization has been a success in Egypt and Algeria when charismatic religious/spiritual leadership is in place to legitimate the de-radicalization process. Attempts to de-radicalize without charismatic leadership consistently failed in Egypt and Algeria. State repression, often one of the primary drivers of radicalization, also has a role to play in the de-radicalization process. Ashour finds that the leadership of radical jihadi movements responded to sustained high-level repression and reevaluation of the use of violence as a means of bringing about socio-political change. Repression alone, without the other three factors present, is not enough to bring about de-radicalization. While positive external social interaction is important (as it can broaden the worldviews of radical leaders and their followers), internal interaction between leaders who are pursuing de-radicalization and followers is even more important. This is especially important for containing or neutralizing opposition to the de-radicalization process and preventing a splintering of the movement.

Inducements, the carrots to the stick of state repression, capture the attention of radical group members and bolster the negotiating position of the leaders both internally and externally. Properly applied inducements also provide incentives to consolidate the de-radicalization process. Failure to deliver promised inducements has led to the failure of the de-radicalization process in a number of places. Inducements seem to provide movement leaders and members with positive reinforcement (employment, participation in the political process, pardons, and freedom from incarceration) in exchange for abandoning violence as a socio-political tactic.

The de-radicalization process that Ashour delineates has real-world implications for dealing with radicalized Islamic groups. One of the most important of these implications regards the treatment of detained extremists. Much of the de-radicalization process that Ashour describes took place among incarcerated leaders of extremist movements. These individuals had already gone through the repression/negative rewards phase, which had reoriented their thinking toward other possible courses of action for their movements. As a result, it would make sense to identify key movement leaders who are in custody, whether in the United States or other countries, and work with them. Perhaps they would respond to the promise of selective inducements/positive rewards, as well as interactions with Muslim leaders who espouse more moderate political positions, to reorient their viewpoints away from the use of violence as a legitimate political tactic. Further inducements might then be offered to both the leaders and members of their movements in exchange for repudiating violence and reengaging with a more mainstream socio-political process. The key here is to disaggregate the leaders of the most extreme, reactionary, and violent offshoots of Islamism and redirect them toward more mainstream, moderate positions. The next step is to work with these leaders through the effective deployment of positive rewards to reorient their movement membership, thereby disaggregating large portions of radical movements away from Islamic extremism and towards more mainstream Muslim socio-political norms and forms.