Neil Rollings has written a clear and cogently argued book which will be welcomed by business historians and by those more generally interested in the development Britain's relationship with the European Union and its predecessor bodies. In writing it he says he was responding to the “constant clarion call” of Alan Milward “for histories of European integration to move beyond the realms of diplomatic history” (p. 259) — something which Rollings does admirably. And whilst Rollings also says (p. 7) that one of his initial aims was to build upon and update the work of Robert Lieber (British Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elites, and Pressure Groups. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), he goes well beyond this.

The book is split into three substantive parts. Part I considers both trade and protection and, in an innovative chapter, overseas investment and corporate strategy. The five chronologically ordered chapters in part II trace the attitude of British business to the European project from the immediate postwar years to the “end game” of British ascension in 1973. Part III highlights what Rollings sees as one of his main contributions, which is to argue that in order to evaluate the complex and changing attitude of British business to Europe one has to get beyond a fixation on protection and realize that business was concerned with the broader environment it had to operate in, whether inside or outside the EU tent. Hence chapters on competition policy, indirect taxation, and company law.

One broad methodological point Rollings makes throughout the book is that we should not treat British business (or indeed the state) as a single unitary actor and that we need to acknowledge that the historical record is shaded grey rather than a stark black or white, complexities and contingencies abound and positions are taken and shift for myriad reasons. More generally, after part I, the book is primarily written from the perspective of the “peak level [business] associations,” particularly the Federation of British Industry (FBI—which later transformed into the Confederation of British Industry). This material is based on extensive research in the FBI, and other peak level association, as well as relevant government records. One impressive aspect of the book is the way these rich archival sources are weaved together with an extensive secondary literature that covers economic and business history, economics, politics, and management.

The book puts forward a range of arguments and revisionist views. For example, whilst the general historiography argues that U.K. FDI in Europe, especially the EEC, only increased significantly after 1973, Rollings argues that there were in fact significant increases, without government encouragement, in the 1950s and 1960s—although he is careful to stress that the significance of this FDI was not so much in terms of scale but in terms of the number of British firms involved. He draws an important distinction between the motivations of business and those of the state: “British business believed the way to improve its performance and hence that of the economy was by allowing firms to internationalize by whatever means appropriate to maintain firms' competiveness…[whereas] the economic departments of the government were fixated on the balance of payments and exports” (p. 260). Rollings also believes that “British business adjusted their corporate strategies towards Europe earlier than has been commonly suggested” (p. 69) and that the crucial period in the development of British policy towards Europe was 1958–1963. Furthermore, from a business perspective, the impetus for closer ties with the European six in that period came from below, from individual businessmen and companies because the leadership of the FBI remained committed to EFTA, whose creation they had been closely involved with—it was only with the announcement by the government that it was to apply for membership of the EEC that the FBI leadership changed its stance. Indeed, the FBI leadership then became such strong advocates of membership that they were not above presenting the results of various surveys of their members' attitudes so that they showed a more united pro-European stance than was warranted. The FBI also had a crucial role as a disseminator of information which did help to overcome certain prejudices and ignorance among British business and thus did pave the way for a more pro-European attitude from business in general.

Several chapters (for example, those on overseas investment or competition policy) offer fresh perspectives and evidence that insist that this book should find its way on to the reading list of any course seriously interested in Britain's postwar relationship to Europe or more generally in postwar British business history. Furthermore, most chapters begin with neat summaries of the existing literature views and end with clearly stated summaries of the main findings that students will welcome. From a research perspective, Rollings has thrown down challenging gauntlet to other scholars who operate in this space. Indeed, he ends the book with his own clarion calls: firstly for a ‘“Europeanization' of contemporary history” (p. 264), a clumsy phrase which in essence calls for a greater integration of domestic political-economic dynamics and the wider European project; secondly, for a greater integration across the relevant social science disciplines to tackle a topic which he sees as being intrinsically interdisciplinary.