I must confess that I had begun to despair that I would ever read anything regarding the “science question” in International Relations (IR) that did not either founder on the Scylla of philosophical dilettantism or drown in the Charybdis of disciplinary obscurantism. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson's The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations has cured me of that despair. Skillfully navigating between the twin hazards that have proven fatal to so many earlier efforts, Jackson provides us with a pluralistic vision of scientific inquiry in the field of IR that is philosophically sound yet accessible to nonspecialists in the philosophy of science. His main argument is deceptively simple: science is a capacious concept and, properly understood, constitutes a kind of broad church that can accommodate a wide range of interpretive, reflexivist, and critical IR approaches as well as the “hard science” approaches of neopositivists. Claims to the contrary—i.e., that only certain approaches can claim the mantle of science and the legitimacy it confers—he dismisses as not only narrowly self-serving, but without philosophical warrant. There is simply no way, he argues, that a fair reading of the philosophy of science literature can lead one to conclude that there is a consensus regarding what constitutes “real” science. Rather, he argues, any such reading must necessarily lead to the conclusion that there are numerous ways of defining and doing science and that, as long as its “conclusions follow rigorously from the evidence and logical argumentation” (19), any approach to “empirical inquiry designed to produce knowledge” (19) must be considered scientific.
Having made his point about the irreducibly pluralist character of science, Jackson next proceeds to develop a typology of scientific approaches to the study of world politics. Constructing a 2 × 2 table of ontologies and methodologies, he specifies four basic provisional commitments or “wagers” regarding how to study world politics: neopositivism, critical realism, analyticism, and reflexivity. Jackson then devotes chapters 3 through 6 to discussing these wagers, not only clarifying their respective philosophical and ontological commitments, but creating a framework for thinking (and talking) about the points of contention among them. He concludes the book with a call for a more “pluralist science of IR”—that is, a “‘post-foundational IR’ in which we as a field abandon the futile quest to articulate a single consistent basis on which to produce knowledge” (189–90).
The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations has much to recommend it, and I could go on at some length about its strengths. Given space constraints, however, I will limit my comments here to what I consider to be its two most impressive qualities. To begin with, Jackson's work usefully widens the circle of scientific approaches to the study of international relations. Specifically, it provides a philosophy-of-science foundation for a range of perspectives and approaches that are typically excluded (by their detractors) from the church of science, including those associated with critical theory, postcolonialism, feminism, English School, and constructivism. In so doing, he usefully moves us beyond the various “dialogues of the deaf” that have characterized IR for so long, enabling (perhaps for the first time) a respectful ecumenism characterized not only by mutual toleration of methodological diversity, but also by a common language for talking respectfully about important philosophical differences. We'll have to see, of course, if the opportunity to build such an ecumenical discipline is seized by the IR community, but at least Jackson has provided us with the raw materials for such an enterprise.
Beyond this, and nontrivially (given that I teach at a liberal arts college), Jackson's book is also notable for its accessibility to (advanced) undergraduate students. To be sure, the text is bound to be challenging for IR undergraduates, even good ones like those I have the pleasure to teach. But it is not so challenging that students will simply be left scratching their heads and wondering what these debates are about and why they should care. With careful coaching, the stakes can be made clear, the framework made intelligible, and the call for methodological pluralism made to sound like the clarion call that it is. Indeed, so confident am I that this book is accessible to undergraduates that I intend to adopt it as a core text the next time I offer Advanced International Theory. The plan is to use this book as a framework text, having students read actual works of IR scholarship against the relevant chapters (neopositivist works in conjunction with the chapter on neopositivism, for example) and then placing them in a critical conversation (of the type envisioned by Jackson) with other approaches and their exemplars. While I haven't yet worked out all the details, I can envision both the basic structure of the course and its potential payoffs—and both are exciting.
While Jackson is by and large successful in achieving what he sets out to accomplish, his reach (perhaps not surprisingly given the ambitions of the book) ultimately exceeds his grasp. Simply put, in the course of widening the circle of scientific IR scholarship, Jackson inadvertently reproduces the classic inside-outside distinction between science and ethics. The two, he claims, are simply incommensurable projects—science being about factual production of knowledge and ethics being about making evaluative judgments. But if science (or, more properly, scientific methodology) is ultimately about systematic inquiry in which “conclusions follow rigorously from the evidence and logical argumentation” (19), then it would seem to me that that there is ample warrant to include certain types of ethical inquiry within Jackson's ecumenical dialogue. Surely no one doubts that the works of normative analytical philosophers and neo-Thomists (to take but two examples) meet this test. And just as surely, one would be hard pressed to find practitioners of these forms of ethical reasoning who do not believe themselves to be engaged in systemic production of knowledge about the human condition. Jackson's explicit Weberianism, however, largely obscures the “scientific” character of this form of normative study, excommunicating ethical inquiry from his broad church of science. Given my own ethical commitments, my instinct is to resist this move and to look for ways to pursue an even broader ecumenical vision—one that includes certain forms of ethical inquiry—even if realizing this vision ultimately requires rejecting the Weberian stone upon which Jackson has built his church.
Ultimately, though, this is a perhaps unavoidable flaw in an otherwise excellent work. At the end of the day, Jackson has written an accessible and potentially game-changing book that seeks to build bridges where there are currently only impassable ravines. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations is precisely the kind of text I would—and someday will—use to anchor an undergraduate IR theory and methods course. I recommend it without reservation to all who are interested in—and interested in teaching about—the science question in IR.
