Andrew Larsen's book seeks to provide the first systematic study of heresy condemnations at the University of Oxford in the Middle Ages. In the footsteps of J. M. M. H. Thijssen and Luca Bianchi, Larsen has decided to treat the accusations from an institutional and procedural perspective, rather than as episodes in the history of ideas. He wishes to understand ‘the nuts and bolts of how a condemnation operated within an institutional framework’ (p. 2). Larsen is careful to explain that, in so doing, he is not calling into question the ideological significance of heresy condemnations; nor is he suggesting that they can all be explained purely as manifestations of factional battles within Oxford. He is convinced, however, that an analysis of university power struggles can further our understanding of the heresy condemnations.

Larsen begins by introducing his approach and situating it within the relevant historiography. He offers a helpful overview of the legal regulations regarding heresy and heresy condemnations and relates these to the different kinds of errors that could be made in the schools. Scholars whose propositions came under examination could often get off the hook (in the earlier part of the period, at least) by arguing that ‘any dubious statements that they made would be made disputative and not assertive’ (p. 11), i.e. for the purposes of discussion.

Larsen proceeds to analyse the few Oxford heresy condemnations for which there are extant records. These include the condemnations in 1277 and 1284 of propositions relating to Aquinas's teaching on the Unity of Forms and other metaphysical and logical matters; the censure of Scotist ideas in 1315; and the examination of the teachings of William of Ockham and Uthred of Boldon. There are longer chapters on John Wyclif and his followers, and the condemnations of John Kedington, Richard Fleming and an anonymous Franciscan in the mid-1370s are considered. These cases have already been intensively studied and so it is no surprise that Larsen's account brings forth no major new revelations. He does, however, give thorough attention to the chronology of events and is careful to scrutinise the motives of the various actors in the light of the limited evidence.

Alongside the introduction, the final thematic chapters of the book are by far the most useful. Chapter xii examines the ways in which the relationship between various authorities (secular rulers, bishops, chancellors of the university and the regent masters) affected academic condemnations. It was prudent for the Chancellor of Oxford to consult the rest of the university before issuing condemnations, and Larsen argues that Pecham's autonomous pronouncement in 1284 caused offence at Oxford, although his censure was never challenged. The desire of the university as a whole to defend its privileges in the face of episcopal interference also helps to explain – in Larsen's view – why there was so much resistance to Archbishop Courtenay's clamp-down on heresy in Oxford in 1382. Other condemnations are linked to factional conflicts. The Dominicans certainly saw the condemnations of 1288 and 1284 as an attack on their order, and Larsen believes that the ideological battles can be related to the competition between Dominicans and Franciscans to find new recruits at this time.

In perhaps the most interesting chapter of the book, Larsen considers the debates about freedom of expression within the medieval schools. While he agrees with Thijssen that it is anachronistic to apply the standards of nineteenth-century universities to the Middle Ages, he none the less makes conceptual space for what he calls a libertas inquirendi. Under certain circumstances, Larsen argues, it was permissible to debate certain ideas without personally advocating them. He cites medieval scholars who considered it unjust to condemn purely philosophical positions with no bearing on theology. Interestingly, Larsen uses the concept of libertas inquirendi to explain the failure of the university to prosecute academics who ‘were certainly vulnerable to accusations that they had violated the ban on teaching the Unity of Forms’ (p. 267). This lenience was extended to those accused of Pelagianism by Bradwardine and others from 1328 to 1338. Larsen offers the explanation that ‘Oxford scholars accepted that masters enjoyed some measure of libertas inquirendi and were consequently reluctant to condemn a scholar purely on the basis of what he had said in the classroom’ (p. 268). This assertion prompts us to ask why strenuous efforts were made to curtail academic freedoms in Oxford in the fifteenth century. Larsen chooses to address the problem in terms of ‘non-theological factors’, i.e. political struggles within and outside the university. But it should be added that the reaction against theological speculation needed to be justified ideologically: it drew, for example, on long-standing debates about the value of philosophical methods in the study of theology. Helpful as this study is in casting light on the institutional politics and procedures which influenced heresy condemnations, the ideological contentions need to be situated more firmly within the intellectual life of late medieval Oxford (and the wider world) if they are fully to be understood.