The role played by William of Ockham in the development of rights theory has long been a matter of considerable scholarly controversy. In the 1950s and 1960s, Michel Villey proposed that the origin of the modern (“subjective”) interpretation of ius naturale could be traced to the writings of Ockham composed during the 1330s and 1340s in response to the efforts of Pope John XXII and his successors to suppress the Franciscan doctrine of the sanctity of absolute poverty. One faction within the Franciscan Order asserted that in order to imitate Jesus to the greatest extent possible, mendicants must forgo ownership of property and that they could use such goods as were necessary for their survival (nourishment, shelter) without owning them. In other words, individuals were free to renounce personal property rights in the name of the pursuit of holiness. Thus, to the extent that it was necessary to identify the “owner” of property possessed by the Order, such goods pertained to the stewardship of an external office, specifically, the pope. While this position was initially accepted by the church, John XXII determined it to be flawed and denied that voluntary renunciation of ownership rights as distinct from mere usage was possible; for him, instead, use necessarily conferred a nonrenounceable right of ownership. In Villey's view, William of Ockham's involvement in the dispute led to the statement of a wholly novel understanding of natural rights, according to which the liberty to exercise or to renounce one's ius was a power (potestas) inhering in the human will. Once this bridge was crossed, Villey says, the entire edifice of classical “objective” natural right was doomed (a development that utterly appalled and disgusted him, as he made clear). How did Ockham achieve such a profound transformation? Villey attributed Ockham's status as “the father of subjective rights” to his embrace of the metaphysical doctrine for which he is best known, namely, “nominalism, an individualist philosophy.” By bringing his nominalist principles to bear on legal and moral problems, Ockham introduced the idea that individuals by nature possessed rights in the form of sovereign power over themselves and their external goods, something like self-proprietorship or autonomy.
Villey's account of the genesis of subjective natural rights has been challenged most extensively by Brian Tierney, who proposes an alternative interpretation of the historical record. From Tierney's perspective, the emergence of subjective rights represented not a fundamental break with the medieval worldview, but one of the greatest bequests of the Latin Middle Ages to Western civilization. Tierney attacked the two central prongs of Villey's thesis: first, that Ockham's nominalism shaped his conception of rights; and second, that Ockham's equation of ius with potestas was a wholly new and startling development that only took root because of the Franciscan controversy. Tierney amply demonstrates that ideas quite similar to Ockham's in conception and language were found widely from at least the twelfth century onwards and were especially abundant within the works of medieval canon lawyers from whom scholastic authors drew. Tierney cites passages from a plethora of texts to support the assertion that subjective natural rights discourse possessed a long and venerable lineage in medieval thought long before Ockham.
Jonathan Robinson's new book proposes a third line of interpretation of Ockham's place in the history of rights theory. Adopting the contextualist methodology of the so-called Cambridge School (17–20), Robinson engages in what he terms “a synchronic reading” (7) of Ockham's earliest contribution to the poverty controversy, the Opus nonaginta dierum (Work of Ninety Days [hereafter OND]). Robinson places the OND alongside the writings of several contemporary Franciscan authors (known as the Michaelists, after the Minister General of the Order, Michael of Cesena) who also commented on the same issues. Completed around 1332, the OND (as the title suggests) was composed rapidly as a polemical treatise against John XXII's several condemnations of the defenders of the spiritual poverty thesis. Despite the circumstances of its composition, the OND is a massive work, taking up over 900 pages, spread over two volumes, in H. S. Offler's critical edition. The story of how Ockham became involved in the poverty controversy is itself a long and interesting one, which, alas, cannot be recounted at present. But he was to spend the remainder of his life writing tract after tract denouncing the papacy (and also defending the German king and would-be emperor Ludwig of Bavaria, who became his protector).
Robinson's “synchronic” approach leads him to set the ideas of major Michaelist authors—Bonagratia of Bergamo and Francis of Marcia, as well as Michael himself—side-by-side with the doctrines espoused by Ockham. The bulk of the volume is taken up with the detailed analysis of five central terms and concepts that Robinson identifies as integral to the dispute with John XXII: ius (“right” or “law”), dominium (“lordship”), usus (“usage”), consumables, and corporate poverty. In each case, Robinson's meticulous scholarship reveals that Ockham's position adheres very closely to that of the Michaelists, with little deviation. In sum, the OND proves to be a very conventional work when judged alongside other Franciscan texts of its time. This interpretation thus confirms elements of both Villey's and Tierney's positions, while directly challenging other features. On Villey's side, Robinson demonstrates that the most immediate sources of Ockham's thinking about rights derived from the Michaelist dispute with John XXII. On Tierney's side, the idea that metaphysical nominalism had any impact upon Ockham's rights theory is decisively undermined.
Robinson's engagement not only with primary texts, but also with the massive body of secondary scholarship, is truly breathtaking. Hence, I have only a few small quibbles with his volume. First, his decision to leave all quotations in Latin, rather than to translate them into English, will certainly be off-putting to many scholars interested in the history of rights theory but lacking familiarity with the original language. Second, I was extremely surprised that Robinson made no attempt to confront another view about rights discourse—one, indeed, that also arose from the Cambridge School—namely, Richard Tuck's 1979 book Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development. There is only one reference to Tuck, in a passing footnote on page 67, which I find extraordinary give the position that he stakes out, specifically that it was John XXII, not Ockham, whose ideas presaged modern concepts of natural rights. Finally, as with Villey and Tierney, Robinson makes no effort to draw direct political implications from Ockham's (or more generally, the Michaelists's) conception of rights. As I have argued more than once, it seems to me that the crucial divide between medieval and modern principles of natural rights is the explicit recognition (as in Locke) that the conferral of subjective rights has consequences for the limitations placed on government (constitutionalism) and redress for abuses of power afforded to rights bearers. I hope that none of these (relatively minor) criticisms, however, will be taken to demean an important and profound contribution to the historical understanding of rights theory.
