Post-Soviet Central Asia does not fit neatly into standard categorizations of the world. While local languages are Turkic or Iranian, Russian serves as the regional lingua franca. Although the vast majority of Central Asians are Muslim, the cultural functions of Islam and common understandings of what it means to be a Muslim are very different from those in Muslim countries anywhere else in the world. As Adeeb Khalid writes in this clear and well-researched study, “[T]he Soviet legacy makes Central Asia a world apart” (p. 190). His valuable book demonstrates why policymakers and academics must not assume that Central Asians think or behave similarly to Muslims elsewhere.
Khalid writes for a broad audience; the book is accessible and well organized while solidly based on research in Central Asian, Russian, and Western languages. It would be excellent for classroom use. The core chapters are organized chronologically, from the 19th-century tsarist conquest of the region to today's independent republics, and are bracketed by essays on the pre-Russian role of Islam in Central Asian societies and the state-perpetrated massacre of hundreds of Uzbek citizens at Andijon in May 2005. Throughout, Khalid assesses the current scholarship, sharply criticizing those who reduce present and past conflicts to simple Islamic militancy.
Imperial Russian administrators in Turkestan were primarily interested in economic exploitation of the region, which required the maintenance of a stable society. They barred missionaries, on the grounds that they would only antagonize Muslims, and imposed Russian law in criminal cases, but they otherwise left local religious and social structures intact. Most governor-generals believed that exposure to a “superior” civilization would cause Central Asian culture to die naturally. Central Asians responded to fifty years of European domination much the same way that Egyptians or Persians did: educated elites both resented and admired the Russians while peasants and nomads suffered and occasionally rebelled against economic degradation. The Jadid educational reform movement, about which Khalid has written extensively, was influenced by reform movements in the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Russia to advocate liberation through intellectual and religious modernization.
The Bolsheviks, especially during the 1920s and 1930s, broke down Central Asian societies with a massive and violent modernization campaign. They destroyed Islamic schools, courts, and waqfs as well as thousands of clergy and teachers (including the Jadids) but failed to replace Islam with scientific atheism. At the same time, the Soviet state reconfigured Central Asia as five socialist republics, each with its own literary language, culture, and national political structure. In 1943 surviving ʿulamaʾ in Uzbekistan persuaded Stalin to permit the establishment of a Muslim religious board for Central Asia (the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, or SADUM), which ran two madrasas and represented Soviet Islam to the larger Muslim world.
Among the many ironies of this situation, Khalid highlights the fact that SADUM taught a modernized, Arabic-based curriculum that was closer to the Jadid ideal than to Central Asian Hanafi traditions. State recognition of Islam helped solidify local religious practices as markers of Central Asian Soviet national identities. At-home prayer (based on increasingly elderly memories), circumcision, and visits to holy shrines were ways to act out being Uzbek or Tajik as opposed to Russian. SADUM's influence on everyday Islam was extremely limited, and a few traditionalist ʿulamaʾ were able to teach small numbers of students in private, but connection to the old sources of knowledge was largely lost. Khalid argues that the result was a “demodernized” (p. 115), apolitical Islamic practice, far from the rising Islamic militancy that some Sovietologists of the 1980s claimed to see.
The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 left the former Communist elites in power in Central Asia, and they have focused on maintaining their privileges with no concern for the welfare of ordinary citizens. With the exception of oil-rich Kazakhstan, economic infrastructures have deteriorated badly. All five republics, including Kazakhstan, are governed by authoritarian oligarchies of varying viciousness. These regimes are just as suspicious of Islam as a rival to their power as Stalin was. As in Soviet times, religious organizations can operate only under state supervision while independent religious observance has become synonymous with political opposition. Khalid cautions, however, against easy assumptions that Central Asia is therefore ripe for an Egyptian-style Muslim Brotherhood.
Tajikistan went through a brutal civil war from 1992 to 1997, in which the Islamic Renaissance Party joined with groups that had been disenfranchised during the Soviet period, including Shiʿi Ismaʿilis from the mountainous east, to oppose the Soviet-era elites. Khalid shows that characterizing this struggle as one between militant Islam and secularism, as outside observers often did, vastly oversimplifies the situation. Uzbekistan's president Islam Karimov similarly has used the threat of militant Islam to justify the imprisonment and torture (including having one victim boiled alive) of thousands. However, although unknown groups have staged several serious attacks against the government since 1999, their grievances are driven by economic despair much more than by religious passion.
These states' claims to be fighting “Islamic terrorism” must be treated skeptically. Khalid's book is a very helpful aid in understanding the complexities of today's Central Asia.
