Edmund Burke’s fortunes appear to be on the rise in America. A recent best-selling book, The Great Debate by Yuval Levin, points to Thomas Paine and Burke, respectively, as the inaugurators of the modern Left and Right, and reintroduces Burke to a generation of readers who might today associate the Right with Rush Limbaugh or the Tea Party. And in May of 2014, Yale’s David Bromwich published the first volume of a multivolume biography—The Intellectual Life of Edmund Burke—in which he sets out, among other things, to establish a politically complex Burke whom, he believes, the contemporary Left ought to study and embrace.
Drew Maciag’s Edmund Burke in America persuasively shows, however, that Burke has always been a figure of fascination for Americans, from the country’s earliest days to contemporary times. His book further aims to catalog how varied has been the reception of Burke in America, both—as might be expected—whether reviling or embracing his conservatism, or finding in his work resources for liberalism and reform. Maciag’s aim is finally not only to recover this complex reception and shifting understanding of Burke but to commend a more liberal and reformist Burke to his contemporaries, especially to his fellow liberals.
This aim is itself puzzling, and suggests that the author does not fully grasp the conclusion that should be drawn from his own study. For the overarching thrust of his analysis is that as a practical political matter, Burke has mattered extraordinarily and perhaps surprisingly little in American political history. Maciag’s study appears to have been prompted by his concern over the inordinate influence of Burke upon American conservatism, and what he regards as the worrisome influence of American conservatism over American politics. But if anything, his study in fact reveals that Burke has had little purchase in America, whether as a conservative or as a reformist liberal. And, I would contend, this is because America affords infertile ground not only for conservatism but even for Burke’s moderate liberalism, which finally is too cautious for a nation that has generally preferred Paine, John Locke, and John Dewey.
Maciag recounts roughly three discrete periods of American interest in Burke. The first occurs around the time of the American founding, when Burke’s commendation of the American Revolution and his condemnation of the French Revolution is a spur, especially to the more conservative-leaning John Adams, for articulating the ways Burke does, and does not, adequately grasp the American nation. Adams stressed the continuity between the British settlement of 1688 and the U.S. Constitution, implicitly appealing to a Burkean narrative of tradition and continuity. However, inasmuch as there was a “theoretical” dimension to the American founding—the main point of criticism by Burke of the French Revolution—Adams also expressed ambivalence and even outright disagreement with some of Burke’s critiques. Even the most “conservative” of America’s Founders already reflected the extent to which America was not simply a land of unexamined tradition and custom, but rather—in the words of Hamilton in Federalist 1—the result of “reflection and choice.”
The second is a long middle period—most of American history—when Burke is generally (with a few notable exceptions) vilified for his conservatism, traditionalism, and stance against progress. Reflecting the fundamental liberalism and progressivism of the American character—as Maciag suggests, America is “the Land of Paine”—Burke is barely an object of interest to Americans, especially during the long nineteenth century, except as a figure largely to be dismissed as the antithesis of the American orientation toward progress, innovation, and democracy. Maciag admirably dredges many references to Burke in journals and newspapers, but one’s overwhelming impression of this period is not how frequently Burke’s name surfaces but how peripherally. The influential European intellectuals of this period are the German idealists, decidedly not an Anglo-Irish conservative. Notably, Burke’s one deeply conservative admirer of this middle period is Rufus Choate, whose name is more likely known today because of an elite preparatory school founded by a relative, and not as a source for American self-understanding: Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, yes; Choate, largely neglected and forgotten, effectively for being on the “wrong side of history.”
The third, most recent period makes Burke’s name famous and relevant in America: the rise of the conservative movement starting in the mid-twentieth century until the present. Without this development, it is likely that Maciag might not have written this book, or certainly not in the manner in which it was written, as an effort to “recover” and commend to his fellow liberals a more reformist Burke. If his name is invoked at all today, it is because of his embrace and rehabilitation by iconic conservative figures such as William F. Buckley, Peter Stanlis, and, above all, Russell Kirk. Occurring at the same moment when Lionel Trilling declared that there was no viable conservative tradition in America, and Louis Hartz’s claim that the only tradition in America was Lockean liberalism, unexpectedly the 1950s saw the first time in American history that Edmund Burke’s conservatism not only was firmly embraced but also had a decisive role in the formation of a highly visible and successful political movement. Burke went from the periphery to the center of American intellectual life, playing a prominent role in Kirk’s best-selling manifesto of midcentury conservative formation, The Conservative Mind (2011).
Yet, arguably, far from reflecting an “organic” intellectual development, Kirk’s rehabilitation of Burke was actually quite “revolutionary”: Burke was transplanted into fairly hostile American soil by the nonpareil, Tory-sympathizing Kirk and transmuted as being simultaneously intellectually continuous with America’s founding philosophy (which even John Adams would at least partially contest) and a premodern natural law tradition (which Burke’s traditionalist historicism would suggest was at least a problematic claim). Burke was invoked to create a new tradition in America, and like many transplants, seemed at first to flourish, only to wither quickly in foreign and inhospitable soil.
As Maciag acknowledges, after a meteoric rise within the conservative movement in which he almost single-handedly developed the intellectual basis for a distinctly traditionalist American conservatism, Kirk was sidelined just as the intellectual project gave way to a political movement. As Maciag relates, “As the movement grew in size and strength, most members would reject Kirk’s [and, by extension, Burke’s] traditionalist ideals (which were Old World in character)” (p. 183). This comports with David Brooks’s assessment of the grounds for conservatism’s political success, written shortly after Ronald Reagan’s death: “Reagan transformed [Kirk’s] movement from a past- and loss-oriented movement to a future- and possibility-oriented one, based on a certain idea about America. … Reagan embraced America as a permanent revolutionary force (New York Times, 2004).” If true—and Brooks seems correct to me—the triumph of political conservatism in America was hardly an expression of Burkean caution, tradition, and mistrust of ideology. In other words, at the very moment when Burke’s relevance in America would seem finally to have been realized, it turned out that he was indigestible. Burke’s conservatism rubbed always against the American grain.
Maciag’s title, then, seems inaccurate: The theme of his book might better be captured as “Why Edmund Burke Is Not Really in America.” Burke’s reception has been mostly negative, sometimes ambivalent, and when embraced and promoted, largely sidelined—even by so-called conservatives. Which finally leaves the question: Why would the author conclude that liberals need to appropriate Burke from conservatives and recast him anew as a somewhat cautious yet mainly reform-minded Whig-liberal? Perhaps the most interesting chapters of this book are the most unexpected: The lions of American progressivism, Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, are both effusive admirers of Burke’s cautious reformism. I found these chapters more interesting than the latter ones on Burke’s ascent in modern conservatism, because they were at once surprising and revealing: Burke was embraced for providing some cautionary ballast to the ideas of early Progressive reformers, but ultimately cast as a progressive liberal whose mistrust of “abstraction” was used to critique natural rights constitutionalism. His mistrust of “ideology” was ultimately useful in rejecting conservative aspects of America’s founding ideology! But it seems to be the case that Burke had limited usefulness for this cause, once Progressive confidence in its trajectory led later figures like Dewey to reject “tradition” in the most withering and dismissive terms, making Burke finally irrelevant for the progressive cause.
Thus, in spite of Maciag’s peroration in which he calls for a liberal recasting and embrace of Burke, one wonders finally why this would be necessary when, all along, liberals have had Paine (and a plethora of other liberal heroes) who fit the bill with less baggage? And one also must conclude from Maciag’s own telling that Burke has actually had limited appeal for conservatives, for whom the call to tradition, custom, and prescription finally seem altogether foreign and even vaguely “un-American.” Notably, the most successful “conservative” intellectual current in American academia reflects the influence of Leo Strauss, who classifies Burke as one of the figures who inaugurates the “crisis” of modern Natural Right and ushers in the historicism that eventually gives rise to relativism and even can be linked ultimately to fascism. American conservatism has little time for Burke, it would seem.
Against Maciag’s own conclusions, it would thus seem the upshot of his work to be that Burke may be “in America,” but it seems he is here, if at all, on a temporary visa. His book finally tells us more about America than about Burke, and one wonders if it is not a little tragic that Burke is in fact largely a stranger to these shores.
