This book has a very ambitious goal. The author tries to reconstruct the concept of nature, characterizing Western civilization from the classical Greek period to the contemporary age. Blay claims that four distinct ideas of nature have existed: the one of the Greeks, prosecuted in the classical Arabic world; the one of medieval European civilization; the one connoting the beginning of the Scientific Revolution; and, finally, that existing from the end of the eighteenth century or the beginning of the nineteenth century until now. Blay's general concept is that the idea of nature depends profoundly upon the general belief system and the economic–material necessities of a certain age. As to science, its common basis across a great part of the period considered by the author is the mathematical order invented by Euclid, but the way in which mathematics is conceived and used changed profoundly through the centuries.
To address such a general subject is a dangerous enterprise. It is even more dangerous if the entire treatment is faced in a relatively small book, like this one. The risk lies in generalizing some notions without being sure that a generalization is possible, because some important aspects might have been neglected. Blay's book does not escape this rule. Several of his arguments appear unsound and not completely convincing. On the other hand, this work has strong aspects. In particular, the fourth chapter – the last one – entitled ‘L'ordre économico-cosmique énergetiste’, seems well argued and, whilst the position of the author might not be agreed with, it surely represents a notable contribution to the social history of science.
Though Blay's opinion with regard to the recent development of science and technology is not formulated in an explicit manner, his idea transpires in a relatively clear way: it is a critical view. Blay seems to agree with the train of thought explained by Husserl in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936) (mentioned at p. 271). He also agrees with Heidegger's conceptions expressed in The Question Concerning Technology (1954) (mentioned at p. 255 n. 59). I will concentrate on the first and fourth chapters, as they are the most representative of Blay's conception.
In the first chapter (‘L'intelligible’), the author faces the Greek idea of nature. His conceptualization of Greek mathematics is important, too. Mathematics had a high humanistic–philosophical value: mathematics is desirable in itself, not necessarily for its applications. Blay mentions, as a paradigmatic example, Proclus' commentary to the first book of Euclid's Elements, where mathematics is seen as a preparation to purify the soul (p. 33). Relying upon Vernant's conceptualization, Blay claims that the development of mathematics, with its clear concepts, principles and logical procedures, is also consistent with the development of the democratic polis (p. 38). In the Euclidean order, the intelligible is constituted in relation with the becoming and the sensible (p. 39). First of all, mathematics drives to the contemplation of the intelligible itself (p. 42). There is a mathematics of the intelligible (geometry, arithmetic) and a mathematics of the sensible (astronomy, music, optics and so on, p. 45). After tracing a picture of the concept the Greeks had of mathematics, Blay analyses their concept of nature, basically relying upon Aristotle's Physics. Nature (physis) is composed of the material things having in themselves the principle of their development (p. 48). The physis is both a material and a formal principle (pp. 51–54). Blay tries then to connect his ideas on Greek mathematics with his ideas on Greek conception of nature, in particular regarding astronomy: the Ptolemaic system is based on beautiful and perfect movements, which belong to the intelligible. They connote the super-lunar world, with its perfection, whereas the movements which we perceive on the Earth (as the retrogradations) belong to the sensible world. This means that nature is divided into a perfect and an imperfect world and the perfection of mathematics connotes, in a proper sense, only the super-lunar world (pp. 56–62). In contraposition to nature, there are the artifices constructed by man for his advantage. This is an important point for Blay's argument. For the Greeks the artifices are completely distinct from nature: they do not have in themselves the principle of their development.
The whole construction of this chapter is debatable. Blay relies on some classical theses on Greek science–mathematics–philosophy: the importance of the intelligible, abstract character of mathematics, distinction between super-lunar and sub-lunar world, secondary role of the technique (to summarize). He uses these ideas to compare the concept of nature and science held by the Greeks to ours. The picture has the following limitations. First, the concept of nature expressed by Aristotle cannot be assumed to be the only paradigmatic of Greek thought. Second, the great Hellenistic science is almost not mentioned. Archimedes is mentioned once (p. 63), Apollonius never, restricting the analysis only to mathematics. This is an evident ideological operation: in several works by Archimedes the relation between physics and mathematics, as well as the use of mathematics within science, is similar to ours. This represents a counterexample to Blay's thesis. The whole of Hellenistic science – medicine, geography and so on – is scarcely compatible with the picture traced by Blay.
In the fourth chapter (‘L'ordre économico-cosmique énergetiste’), Blay faces the concept of nature created by contemporary science. The thesis of this chapter is that, starting from the end of the eighteenth century, the concept of nature changes. Nature becomes a part of the economic order, something to exploit from an economical point of view. Thence, the difference between nature and artefacts tends to become insensible. Nature is seen as a mere engine, as a reserve of work (p. 237). The concept and the language of science become suitable for this new conception: the two most important notions of physics become ‘work’ and ‘energy’. The principle of energy conservation becomes the cornerstone of the whole physics. This is coherent with the necessity to conserve energy and to exploit work, which is typical of the contemporary economic order. Blay develops an interesting analysis of the way in which the concept of work was introduced and conceived by Coriolis (pp. 237–260), and of the way in which Helmholtz characterized the principle of energy conservation (pp. 261–271). These analyses are implemented by several considerations on the links between the development of science and the development of the economy within society. Albeit interesting, Blay's analysis is incomplete in this case, too, because parts of physics, which were fundamental in the science of the nineteenth century, are neglected because they do not enter into the picture traced by Blay. There is reference neither to Faraday, Maxwell or Hertz, nor to the problems of electricity and magnetism. Finally, Blay's attempt to inscribe quantum mechanics and theory of relativity within his picture seems rather weak. A consistent part of physics was developed according to Blay's idea, but another important part was not.
This confirms that the general picture traced by the author, although stimulating, does not seem to rely upon solid bases.
