Today, fighting terrorism is the central focus of United States foreign policy. However, in the late 1970s, President Carter's administration promoted human rights as the focal point of its diplomatic efforts. Schmidli's carefully researched and well-written book explores the Carter administration's adoption of human rights policies and the attendant tensions, conflicts, failures, and successes this decision generated. To do so, the author focuses on United States government relations with Argentina, because they offer a compelling example of the multiple issues that incorporating human rights into United States foreign policy entailed and engendered.
In 1976, the Argentine military overthrew the government of Isabel Perón and installed itself in power. It then proceeded to brazenly and brutally torture, murder, and “disappear” thousands of people (30,000 is the most commonly accepted number). Human rights movements, inspired by the protests of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, denounced the savagery, and demanded its cessation.
Carter, elected president in 1976, promised to make human rights central to United States foreign policy, a decision that appealed to the American public, much of which had been shocked and repulsed by the Vietnam war and the Watergate crimes. However, pledging to incorporate human rights into United States foreign policy and actually doing so proved to be extremely challenging, as this book clearly illustrates.
One key point of contention, which was never satisfactorily resolved, was the definition of human rights. Did it simply mean “crimes against the security of the person” or, as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance advocated, “the right to be free from government violation of the integrity of the person;” “economic and social rights;” and “civil and political rights” (104–5)? Another point of contention was whether or not to support governments that violated human rights but were staunchly anticommunist, as was true of the Southern Cone military dictatorships. Many foreign service officers, steeped in cold war anticommunist ideology, rejected the idea that a government's abuse of its citizens should take precedence over that government's opposition to communism. These conflicting approaches permeated all levels of the United States government, from top-level officials to junior officers working in the United States embassy in Argentina (and elsewhere).
Two other significant factors impeded the implementation of a United States foreign policy premised on the embrace of human rights. First, as Schmidli shows, the United States government was profoundly implicated in the 1976 military coup because of its close relationship with the Argentine military. The United States government had provided ideological tools, practical training, and a generous supply of resources to the Argentine military. In addition, United States businesses enjoyed lucrative commercial relations with Argentina, which they did not want to see eliminated as a result of the Carter administration's opposition to the military's practice of torture and murder.
Schmidli moves skillfully through these layered conflicts by bringing to life some of the key actors in them. One such person was Patricia Derian, the assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, whose trajectory parallels the ebb and flow of the Carter administration's prioritization of human rights. From 1977 to 1979, she, along with other United States officials, decisively demanded an end to United States government and corporate support for the Argentine dictatorship and military. One clear success of this period was the 1979 visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which resulted in a definite decline in the military's arrest, torture, and “disappearance” of people. After 1979, Derian's power waned, as did Carter's commitment to human rights as the defining feature of United States foreign policy.
One of the book's few shortcomings is that it does not recognize the importance of Argentine actors, although a picture of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo graces the cover. This, unfortunately, is a problem that runs through much of the literature on United States foreign policy, which portrays United States diplomats as the key actors, and the “local population” as little more than background figures. In reality, had Argentines not denounced the military's violation of their human rights, had the Mothers not braved the repression unleashed by the armed forces, it is unlikely that anyone in the United States foreign service would have been moved to repudiate the atrocities committed by the military junta.
Another concern is that Schmidli does not draw upon the literature that discusses United States foreign policy, human rights, and solidarity with Latin America: James N. Green, We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship and the United States (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Vania Markarian, Left in Transformation: Uruguayan Exiles and the Latin American Human Rights Network, 1967–1984 (New York: Routledge, 2005); and Margaret Power, “The U.S. Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” Latin American Perspectives 36 (2009). Doing so would have allowed him to both establish the impact these movements had and explain more fully why Argentina occupied such a central role in the Carter administration's human rights policies.
Nonetheless, this is an excellent book, and one that is highly readable and valuable both to experts on the topic and undergraduates in the fields of law, human rights, Latin America, United States foreign policy/diplomatic history, and the 1970s.
