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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 August 2005
Oral Arguments and Decision Making on the United States Supreme Court. By Timothy R. Johnson. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 180p. $35.00.
This book makes a persuasive thesis that the oral arguments presented in cases before the United States Supreme Court are used by the justices to help them arrive at substantive legal and policy decisions that closely parallel their preferred outcomes. Although that would seem to be logical, the author documents that many scholars who write about the Court do not share this thesis. Those scholars, such as the so-called attitudinalists, posit that oral arguments have no effect on justices' votes. In order to reinforce his thesis, Timothy Johnson uses the strategic model of decision making, namely, that justices are goal oriented, they are strategic, and they account for institutional rules. He then goes on to explain that because the briefs presented to the Court from both the litigants and from amici curiae are understandably biased in behalf of their particular points of view, the oral arguments serve to solve this problem.
This book makes a persuasive thesis that the oral arguments presented in cases before the United States Supreme Court are used by the justices to help them arrive at substantive legal and policy decisions that closely parallel their preferred outcomes. Although that would seem to be logical, the author documents that many scholars who write about the Court do not share this thesis. Those scholars, such as the so-called attitudinalists, posit that oral arguments have no effect on justices' votes. In order to reinforce his thesis, Timothy Johnson uses the strategic model of decision making, namely, that justices are goal oriented, they are strategic, and they account for institutional rules. He then goes on to explain that because the briefs presented to the Court from both the litigants and from amici curiae are understandably biased in behalf of their particular points of view, the oral arguments serve to solve this problem.
In order to prove his thesis, Johnson does cite evidence presented by other scholars who discuss the role of oral arguments, and he cites statements made about oral arguments by the justices themselves. For original data, he uses litigant and amicus briefs, oral argument transcripts, notes and memoranda from the private papers of some of the justices, and the actual Court decisions. His time frame for the data was the years between 1972 and 1986. He looked at the private papers of Justices William Brennan, William Douglas, and Lewis Powell, with the latter being the most useful because of the notes Powell took during oral arguments. He then augmented his data with that obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
Johnson begins his substantive argument by examining the informational role played by oral arguments. He says that justices ask questions during oral arguments to determine the extent of their policy options, as well as to assess the preferences of external actors and how they might react to decisions. He also says that the justices are able to use oral arguments to obtain information not previously provided them.
After that initial argument, Johnson next makes a jump based on Powell's notes and suggests that Powell, at least, used oral arguments as a means to learn about the other justices' preferred outcomes in the cases at hand. This is important in that a justice is then able to effectively build a coalition when deciding on the merits of the case. He sees no reason why Powell's approach would not be one utilized by the other justices as well.
The author then looked at the conference deliberations done by the justices in the contentious case of Roe v. Wade, as well as the bargaining memoranda circulated by the justices concerning this case, and then follows that by looking at the same material in other cases. The result is that the justices indeed do raise issues at these times from the oral arguments. He reminds the reader that Justice John Paul Stevens has said that oral arguments provide a time to raise issues about which he wants his colleagues to think.
Once the author's thesis has reached this point, there remains one final topic to examine, and that is whether the oral arguments really do affect substantive and legal policy decisions. His data says yes. The Court cited issues discussed during oral arguments more than three times per case, and almost one-third of the references were not even discussed in the written briefs: thus, a unique information source upon which to arrive at decisions. Johnson admits that his data show that although the Court does not often turn to oral arguments when making substantive decisions, it does so under one key condition: when the outcome of a case is in doubt. His data also show that the Court is, indeed, a collegial body and that the justices do not act as separate entities. They also use oral arguments to raise questions about outside forces, namely, the preferences of political institutions, public opinion, and the impact of their decisions. Thus, the Court is not an unaccountable entity.
In conclusion, Johnson has presented an interesting thesis and has admirably backed it up with data so that a reader does come away from the book with an understanding of the importance of oral arguments before the Supreme Court. The major drawback to the book is that it cites other scholars and works of which most students are unaware, and those citations tend to disrupt the arguments made. In a word, it tends to be difficult reading. It is a worthwhile book for scholars, but only graduate students studying the Court or highly Court-literate undergraduate students will find it holding their interest. Oral Arguments and Decision Making on the United States Supreme Court is obviously not geared for the general public. It is an important addition to Supreme Court literature and it is to be hoped that there will be more studies done on this topic.