Joseph Fishkin proposes that in considering what the ideal of equality of opportunity demands, we ought to shift our focus from how to equalize opportunity to how to structure it. Equal opportunity is a particularly powerful ideal, he argues, not primarily because of the value of equality but because of the value of opportunity. Opportunity broadens the range of paths that are open to us, providing us, as Fishkin quotes John Stuart Mill, with greater freedom to pursue “our own good in our own way” (p. 44). Fishkin argues that rather than aiming to equalize opportunity, we ought to open up more opportunities to more people, at all stages of life, to construct and pursue their own paths.

The first half of Bottlenecks argues that equal opportunity is “an ideal that cannot be achieved—and in certain respects, ought not to be achieved—even in ideal theory” (p. 24). Four problems hobble the ideal of equal opportunity: first, “the problem of the family,” that the family in any conceivable form unavoidably passes on unequal opportunities to children (pp. 48–56); second, “the problem of merit,” that it is impossible to disentangle what is a result of a person’s talents, efforts, and choices from his or her circumstances (pp. 56–65); third, “the problem of the starting gate,” that there is no fair point at which to equalize opportunity, because the outcome at any point is the result of past opportunities and the basis for future ones (pp. 56–74); and fourth, “the problem of individuality,” that equal opportunity tends to channel everyone’s efforts toward a narrow set of values and goals (pp. 74–79). Fishkin argues that these problems are impossible to solve. But by reshaping the opportunity structure, it is possible to mitigate their effects and, importantly, to better realize the value of equal opportunity (p. 131).

The opportunity structure of any society, Fishkin argues, falls on a spectrum between two ideal types: unitary and pluralistic. The guiding example of a unitary opportunity structure is “the big test society,” in which all desirable careers or life paths depend on performing well on a test taken at age 16. Attending a university requires doing well on the test, and all good jobs require university degrees. Those who do not succeed at the test are consigned to unsatisfying jobs with few rewards, and it is not possible for adults to attend a university to broaden their prospects later in life. Although this is an extreme example, as the author notes, many societies place “overwhelming weight” on a comprehensive test taken at an early age (p. 68).

According to Fishkin, the big-test society is objectionable for at least two reasons. First, for those who fail the test, all of their future opportunities are limited, constraining their lifelong ability to develop and exercise their capacities and lead a flourishing life. Second, for everyone in the society, the test narrows what they value and what paths they pursue, since it would be irrational for parents and children not to orient their lives toward succeeding on the test.

The alternative toward which societies ought to strive, Fishkin argues, is the pluralistic model. To the extent that a society satisfies four conditions, it realizes the ideal of “opportunity pluralism.” First, people value different goods and aim to pursue different ends (pp. 132–37). Second, as far as possible, the valued goods and ends are nonpositional and noncompetitive, and the various goods and roles are not bundled together (pp. 137–44). Third, as far as possible, there is a plurality of ways to attain the valued goods and roles (“the anti-bottleneck principle”) (pp. 144–51). And fourth, there is a plurality of actors who shape the opportunity structure, and individuals are enabled to create new goods and paths (pp. 151–56).

The book’s most distinctive contribution is the third condition: that people’s paths ought to be less constrained by “bottlenecks,” those “narrow place[s] in the opportunity structure through which one must pass in order to successfully pursue a wide range of valued goals” (p. 13). There are three types of bottlenecks: qualification bottlenecks (required credentials or features, e.g., a high school diploma or being white), developmental bottlenecks (required skills or opportunities, e.g., writing ability or growing up nonpoor), and instrumental-good bottlenecks (required for achieving other goods, e.g., money or social status).

Any opportunity structure inevitably contains bottlenecks. Although the ideal of opportunity pluralism provides a pro tanto reason for eliminating any bottleneck, given countervailing values and practical constraints, it is undesirable or impossible to remove every bottleneck (p. 171). Fishkin provides a series of priority rules to guide the implementation of opportunity pluralism.

When evaluating any single bottleneck, the case for eliminating it is strongest if it is both arbitrary (i.e., does not serve “goals that we deem to be legitimate”; p. 162) and severe (i.e., strongly bars access to a broad range of paths). The rising use of credit checks by employers to screen applicants for a wide range of jobs is one such example (p. 166). If a bottleneck should not or cannot be eliminated, then opportunity pluralism recommends loosening it by improving people’s opportunities to pass through it and/or by creating paths around it (p. 171). To take the example of employers who require their employees to speak English, we ought to both increase non-English speakers’ opportunities to learn English and expand the range of valuable jobs that do not require speaking English. But the author stresses that we ultimately ought to evaluate any bottleneck within the opportunity structure as a whole, not in isolation. When taking this broader perspective, we ought to prioritize expanding the opportunities for those whose opportunities are at present most limited (p. 160).

In the final chapter, Fishkin considers the bottlenecks of class (“probably the most pervasive bottleneck of all”; p. 200), inflexible work, and discrimination, and his ideal of opportunity pluralism, when combined with his subtle understanding of the relevant law and policy contexts, yields compelling and grounded policy recommendations.

Bottlenecks is carefully and thoroughly argued and is a significant contribution to debates about equality of opportunity. It should be of interest to moral and political philosophers and those who study education, antidiscrimination law, and social policy. One of the book’s strengths is that even if one does not endorse the first half’s critiques of existing ideals of equal opportunity, one can still welcome its primary contribution: the ideal of opportunity pluralism. That ideal, and its anti-bottleneck principle, provide a fruitful way to evaluate and guide our social practices toward the worthwhile aim of providing more people with the freedom to shape their own good in their own way.