One day, many years ago, I was standing in the Musée d’Art Moderne in Paris, when a tour party gathered close by around a Raoul Dufy. The tour guide began her exposition with the words “On ne présente pas Dufy”; and, if you do not introduce Dufy, you do not review Klein. Over the last 30 years, his political analysis of the history of the NHS has been the canvas that everyone has admired. In what follows I will not try to summarise that canvas. Instead, I shall take Klein’s observations and analysis to be the jumping off point into the fundamental question prompted by the story he tells: what exactly is it that makes the NHS politically distinctive?
One clue to that distinctiveness is represented by the fact that this book is now in its seventh edition. First published in 1983, the second edition, published in 1989, was able to take in the publication of Working for Patients, but not the succeeding policy of creating the internal market and GP fundholding, slowly at first, in the post-Thatcher Conservative administration. Since the early 90s, there have been major reorganisations every few years: the abolition of the internal market by the Labour government in 1997, followed by its reinvention in 2002, the rise of performance management through targets, the Darzi review and the fundamental changes first mooted in 2010 by the Coalition government, with the creation of GP dominated clinical commissioning groups and NHS England together with the return of the major public health functions of the NHS to local government, the last reversing the reorganisation of 1974.
For each major change there is more or less a chapter in the latest edition. Yet, as Klein points out in his preface, this organisational turbulence has been cocooned in institutional and cultural continuity. The system has remained overwhelmingly tax funded. Its ethos of universal provision of treatment equitably secured to those in need has been the central dogma that all proposals for reform must respect; and – a point to return to later – the NHS has been organised as a national service rather as the Church of England is a national church, with a geographical basis to its organisation just as the parish is the basis of the Church of England. So, any understanding of why there has been such extensive organisational change, with each change trumpeted as the one that will solve the problems that no others have managed, requires us to see how the central fixed points create an insoluble problem of institutional design.
To understand the issues at hand, it is useful to begin with a quotation, cited by Klein, from Sir George Godber, the Chief Medical Officer between 1960 and 1973 and, as Klein puts it, “a dominating figure in the first 30 years of the NHS”. The quotation runs as follows:
“The NHS is comprised of very many services rendered daily by physicians, nurses, dentists, pharmacists and others. The content of those services is defined, not by planners, but by essential professional knowledge and skills. Change in method and practice is brought about by intra-professional exchanges; it may be abrupt because of a scientific development such as the advent of a new drug, or it may occur gradually with experience” (quoted in pp. 32–33).
In this quotation, there is a very simple but powerful syllogism, defining one of the core political dynamics of the NHS. It runs as follows: Premise 1: the NHS is comprised of the very many services rendered by professionals. Premise 2: the content of its services is defined by those professionals – and not the planners. Conclusion: change can only be brought about by intra-professional exchange. For roughly the first 30 years of the NHS, the political task was based on the acceptance of this syllogism. With that acceptance, the politics of the NHS required the government to administer a professionally dominated service, respecting the fact that change depended upon professional expertise and development. For the second 30 years the political task has been to break the organisation logic of the syllogism so that service change no longer depended upon intra-professional developments. The politics of steering, the politics of the first 30 years, was replaced by the politics of markets or hierarchy, sometimes in tandem and sometimes in tension, but with little recognition of the complications involved in either.
After the initial war between the medical professions and Bevan in the 1940s had resulted in a truce, the task of politicians was seen as being to provide the institutional set-up in which professional expertise could be allowed to do its job. To be sure, this seemingly simple task was compounded by the fact that the institutional set-up also required pay arrangements that kept doctors reasonably happy. Klein shows clearly how neglect of this elementary truth led to problems between the 1950s and the 1970s as doctors felt themselves falling behind their professional reference groups and, in consequence, adopted the militancy of the working class movement of the time. Even the Heath reorganisation of the early 1970s can be regarded simply as the modernisation of this traditional relationship. Professional self-control was not to be superseded but rationalised according to uniform principles of administrative structure. Clinical teams were contained in hospitals. Hospitals were contained in districts. Districts in areas. Areas in regions; and the whole was to be supervised by the ministry, acting more as constitutional monarch than as chief executive.
In this set-up, decentralisation and respect for professional autonomy went hand in hand. For Klein the major transformation of the period has been, as the last chapter of the book puts it, ‘From Church to Garage’. In other words, what was once seen as a quasi-religious provision of a public service – the sacraments of medical care made available to the masses – became a consumer service in which the punters took their bodies in for repair just as they would treat normal commercial services. Yet, allowing for the transformation of public attitudes and sentiments, this account leaves us with a major puzzle. Why did consumerism and the policy response it evoked take the form that it did in England? After all, it could conceivably have taken the form that it does in Germany, in which the search for better medical practice by individuals is revealed in respect for expertise and the rewarding of those physicians who equip their practices with the latest in magnetic resonance imaging scanners and other diagnostic equipment. Why did the consumer revolution take an anti-professional form rather than a search for greater professionalism?
The short answer is that the very centralisation of the system allowed politicians to fashion an account of what a consumer orientation required that was in line with their own ideological and intellectual presuppositions. Originally, it meant the introduction of management to the organisation of the NHS via the Griffiths reforms of 1983. This was to conceive of the whole of the NHS as a corporate hierarchy with the Secretary of State and the Supervisory Board at the top taking strategic decisions and receiving reports on performance. There was to be a Chief Executive, with general managers at different levels responsible for operational matters. In subsequent developments of this hierarchical managerial model, for example in Alan Milburn’s development of the National Service Framework and the Performance Assessment Framework in 2002, the assumption has been repeated that governing the NHS is a management problem within an organisation that is a corporate hierarchy.
If one mode of organisation is hierarchical, internalising the process of coordination by centrally determined targets and the monitoring of performance, the alternative mode involves externalising coordination through the price mechanism. It was this mode that was pursued by the big bang inaugurated in 1989 by Margaret Thatcher but implemented by her successors. It came to mean the institutionalisation of the purchaser–provider split as a way of creating an internal quasi-market. The internal market, initially abolished by New Labour when it came to power in 1997, while yet retaining an organisational distinction between purchasers and providers, was forcefully recreated in 2002 under Alan Milburn backed up with the policy of payment by results. Andrew Lansley’s attempts to create an NHS free from political determination but coordinated by GP-led commissioners in contractual relations with their providers is the latest incarnation of this way of thinking.
Market and hierarchy are conventionally seen as alternative and mutually exclusive modes of coordinating productive activity, with the fundamental difference being that hierarchies suspend market relations (see Coase, Reference Coase1937, although the idea is found in Marshall, Reference Marshall1979, 365–366). Why then in a system that is using the single market are hierarchical elements present? As Klein points out, one of the central political conflicts of values built into the NHS is that between a centralising doctrine of political accountability and an administrative recognition, politically acknowledged from time to time, of the need for the decentralisation of authority. Whether or not Anuerin Bevan ever said that if a bedpan is dropped in a hospital ward, its noise should resound in the Palace of Westminster – a quotation that as Klein notes (p. 276) comes in various forms – the logic of the sentiment is absolutely correct. In a centrally funded service that aspires to nationalise the best, there is no escape from the centralisation of authority, for eventually, whether it be failing services in an Ely mental hospital, the length of queues for elective surgery or the problem of getting an appointment with one’s GP, it will all come back to central government. Moreover, given the political salience of the NHS, appearing as it does from time to time towards the top of the list of concerns of voters, central government cannot hide behind the cover of the administrative reality that services are the product of a myriad of decentralised purchasing bodies. For example, long waiting lists may well represent a failure of commissioning and ingrained inefficient practices in the management of hospitals, but they can also be seen as the product of inadequate central funding and will often be presented as such by leading political actors.
In this context, there is one intriguing constant amid all the organisational changes, namely that the unit of responsibility for purchasing has always been defined as purchasing for a geographically defined population, whether a district or locality. Viewed objectively, this is strange. The separation of purchaser and provider in principle allows a disjunction between finance and location. There is no need to tie purchasing to localities. European social insurance funds are not so tied. Indeed, it is hard in comparative terms to find bodies responsible for health care financing who are tied to localities but not integrated with local government. The existence of the geographical tie becomes even stranger when we note that, in replacing primary care trusts with clinical commissioning groups, the Lansley reforms increased the number of purchasers from around 150 to 212. Why the fragmentation of purchasing power to this degree makes sense is a mystery.
If there is not a rational explanation in terms of the functional requirements of commissioning, the explanation has to be that it reflects some latent and unquestioned assumptions at work in the minds of policy makers. Such assumptions are reinforced by the institutional reality that GPs act as gatekeepers controlling access to specialist physicians. It seems a short step from this fact, to the conclusion, given that GPs are geographically organised, that they are in the best position to determine the needs of their localities. To derive such a conclusion is, of course, a fallacy, since it does not follow from the fact that GPs know their individual patients (even if they do in the present depersonalised state of GP services) that they know the collective needs of a locality. The fallacy compounds the tacit assumption that it is a population defined by locality for which health care finance is needed.
There is, perhaps, a further conflation of ideas contained in the assumption that purchasing has to be geographically based, namely between the idea that public authorities should be responsible for securing protection from the financial consequences of ill health and the idea that public authorities should be responsible for the health of the population. It is not difficult to see how this conflation could arise as a result of a service originating out of the need to provide health services to mass populations subject to aerial bombardment in war time. However, in a system in which the primary responsibility is seen as protecting individuals and households from the financial consequences of ill health, there is no need to assume a geographical basis for finance. Instead, what is required is social solidarity across social groups who have different actuarial probabilities of becoming ill. There may be a geographical dimension to this, but there are many other important dimensions, including the occupation, gender and age. To expect relatively small geographical commissioning groups to be able to encompass these different dimensions is asking a great deal.
If this analysis is correct, there is an inherent instability in the organisational structure of the NHS, established by the Lansley reforms. Clinical commissioning groups will be too small to be able to commission services effectively, and they will be hampered by their lack of administrative support and by the demands of constrained public expenditure. Provider trusts will then find that they run increasing deficits that will be impossible to sustain in the medium term. NHS England will, by default, become an increasingly important commissioner both for the services for which it is responsible and for the detailed guidance it gives to the commissioning groups. Bankrupt providers, struggling commissioners and the ever increasing tide of service demand will precipitate a crisis and a further round of reforms and organisational change; and the eighth edition of The New Politics of the NHS will have to be written.
