It is true that the BJP and other Hindu organizations hate Muslims. But at least they hate us openly and do not hide their intentions. But the real enemy lives amongst us; they claim to be Muslims and yet are leading the Muslims astray. They are the greatest enemy of Islam.
(A student at Madrasa Ashrafia, Mubarakpur)
Introduction
Long before 9/11, madrasas were made infamous in India by Hindu Right wing parties. The Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and their ideological fountainhead, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), all blamed the madrasas for teaching hatred towards the majority (Hindu) community and engaging in what they claimed were anti-national activities. In 1995, the VHP declared that it would not tolerate the nefarious designs of madrasas as they were teaching ‘anti-Hindu’ ideas to their students. The Hindu Right termed the madrasas ‘dens of terror’ training jihadis to massacre Hindus and turn India into an Islamic nation.Footnote 1 During the BJP led government, a ministerial committee report of 2001 stated that madrasas were engaged in systematic indoctrination of Muslims in fundamentalist ideology, which was detrimental to communal harmony.Footnote 2 The Report suggested that ‘modern education’ be imparted in madrasas in an effort to bring them into the ‘national mainstream’. Certainly, while in power the BJP could persuade only a handful of madrasas to introduce modern subjects, for which grants were made available by the state. Most madrasas were suspicious of the state's intention and rejected the offer.Footnote 3 Such ideas on madrasa education were not the monopoly of the Hindu Right alone, but were voiced on different occasions even by the Left led government in West Bengal.Footnote 4 It is true, however, that it was the BJP and its ideological partners which consciously tried to foster the terrorist image of madrasas, as it suited the wider aim of portraying Indian Muslims as the belligerent ‘other’.
It is clear that most contemporary debates on Indian madrasas remain oblivious to the complexities of Indian Muslim communities, especially their institutions. Both liberal and right wing commentators assume that madrasas are the same across India and that they reproduce a monolithic Muslim identity which is antithetical both to other religious traditions and secularism. I will argue that the reality is much more complex: not only is ‘Islam’ itself a matter of fierce debate amongst Indian Muslims, but madrasas are principally concerned with the transmission of their own (maslaki) understanding of Islam. Rather than working towards creating a unified Muslim identity in opposition to other religious faiths, madrasas reproduce maslaki identities which are then internalized as properly ‘Islamic’ by their respective followers and students. Discussing the processes and strategies through which such an identity is internalized by madrasa students, I will argue that—despite the rhetoric of right-wing Hindu parties—a madrasa student's ‘other’ is not the Hindu, but a Muslim from another maslak. Footnote 5
Certainly, this is not an original idea. Historians have long documented the maslaki divide in South Asia, demonstrating that Muslim identity itself has been a site of contestation among different social groups on the basis of differing interpretation of religious texts. They have also identified the central role of madrasas in perpetuating maslaki rivalries.Footnote 6 However, owing to the nature and focus of their works, historians cannot specify how and through what practices such sectarian identities are actually formed. In other words, what is missing from their analyses is the very process of identity formation, which is the focus of my discussion. I will consider the formation of Muslim identities by observing various strategies at work in a prominent madrasa in North India. While I will focus mostly on a madrasa called al Jamiat al Ashrafiya Misbahul Ulum (hereafter madrasa Ashrafiya), for comparative purposes I will also refer to another madrasa called Ihya ul Ulum. Both madrasas are located in the same qasba (small town) of Mubarakpur.
The Qasba and Madrasas
Mubarakpur is located within Azamgarh district of eastern Uttar Pradesh in North India. It has long been a town of low-caste Muslim weavers who call themselves Ansaris.Footnote 7 The town is primarily known for producing Banarsi sarees, traded in India and abroad. However, it is not just for their craftsmanship that the Ansaris of Mubarakpur want to be known, but also as upholders of Islam.Footnote 8 According to the 2001 Indian census, Mubarakpur has a population of 51,100,Footnote 9 although locals put the figure in 2004 as 80,000. The qasba is predominantly Muslim, with Hindus comprising only 10% of the population. Muslims are divided into Barelwis, Deobandis, Ahl e Hadis and the Shi'as, with the majority being the Barelwis. All these maslaks have their own madrasas: Bab ul Ilm and the Dar ul Taleem madrasas belong to the Shi'as to and Ahl e Hadis respectively, while the Deobandis run the Ihya ul Ulum madrasa and the Barelwis the Ashrafiya.
Madrasas Ihya ul Ulum and Ashrafiya have had a common origin in one maktab (small madrasa) called Misbahul Ulum, founded in 1899. This institution was financed by a few wealthy families, as well as through popular donations.Footnote 10 It was during 1915–16 that differences arose between the only two full-time teachers of the original maktab—Mahmud Marufi and Siddique Ghoswi—over whether Allah could lie.Footnote 11 While Marufi argued that since Allah was capable of doing anything and everything, he could also lie, Siddique Ghoswi argued that Allah could not lie and it was blasphemous to ascribe bad deeds to Allah. Ghoswi accused Marufi of being a Wahabi and under the influence of Deobandi ideas. This led to a formal split and both teachers founded their own separate madrasas. While Ghoswi moved out of the original maktab and founded madrasa Misbahul Ulum, Marufi stayed, but renamed the original madrasa as Ihya ul Ulum.
The split was one of the most important events in Mubarakpur, leading to an awareness of belonging to different maslaks, Barelwi or Deobandi. The fact that Friday prayers continued to be conducted under a common Imam indicates that sectarian differences were not yet acute. But this arrangement did not last long. In 1917, Madrasa Ihya ul Ulum saw the arrival of Shukrullah Mubarakpuri. Fresh from the madrasa at Deoband, Shukrullah was nominated Nazim (Manager) and Principal of the madrasa. True to his reformist Deobandi ideas, he criticized various existing customary practices, such as those associated with circumcision rituals, Eid festivals and marriage ceremonies. As a Sunni reformist, Shukrullah was particularly incensed by the adoption of Shi'a rituals, strongly opposing participation in tazia Footnote 12 processions during Muharram.Footnote 13 He also introduced separate Friday prayers for his followers. Being an Alim trained at Deoband added to his stature in Mubarakpur where he was instrumental in winning over the support of some Muslims who were till recently Barelwis. At this time, the Deobandi Ihya ul Ulum madrasa was supported by a few, relatively educated and prosperous Muslims of the qasba. Footnote 14 Most of the members of the shura (committee) which oversaw the functioning of madrasa Ihya ul Ulum are addressed as sardars,Footnote 15 which attests that they were important people in Mubarakpur. On the other hand, Misbahul Ulum found support from a zamindarFootnote 16 called Amin Ansari. Other members of its committee, however, were mostly petty traders and small shop owners. The emerging Deobandi–Barelwi divide in Mubarakpur thus had some correlation to the social and economic status of its respective followers. Deobandi reformism, led by Shukrullah Mubarakpuri, can be understood as an attempt of one social group (which was relatively wealthy) to redefine the popular practice of Islam in the qasba. Footnote 17
The increasing popularity of Shukrullah did not go unnoticed among the Barelwis. Muslims of Mubarakpur were murids Footnote 18 of one Ali Husain Ashrafi (1867–1948), then gaddi-nashin Footnote 19 of the famous shrine at Kichocha, with a lineage traced to Abdul Qadir GilaniFootnote 20 (d. 1166). One of Ali Husain Ashrafi's murids was one Amjad Ali.Footnote 21 Being from the neighbouring town of Ghosi, Amjad Ali was a well-known Alim in Mubarakpur. Moreover, he was related to Siddique Ghoswi, who was instrumental in founding madrasa Misbahul Ulum after the split. Responding to the Deobandis' growing popularity, Amjad Ali persuaded one of his students, Abdul Aziz, to go to Mubarakpur to attempt to arrest the Deobandis' progress. He advised Abdul Aziz that he was sending him to an akhara (wrestling arena), and that by the wishes of Allah, he would emerge victorious.Footnote 22 Finding themselves together in Mubarakpur, between 1934 and 1936 Abdul Aziz and Shukrullah involved the whole qasba in a series of munazaras (oral religious debates). At the end of this 2-year period of intense ideological rivalry—where both sides claimed victory—the qasba became more polarized.
In 1935, the prefix Ashrafiya was added to madrasa Misbahul Ulum in deference to Ali Husain Ashrafi and a foundation stone was laid for the construction of a new madrasaFootnote 23 which eventually became—and remains to date—the most important Barelwi madrasa in India. In the midst of such developments, the rival Ihya ul Ulum madrasa has remained far behind in popularity and following. While Ashrafiya has grown to accommodate about 1,500 students in its various hostels, Ihya ul Ulum has the capacity for only 250.Footnote 24 Ashrafiya's success is due on the one hand to the fact that the majority of Mubarakpur Muslims are Barelwis and on the other to its wider geographical network of donors and students compared to Ihya ul Ulum.
But even more important in the fortunes of Ashrafiya was the association of renowned Ulama with the madrasa. Among its ranks were Mufti Abdul Mannan, Zeya ul Mustafa (son of Amjad Ali) and Arshadul Qadri, all of whom commanded great respect among the Barelwis and were instrumental in creating a large network of prosperous donors, even as economic support to Ihya ul Ulum madrasa dwindled. Moreover, the current chief of madrasa Ashrafiya, Abdul Hafiz (Abdul Aziz's son)—a graduate from Aligarh Muslim University—has started schools for local girls, which has brought the madrasa yet new donors.
Over time, Ashrafiya's own outlook has changed. The once-competing Deobandi Ihya ul Ulum madrasa is no longer perceived as a threat. Apart from preparing students to become religious scholars, Ashrafiya nowadays also concentrates on advising local Muslims on their everyday problems, offering counsel from its own theological perspective. Its monthly magazine, Mahanama Ashrafiya, increasingly cautions Barelwi Muslims against shirk (associating partners to Allah) and bida (reprehensible innovations), campaigns which were once the prerogative of Deobandis. While in earlier times a famous graduate of Ashrafiya—Arshadul Qadri—took the Deobandis to task for condemning local religious and customary practices, today Ashrafiya has turned to encourage Muslims to get rid of ‘un-Islamic' practices’—such as singing and dancing during marriage feasts—and to keep life-cycle ceremonies as simple as possible. Ashrafiya has also been at the forefront of campaigns to dissuade Mubarakpur's Sunni Muslims from taking out tazia processions during Muharram, reminding them that ‘they should not behave like Shias’. Thus Madrasa Ashrafiya today sees itself in a similar reforming role as the Deobandi Ihya ul Ulum saw itself during its heydays.Footnote 25
Regardless of such apparent ideological convergence, important doctrinal differences remain between Deobandis and Barelwis. The most important concerns the understanding of the person of Prophet Muhammad. For the Barelwis, Muhammad is not just a ‘model man’; rather, he was bestowed with special powers which make him truly unique. For the Deobandis, in contrast, the Prophet should be emulated as an example of perfection and piety, but should not to be venerated, since to do so would constitute shirk (associating partners to Allah). Through their networks of madrasas, this basic doctrinal difference is transmitted to students. I will now move on to consider some strategies and practices through which the madrasa Ashrafiya reproduces sectarian divisions.
The Madrasa Constitution
The formative influences of the 1934–36 sectarian debates on Ashrafiya are reflected on the madrasa's Dastur e Amal (Constitution). This document not only set a blueprint for the growth and development of the madrasa, but also specified that Ashrafiya will remain always ‘Sunni’Footnote 26 in orientation. At least three of the objectives laid down in its Dastur relate to the propagation of Barelwi maslak. Footnote 27 The very first objective of the madrasa is to ‘spread education of true religion’. The Dastur goes on to define ‘true religion’ as the mazhab (faith) of Ahl e Sunnat wa Jamaat (people of the Prophet's ways) specifying that a ‘Sunni’ is a Muslim who follows and practises the path of Ala Hazrat,Footnote 28 that is, of the Barelwis. This definition is reiterated by stating that a Sunni is one who believes in every word written by ‘Ala Hazrat’. The Dastur also makes it incumbent on Sunnis to struggle against the Deobandis, Ahl e Hadis and Shi'as, all collectively labelled as bad-mazhabis. Footnote 29 In other words, those who do not subscribe to the Barelwi definition of Islam are not considered to be ‘true’ Muslims.
The Dastur also has a section called ghair mutabaddil usul (non-changeable laws). These are three, and two of them underscore once again the Barelwi orientation of the madrasa.Footnote 30 Clause 1 states that ‘Members of this madrasa, from a humble sweeper to the Manager, should all be the followers of Ahl e Sunnat wa Jamaat’. No non-Sunni should ever find a place in this madrasa. It goes on to state that, ‘If for any reason this madrasa falls into the hands of a non-Sunni, then any Sunni from anywhere in India will have the right to appeal to the courts in order to bring back the madrasa into the hands of Sunnis once again’. Clause 3 makes it mandatory for all officials of the madrasa, including members of Majlis e Shura (general committee) and Majlis e Amla (working committee), to take a pledge of loyalty to the madrasa. This pledge includes the statement, ‘I am a true Sunni Muslim and I believe in every word of Hussam al Haramain’.Footnote 31 Ashrafiya is not unique in insisting that its officials abide to a specific definition of ‘true Islam’. All madrasas do so. The Deobandi Ihya ul Ulum also insists that its teachers and other zimmedaran (responsible) should be followers of their maslak, which they argue is the ‘true Islam’.Footnote 32 Even in madrasas where this injunction is not written down in a Dastur, there is a marked preference for recruiting teachers and other officials from within the maslak. What distinguishes Ashrafiya, though, is the insistence that its members should take a pledge of allegiance. In the qasba, even some Barelwis find this clause unacceptable since, they argue, loyalty should be given only to Allah.
Criticisms apart, the institution of the pledge shows how strongly Ashrafiya is wedded to the Barelwi ideology. For the madrasa's students, therefore, Ashrafiya is a pre-given ideological space, marked by a strictly-defined value system to which all the members of the madrasa are called to conform. It is against this ideological backdrop that students take to their learning and everyday tasks. Coming from different geographic regions and from families which are nominal Muslims,Footnote 33 students acquire a common identity in becoming Barelwi Muslims. I now turn to the processes through which such an identity is acquired.
Texts and Identity
Like most Indian madrasas, Ashrafiya also teaches what it calls the Dars e Nizami,Footnote 34 the curriculum developed by Mulla Nizamuddin (d. 1748). In contrast to the medieval system of Muslim education,Footnote 35 when there was no formal and fixed system of instruction, Nizamuddin for the first time gave form to a madrasa curriculum which came to be known as Dars e Nizami. This curriculum had a bias in favour of what was called the maqulat (rational sciences) as opposed to manqulat (copied or transmitted sciences). Thus books on Hikmat (Philosophy), Mantiq (logic) and Riyazziyyat (Astronomy and Mathematics) outnumbered texts on purely religious subjects as Kalam (Theology) and Fiqh (Jurisprudence).Footnote 36 But the Dars e Nizami taught in contemporary madrasas, including madrasa Ashrafiya, has little in common with Mulla Nizamuddin's curriculum, resembling more the modified version devised by the Ulama at the madrasa of Deoband in the late nineteenth century, which drastically reduced the content of ‘rational studies’ and put more emphasis on studying hadis. In this revised Deobandi curriculum, religious education became the focus of madrasas. Indeed, in popular imagination, madrasas today are associated with religious learning alone, a perception which is shared, as well as defended, by the Ulama of different madrasas.Footnote 37
When Ashrafiya and Ihya ul Ulum madrasas both claim that they are teaching what they call the Dars e Nizami, it does not mean that they teach identical syllabi. In the absence of a single governing body, madrasas in India have considerable freedom in choosing books to be taught in their respective institutions. For example, even though the study of hadis forms an important part in the curriculum of all madrasas, the commentaries selected for this purpose differ according to the maslaki affiliation of specific madrasas. The ideological orientation of the particular commentator affects the understanding of hadis in different madrasas, so that hadis classes in madrasas such as Ashrafiya and Ihya ul Ulum become spaces for ideological transmission.
In a hadis lesson in madrasa Ashrafiya, for instance, a verse from Bukhari SharifFootnote 38 was being taught to explain students that Prophet Muhammad possessed ilm e ghaib (knowledge of the unseen). The teacher stated that according to this tradition, the Prophet knew who would go to heaven and who would go to hell, in that he was omniscient. The teacher stressed that this was one of the most important Barelwi beliefs; but in the same breath he also made it clear that, contrary to this ‘truth’, the Deobandis believe that the Prophet was given knowledge of only certain events. In the same way, in Ihya ul Ulum, madrasa teachers cited another hadis recorded in the same Bukhari Sharif, according to which Allah alone possessed knowledge of ilm e kiyamat (knowledge of the Judgement Day). On the strength of this hadis in Bukhari, teachers told the students that the Prophet had only partial knowledge and hence the Barelwi claim that the Prophet possessed ilm e ghaib starting from creation to qiyamat (resurrection at the end of time) was completely wrong. Similarly, there are differences over the maslaha (theological problem) of Hazir o Nazir, a Barelwi belief that the Prophet could be present at the same time in different places and that he could see the whole world ‘just like the palm of his hand’. Students in Ashrafiya learn that, one day before the battle of badr, the Prophet marked the exact spot on the ground where two of the kafirs (infidels, enemies) would fall. Students at the Ihya ul Ulum also learn the same hadis, but interpret the event differently. Here, teachers tell students that the Prophet's knowledge of the event even before its occurrence was given to him by Allah, specifically for this event, and not because he possessed ilm e ghaib as a personal quality; they add that the Barelwi belief is erroneous. In a similar fashion, the Deobandis emphasize that a Muslim should not ask for help from anyone other than Allah; students at Ihya ul Ulum learn that the Prophet asked his own daughter Fatima to seek help only from Allah. Against Deobandi beliefs, Ashrafiya students learn that it is permissible to ask for help not only from the Prophet, but also from pirs and other holy men.
Hadis lessons are not the only spaces through which doctrinal differences are transmitted. Other subjects of study, such as jurisprudence, also serve the same purpose. In the process of acquiring Islamic knowledge, an average madrasa student simultaneously becomes aware of different maslaks among Muslims. However, this does not lead to an ecumenical understanding of different interpretations. Learning about other theological orientations is inextricably woven with the understanding that all other maslaks are misleading, if not altogether wrong. Thus for a student of Ashrafiya, it is only the Barelwi interpretation which is the correct one.
There are a number of books which are not included in Ashrafiya syllabus but which are extremely popular among its students. Fazilat Footnote 39 degree students told me that they are encouraged to get acquainted with books written by Barelwi scholars and other Ulama of Ahl e Sunnat wa Jamaat. Most popular among the students were polemical books written against the Deobandis, such as Zalzala and Dawat e Insaf. The fact that the author of both these books was Arshadul Qadri (1925–2002), a Fazilat graduate of madrasa Ashrafiya, added to their popularity.Footnote 40Zalzala and Dawat e Insaf are popular in Indian as well as Pakistani Barelwi madrasas.Footnote 41 Both books engage with Deobandi beliefs in order to refute their interpretation of Islam. Both texts are like a writ (Istigaza), in which Qadri appeals to Muslims of the subcontinent to judge for themselves what is right and what is wrong. Their style of engagement is also similar. Arguments are substantiated by quoting from relevant Deobandi texts which are then analysed in the light of existing traditions, invariably ending in the refutation of Deobandis' positions. Some statements made by Deobandi Ulama, as written in their biographies, are also compared to other Deobandi texts with the intention of proving them contradictory and misleading. Most of the arguments relate to the understanding of Prophet Muhammad. Ahmad Riza Khan, the Barelwi central figure, argued that not believing in the special powers of the Prophet constituted a grave shirk and he charged the Deobandi Ulama with being knee deep in this shirk. Arshadul Qadri takes this criticism further. In both texts, he argues that although the Deobandis believe in the special powers of their own ‘elders’—people like Muhammad Ismail, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Ashraf Ali Thanwi and Qasim Nanotwi—they deny similar attributes to the Prophet. For Qadri, this amounts to believing that elders of Deoband had more powers than the Prophet Muhammad himself!Footnote 42 This, according to Qadri, is an insult to the person of Prophet Muhammad which is not permissible in Islam.
Taken together, these texts level three important charges against the Deobandis. Firstly, they accuse ‘elders of Deoband’ of having been disrespectful to the person of Prophet Muhammad.Footnote 43 Arguing that the ‘sword of Islam’ has never spared anyone who has shown disrespect to the Prophet, Qadri states that the famous Deobandi Alim Ashraf Ali Thanwi once wrote that the knowledge possessed by the Prophet could be likened to that of a maverick or the shaitan. Footnote 44 This comparison, according to Qadri, amounts to an insult to the Prophet, and dishonouring the Prophet even in the slightest amounts to severing of ties with Islam and Muslims.Footnote 45
The second set of objections broadens the criticism moved against the Deobandi Ulama, raising questions regarding the status of shrines, pirs and walis. As Metcalf and Sanyal have argued, one of the principal concerns of Deobandi Ulama was to wean away Indian Muslims from what they considered to be bida, or deviation from ‘true’ Islamic precepts.Footnote 46 In Deobandi understanding of Islam, visiting shrines or tombs of holy men and asking for boons compromised the fundamental Islamic principle of tawheed or the one-ness of Allah. They maintained that turning to anyone other than Allah amounted to associating partners to God, which is a grave sin. The Deobandi Ulama attribute the popularity of shrines and ‘grave worship’ to Hindu influences on Islam. Hence, Deobandis fought to purify Islam from ‘Hindu practices’. According to Qadri, however, the practice of visiting shrines does not entail associating partners to Allah. Rather, he argues that it provides an occasion to remember His glory. Moreover, since Allah is all-powerful, He cannot be reached directly by his followers and, therefore, something akin to a ‘spiritual ladder’ was necessary. In other words, he insisted that intercession is an important aspect of Islam itself.Footnote 47
The third set of objections relate to those fatwas (religious legal opinions) and writings of Deobandi Ulama through which, Qadri argues, Deoband Ulama tried to show that most of the religious practices of Indian Muslims were non-Islamic or in need of reform. Qadri is particularly incensed with Deobandi attacks against even seemingly traditional ceremonies such as marriage and tells readers that the Deobandis even frown upon wearing the sehera, the bridegroom headgear.Footnote 48 It has become commonplace in scholarly literature to understand Barelwis as repositories of traditional practices, while Deobandis are described as reformists who want to purify Islam of the same. While Qadri's defence of some traditional practices might confirm such a view, the reality is more complex and does not yield to such a simple dichotomy. Ahmad Riza Khan frowned upon women's presence inside shrines and tombs and condemned the participation of Sunni Muslims in Muharram processions, particularly the making of tazias. Qadri's other writings certainly agree with Ahmad Riza's position, and hence his defence of marriage practices among Indian Muslims should not be taken as a blanket defence of all customary practices.
Through reading texts such Zalzala and Dawat e Insaf, Ashrafiya students learn that Deobandis are the (internal) enemies of Muslims and Islam. It is argued that since the Deobandis appear pious and committed to Islamic precepts, they are even more dangerous, since one cannot fault them on basic tenets of Islam. They are said to be like ‘termites’, which eat up Muslims from within, through their erroneous teaching and practice of Islam. To buttress their claim, students cite a hadis according to which the Prophet had foretold that the most important danger to Islam would come from a community which would behave as Muslims and would be steadfast in their prayers, but in reality would spread confusion and sow discord among Muslims. Students at Ashrafiya identify this community with present day Deobandis.
Pedagogical practices within madrasa Ashrafiya thus not only make its students aware of their own maslaki identity, but also of interpretations of Islam which are deemed misleading or faulty. Specific texts are critical tools which students should refer to in situations where they have to prove the truth of their beliefs or to refute other interpretations. A student explained how he had employed the arguments of Zalzala when he was debating with a Deobandi in his village. Mere knowledge and argumentative logic, however, are not enough. Within a more formal setting, the learning of texts goes hand in hand with learning oration style and technique. In madrasa Ashrafiya, texts are enlivened through particular performative actions which further embed Barelwi identity.
Enacting Identity
Every Thursday evening, Ashrafiya students prepare for their weekly debating and oratory practice. They form groups of 20 or more to prepare and participate in what is popularly called the bazm. There is no fixed space for this performance; it could be any place ranging from students' living quarters to the mosque, or any open space within the madrasa. Groups generally comprise of students with similar interests: for example those having interest in naath-kwani Footnote 49 would cluster together, while those interested in munazara (oral debate) and takrir (speech) would form another group. Given the large number of students, there would be more than one group practising naath or takrir. Groups are mostly based on regional affiliations: those from particular districts of Bihar would organize their separate bazms, and so on. Although the institution of bazm is listed as one of the objectives in the madrasa Constitution, its actual organizational details are taken care of by the student body, while the presence of teachers—in a supervisory role—is expected but not considered obligatory. Generally senior students are responsible for allocating topics on which speeches will be prepared, although in some groups this choice is left to individual students. Towards the end of a bazm, the merits and demerits of individual presentations are discussed and commented upon by senior students of each group.
These practices are important for the students in a number of ways. Apart from fostering institutional bonding, they reinforce relationships based on students' regional affiliation or age. The sense of camaraderie developed through practices such as bazm goes a long way in sustaining networks of relationship at a later stage in the students' career. More importantly, bazm is one of the most valuable tools for gaining that self-confidence essential for public speaking, a role that many will be called upon to take up later in their lives. It is important to understand the social background of students in Ashrafiya and other madrasas. The majority come from non-literate or semi-literate labouring or petty-trading families. Very often the size of these families is large and children are expected to earn a living from a young age. For such families, sending a child to a madrasa—where he will receive free board and lodging—relieves the household of a financial burden, while simultaneously conferring status and prestige. An Alim in the family brings in much social and cultural capital which might, through judicious deployment, help secure a less precarious existence.Footnote 50 For a student, though, success depends not only on learning the texts, but also on developing good oratory skills which will eventually bring monetary and social benefits. In Ashrafiya, bazm allows students to hone the skills necessary to become good public speakers and debaters.
Topics for debate are decided a week in advance and students are expected to memorize their speech and naath before attending the bazm. Here again, the majority of the themes revolve around refutation of maslaks, Deobandis in particular. While some students take pains to write their own speeches, culling their arguments from various texts, most of the students look for ready-made published speeches made by one of their Alim. Students also listen to audio speeches of their Ulama, which helps them to acquire a narrative style. While eventually, within these bazms, some students acquire distinctive styles of oratory, most copy the style of one of their Ulama.
The structure of the bazm is fairly simple. A student from the audience introduces the speaker by adding honorific titles to his (speaker's) name.Footnote 51 The speaker normally stands up to speak or to sing a naath. The audience is attentive and involved in the performance, now and then loudly praising the speaker or singer. One of the students told me that when he takes part in a bazm, he imagines a crowd of thousands listening to him, captivated by his speech. Coming from very poor households, the mere thought of keeping an audience enthralled must be no mean sense of fulfilment. Bazms, therefore, apart from being arenas of performance, are also arenas of empowerment. But again, one of the important tasks of the Alim is to guide Muslims in differentiating between right and wrong. For the students of Ashrafiya, it is the Barelwi understanding of Islam which is right, all other interpretations lead Muslims astray.
During a practice of takrir (speech), one speaker alleged that the WahabisFootnote 52 hold Prophet Muhammad to be an ordinary mortal who had been given nabuwat (Prophet-hood) by the grace of Allah. He went on to explicate his own understanding of the Prophet, linking him with the concept of Nur,Footnote 53 which, according to his words, had existed much before creation. He argued that comparing the Prophet with any other human being is a sin, since he (Prophet) was made of light (Nur) while humans are made of clay. To prove his point, the speaker cited a hadis, according to which the Prophet did not cast a shadow because he was made of pure light. To explain Deobandis' alleged vilification of the image of the Prophet, he considered Islamic history. Linking Deobandis/Wahabis with the munafiqin,Footnote 54 the speaker went on to narrate of a long chain of conspiracies against Islam and the Prophet's memory. He cautioned his fellow students that the most dangerous evildoers are to be found within the community itself. He went on to add that the Prophet himself had indeed foretold such tribulations. Citing again from hadis, he clarified that Prophet Muhammad had predicted that his community (qaum) would be divided into 73 groups, and only one among them would be the true follower of the Sunnah and go to heaven. The rest would all be banished to burn in hell fire.Footnote 55 The speaker ended with the exhortation that, as Barelwis, it was incumbent upon all of them to fight against the Deobandis. On another occasion, a different speaker dealt with the same subject, using a different oratorical style. Stating that Islam is inconceivable without Muhammad, he told his audience that the Quran does not tell Muslims how to offer namaz (prayer). It is only through observing the Prophet that Muslims came to know about it. So, his argument went, whatever the Prophet did became Islam.Footnote 56
In the naath (religious poetry) sessions as well, Deobandis are berated for allegedly not paying due respect to the Prophet of Islam. In Ashrafiya, most naaths singers are junior students, their seniors concentrating on takrirs. In naath recitations, Prophet Muhammad is understood as the saviour of the followers of the ‘true’ Islam. In these poems, Ashrafiya students implore the Prophet to save them from various secular and religious problems. The naaths frequently refer to peoples' powerlessness and to appeals to the Prophet for help.
The institution of bazm is not unique to Ashrafiya. Although the techniques and format might vary, in almost all Indian madrasas of different maslaks, it is regarded as one of the most important objectives. For instance, in madrasa Ain ul UlumFootnote 57—located in Gaya, Bihar—bazm is much more theatrical. The students here are divided into two groups—one representing Barelwis and the other Deobandis—and pose questions to each other on the understanding of Islam. Unsurprisingly, the ‘Barelwi’ group always has the upper hand since both questions and answers are written by the Barelwi teachers of the madrasa! Teachers argue that since the students are much younger than in other madrasas, they find it much more interesting to get involved in theatrical performances rather than in formal takrirs.
Since madrasas in India invariably espouse one maslaki identity or the other, bazms are crucial for imparting and reinforcing ideological differences, which cannot be sufficiently done through formal teaching alone. The performances in bazms become necessary for the ‘stylized repetition of acts’,Footnote 58 through which a maslaki identity is thoroughly internalized. The expression of this internalized ideology is visible in various posters brought out by the students of Ashrafiya. In these posters, one finds vitriolic tirades against the Deobandis, warning Barelwis to be vigilant against the lies spread by the Deobandis.Footnote 59
Conclusion
The educational practices I have discussed underscore that madrasas are primarily concerned with the production and reproduction of specific maslaki identities. I have shown how certain strategies adopted by the madrasa Ashrafiya lead to the ‘othering’ of those who are considered a threat to Islam and Muslims. Since these ‘others’ are considered dangerous precisely because of their proximity and familiarity, the process of ‘othering’ becomes important for boundary maintenance. While scholarship has shown how the Hindu Right creates the Muslim as the ‘other’,Footnote 60 processes of ‘othering’ within the Muslim community itself have hardly received any attention. I have argued that Muslims of different maslaks are considered far more dangerous to ‘true’ Islam than are non-Muslims. Hence, for a Barelwi student of madrasa Ashrafiya, it is the Deobandis who are the enemies of Islam, since they sow the seeds of confusion (fitna) in the minds of Muslims. In other words, assuming that madrasas preach hatred towards non-Muslims is erroneous.
In madrasa Ashrafiya, a combination of texts and performances produces the Deobandis as a Barelwi ‘other’. Coming from families where religious education is very rudimentary, students propagate the Islamic knowledge gained in the madrasa amongst their kin. They exhort them to pray regularly, to shun television and to encourage women to follow purdah. At the same time, they also tell their families about the Deobandis and other maslaks, and how these are misleading Muslims. As one of the students of Ashrafiya told me,
Before I came to Ashrafiya, I did not know what correct Islam was. We did not know it, but the imam of our village mosque was a Deobandi and told us not to visit shrines [sic] or take part in the birthday celebrations of Prophet Muhammad. We all believed him since he was the only Alim in the village. But now, with the grace of Allah, we have our own imam and mosque in the village and we do not pray behind a Deobandi imam. I and my uncle, who also studied in a madrasa, established this mosque with local contributions.
Certainly, not all students get the opportunity to do such ‘service in the path of Islam’, yet most of those I talked to did say that they wanted to establish their own madrasa so as to spread the light of ‘true’ Islam. Recent decades have seen an increase in the number of madrasas and madrasa graduates in India. Aided by technologies of print and audiocassettes, madrasa graduates are now in a better position to transmit their ideology to the wider Muslim community. Since the foundation of a madrasa is primarily linked with the propagation of its own maslak, I suggest that Indian Muslims will increasingly define their religious identity in terms of different maslaks.
