With the hundredth anniversary of the Great War and its causes, including the naval race between Britain and Germany, the usual fascination with the armaments of that period flourishes. The several technologies that propelled that race, the mastery of them, and the search for countermeasures continue to attract scholarly and popular interest. Propelling these interests is the propensity of some scholars to advance grand theories about interactions among governments and relations between the states and societies. This study of the development of the torpedo in the United States and Great Britain in the decades prior to 1914 falls into this realm.
Governments, the state, and their elites have had interests in weapons technology from the time of Caesar and his legions (Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar [2006]). The Duke of Ferrara, Ercole d'Este—appreciating the need for lighter and inexpensive artillery—created a laboratory and production capacity to weld iron bars into cannon. These he sold to the Hapsburgs and other favored allies (Thomas Tuohy, Herculean Ferrara: Ercole d'Este (1471–1505) and the Invention of a Ducal Capital [2002]). William McNeill, professor emeritus in the University of Chicago's history department, in his seminal book The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (1982), recounts the perfection of the French artillery under General Jean B. V. de Gribeauval through the application of “reason” to all aspects of the production, staffing, and management of artillery. The consequence of perfected artillery was a decidedly French military advantage during the Napoleonic era. McNeill goes on to describe the technological development of the naval torpedo and its effect on society in the decades before World War I.
Naval armaments and their technology had remained essentially unchanged from the mid- sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century. The American nineteenth-century frigate Constitution would have been recognizable both to captains of the Spanish armada and to Sir Francis Drake. True, there had been substantial improvements in gunnery, riggings, and navigation, yet these were evolutionary. In the late nineteenth century—along with the development of steam engines, iron metallurgy, chemical explosives, breech-loading naval artillery, and radio communications—naval armaments were revolutionized. By 1914 the descendants of Nelson's Victory and the Constitution were five times the size of those vessels—steel-hulled, oil-fired, and turbine-engined battleships that cruised at twenty knots and fired one-ton projectiles upwards of twenty miles. They maneuvered together in all weather, day and night, and were immensely expensive. The nonbattleship “establishments” of support ships, bases, and auxiliary services burgeoned, as did the size and costs of the ships themselves.
To counter the threat of these battleship behemoths, naval planners sought weapons that could cripple them at minimal cost. Explosive mines for defense had been in use for a century, but what was now needed was an offensive weapon—one that was self-propelled, accurate, and fast, or what was then described as an “automobile torpedo.” A British expatriate named Robert Whitehead, as well as French and German innovators working at the same time, developed and widely marketed such torpedoes starting in 1867. Initially, these naval missiles were of limited accuracy and range—just two hundred yards—but their range grew over the next fifty years to surpass fifteen thousand yards (ten miles) (Edwyn Gray, The Devil's Device: The Story of Robert Whitehead, Inventor of the Torpedo [1975]). With speeds over fifty miles an hour, they could outrun their battleship targets; however, accuracy at extended ranges would remain a problem. Needless to say, the existence of such a threat to a navy's battleships prompted defensive innovation, tactics, and strategies.
Katherine C. Epstein, a history professor at Rutgers University, received her PhD from the University of Chicago, where she was clearly influenced by the work of Professor McNeill. As set forth in this book’s introduction, she is seeking to elaborate on the implications of McNeill’s concept of “command technology.” Specifically, Epstein aims to expand McNeill’s work, which explored the disputes that arose between government purchasers of torpedoes and private weapons makers as both claimed ownership over these new technologies. By including Britain and the United States in her analysis, Epstein further describes how naval officers who contributed to the development of torpedo technology also made claims of ownership. In turn, governments, motivated by both economic value and national security, disputed the claims of other parties.
In both Britain and the United States, these disputes impeded the prompt evolution and exploitation of torpedo technology. In fact, to avoid such future disputes both governments sought to create their own torpedo factories independent of private-sector innovation. Subsequently, the conservative naval establishments and officers—not inclined to innovation—failed to successfully master the torpedo's technological development.
Epstein provides brief outlines of the impact of the threat of torpedoes and the resulting defensive policies and costs. New, smaller craft such as “torpedo boat destroyers” evolved into modern destroyers. Ships’ armor was vastly increased. Avoidance of close combat with the enemy—and its torpedoes—in naval engagements was required. Yet we are left with little of the actual naval combat consequences, as Epstein ends her study at the outbreak of World War I.
Epstein provides details of disputes within the Royal Navy, from Winston Churchill to Admiral Fisher and the Vickers-Armstrong Company (successor to Whitehead's Company), and similarly in the United States between the Ordnance Bureau of the Navy and the E. W. Bliss Company and Electric Boat Company. Much of this extensive detail supports her contention that both countries failed to master McNeill's command technology because all parties were fixated on property rights related to the technology. Epstein asserts that both governments abused the need for national security “secrecy” to euchre private property rights to the technology. All of this is further confounded by the increasingly arcane technology, commanded solely by emergent “technological elites.” It is from this recognition that McNeill and now Epstein see the roots of the Military-Industrial Complex.
The book's sharp focus on property rights diminishes the context of torpedo development. There is no mention of the naval battles of Santiago in 1898 and Tsushima in 1905, where torpedoes played their initial significant role. The study of the torpedo is somewhat hobbled by the author's failure to discuss its most effective launch platform, the submarine. The sinking of the Lusitania by the German submarine U-20 on May 7, 1915, is the signal reflection of a jointly operated submarine and torpedo. Further, it is somewhat of an exaggeration to suggest that the three subsystems in torpedo construction—the gyroscope, the “super heater,” and the balanced turbine—comprise the foundation of the Military-Industrial Complex with all its weighty societal implications. Clearly some consideration of German torpedo development and its consequences would have enhanced the admirable scholarship Epstein has presented.
